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In general, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs, hereafter) are 
characterised by the lack or low level of collateral and the lack of any history 
or financial track record. As a result, the problems stemming from information 
asymmetries seem to be more acute in this group of firms and access to the 
stock and debt markets is more difficult, or even impossible, to achieve. 
Without external financing, investment decisions related to growth 
opportunities are then conditioned to the available internally generated funds.  
Nevertheless, when SMEs cannot carry out investments to take 
advantage of growth opportunities, they search for financial intermediaries 
able to alleviate and manage information asymmetries. Their ambitions to 
grow as well as their needs to look for financial intermediaries change their 
attitude towards accessing external stakeholders. 
In this framework, Venture Capital (VC, hereafter) represents an 
alternative source to finance investment opportunities for newly-created firms 
with a high growth potential. These specialised investors can deal effectively 
with adverse selection and moral hazard problems, and alleviate the problems 
stemming from information asymmetries between SMEs and investors. In 
addition to the funds supplied, venture capitalists provide non-financial 
services which add value to investee firms and increase their credibility in their 
relation with the stakeholders, namely potential shareholders, creditors, 
customers and suppliers. The latter make it easier for SMEs to access 
additional financial resources, thus alleviating the investment dependency on 
internally generated funds. 
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The main aim of this research is to fill the gap in the literature about the 
role played by venture capitalists in the reduction of the natural dependency of 
SMEs on internally generated funds to finance their growth opportunities. Most 
of the studies about VC financing on SMEs focus on the determinants of the 
firm’s access to the financial resources provided for these investors as well as 
on the facts that determine the entry of venture capitalists. More recently, few 
papers focus on the investment sensitivity to cash flow in VC-backed firms and 
they obtain mixed results concerning the impact of VC funding due to 
methodological and sample selection issues. 
We conduct our analysis on a representative sample of unlisted Spanish 
SMEs that were subject to a VC deal. Even though we will also consider 
mature firms, the main focus of attention will be firms at the expansion stage, 
for which growth is an important variable and data on both the pre and post-
investment period are available.  
Two empirical exercises are carried out to test our central research 
question. First, we test if the investment-cash flow sensitivity in firms that 
later receive VC funds differs from firms without VC involvement in the period 
prior to the investor’s joining the SME. And second, we study to what extent 
venture capitalists reduce the investment dependency on cash flow of SMEs 
when that relationship in the pre and post-investment period is compared. 
In both empirical works the results confirm the existence of the 
investment dependency on cash flow in the period prior to the entry of the 
venture capitalists. Nevertheless, this investment sensitivity becomes less 
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significant in the post-investment period. These results are consistent with the 
idea that VC does reduce SME’s investment dependency on internally 
generated funds. 
Additionally, we study whether the role played by VC investors in the 
investment sensitivity depends on the stage of the investee firm at the time of 
the funding. With a different methodological approach, we test our hypothesis 
on a sample of unlisted Spanish firms that were invested in at the expansion 
or later stages. The positive and significant relationship between investments 
and cash flows found in firms at the expansion stage before the investment 
event is significantly reduced in the post-investment period. As in previous 
empirical works, these results suggest that venture capitalists do reduce firm’s 
sensitivity of investments to the internally generated cash flows. Conversely, 
investee firms at the late stage, namely buyout, did not exhibit any significant 
investment dependency before the Private Equity (PE, hereafter) deal whereas 
it becomes positive and significant after the firms are acquired by PE 
investors.  
The empirical demonstration of the investment-cash flow sensitivity in 
unlisted SMEs, as well as its reduction after the VC investment, are the main 
contributions to the literature. These findings are robust to different settings, 
and methodologies. As alternative financial intermediaries, the financial and 
non-financial services provided by venture capitalists exert a positive effect on 
the investment-cash flow sensitivity of SMEs. 
This PhD thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 1 presents a review of 
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literature outlining the financial problems found in SMEs as well as in mature 
firms, and the impact of VC and PE involvement on those groups of firms. In 
chapter 2, we describe the existing empirical framework related to the 
investment-cash flow sensitivity and the different methodological approaches 
to analyse this relationship. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 present the empirical results 
of our study. Chapter 3 provides evidence of the investment sensitivity to cash 
flow in firms belonging to the manufacturing sector prior to the entry of the 
venture capitalist. Chapter 4 illustrates the positive role played by VC on 
investee firms by testing the relationship between investments and cash flows 
on a sample of firms belonging to the technology, media and 
telecommunications (TMT), manufacturing and service sectors between the 
pre and post-investment period. In chapter 5, we apply a different 
methodology in order to identify the different role played by VC and PE 
investors. We analyse the investment-cash flow sensitivity in investee firms 
operating in low and medium technology firms, before and after the 
investment event. Finally, a discussion of the main findings and the main 
contributions to the literature are compiled in the last chapter. We also 
examine the limitations and implications of our work as well as our ideas for 
conducting further research on this topic. The process to build the dataset is 
described in the Annex. The samples of firms used in the three empirical works 
are based on that dataset. 
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1.1. INTRODUCTION 
The problems stemming from information asymmetries make it difficult, 
or even impossible, for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs, hereafter) 
to access the capital markets. As a result, most SMEs must rely on their 
owners’ wealth plus the internally generated resources to fund their 
operations. Nevertheless, the latter may not be sufficient to cover the 
investment required to develop their growth opportunities. An alternative 
financial source, such as Venture Capital (VC, hereafter), plays a critical role 
for SMEs, which would otherwise base their growth on short term debt or, 
else, forgo their growth opportunities. 
But VC represents more than a financial source for entrepreneurs (Hsu, 
2004; Chemmanur et al., 2009), with the VC institutions also providing many 
value-added services to investee firms, such as monitoring, advisory services 
and reputational capital (Sahlman, 1990; Gompers and Lerner, 1998). As 
specialised investors (Barry, 1994; Wright and Robbie, 1998; Gompers and 
Lerner, 2001; Tykvová, 2007), venture capitalists tend to closely follow the 
technology and market developments in their area of expertise. Accordingly, 
unlike traditional financial intermediaries, VC investors are actively involved in 
the investee firm (Sahlman, 1990; Gompers and Lerner, 1998; Wright and 
Robbie, 1998; Hellmann and Puri, 2000).  
The origins of VC can be traced back to the US in the mid 1940s (Bygrave 
and Timmons, 1992). Its introduction in Europe occurred almost four decades 
later and with mixed success. First, most investments performed at the early 
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stages turned out not to be as profitable as they had been in the US. Second, 
the existence of less developed stock markets in Europe gave rise to a 
substantial flow of deals in unlisted mature firms, mostly related to low and 
medium technology sectors. In most cases the purpose was to provide an exit 
for the existing shareholders, who were no longer experiencing high growth 
rates but had stable cash flows to pay back debt. In such deals the high 
returns realised were based on a combination of high leverage, an active asset 
management and a substantial strategic shakeout after having acquired a 
majority stake. The importance of these deals resulted in the emergence of a 
market in Europe dominated by Private Equity (PE, hereafter), rather than VC, 
investors.  
Notably, VC and PE play substantially different roles in investee firms. 
VC, which focuses on early stage growing firms, provides additional financing, 
alongside coaching and mentoring. PE, instead, does not usually inject 
additional funding in investee companies but, on the contrary, contributes to 
increasing their leverage. 
Building on Jensen and Meckling (1976), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Myers 
and Majluf (1984) and Jensen (1986), the aim of the chapter is to describe the 
financial problems in SMEs as well as in mature firms, and the impact of VC 
and PE involvement on both groups of firms. The rest of the chapter is 
organised as follows. The following one focuses on the finance of SMEs and the 
value-added by VC institutions in addition to the financial resources. The third 
section describes the governance issues in mature corporations and the role 
played by PE institutions in this group of firms.  
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1.2. SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES AND VENTURE CAPITAL 
1.2.1. THE FINANCING OF SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES 
The unique characteristics of SMEs, which are not considered in the 
modeling of the mature firm paradigm, could generate a different set of 
financial problems. Those different characteristics may also explain why SMEs 
could find themselves faced by the same set of financial problems that mature 
firms address, but from a different angle (Ang, 1991). Unlike mature firms, 
SMEs are characterised by the lack or limited reliability of their financial track 
record (Ang, 1991; Chittenden et al., 1996; Berger and Udell, 1998). 
Therefore, SMEs are more affected by information asymmetries in their 
relationship with external sources of capital. These problems become more 
acute due to the lack or low level of tangible assets to pledge as collateral 
(Ang, 1991; Chittenden et al., 1996; Berger and Udell, 1998).  
The problems stemming from information asymmetries, described by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers and Majluf (1984) for the equity 
market and by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) for the credit market, among others, 
imply that stakeholders do not have the same access to information. The lack 
of sufficient information to assess the quality of different investment projects 
in the firm1 (adverse selection problems), or to ensure that the funds will not 
be diverted (moral hazard problems), determines the level of risk that 
creditors and/or equity investors face. A higher level of risk is then reflected 
by a high cost of external capital. Thus, information asymmetries between 
                                                 
1  Each interest group has its own evaluation criteria (Cassar and Holmes, 2003). 
VC AND PE ON INVESTMENT-CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY OF SPANISH SMES 
CHAPTER 1: THE IMPACT OF VC AND PE INVOLVEMENT 
 24 
stakeholders and entrepreneurs condition the choice of financing between 
outside sources and internally generated funds, and, regarding external 
financing, the choice between debt and equity. Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
Myers and Majluf (1984), and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) affirm that information 
asymmetries may lead to the rejection of positive net present value 
investment opportunities in order to avoid the excessive cost of external 
financial resources. Regarding SMEs, this implies that they face additional 
difficulties to carry out investments to expand or, even, maintain their stake in 
the market.  
According to Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984), there is a 
hierarchy in the use of funds, which is based on information asymmetry, when 
additional financing is required to take advantage of growth opportunities. This 
preference reflects the relative costs of the various sources of finance. 
Initially, funding firm investments should be covered by internally generated 
funds, which are not affected by adverse selection problems. If these were not 
enough, debt would be the next option and, finally, a stock issue would be the 
last choice. In this framework, firms with high levels of internally generated 
funds may carry out their investment opportunities with no need to seek 
external finance.  
Since problems stemming from adverse selection and moral hazard may 
well be greater for SMEs (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002a; Frank and Goyal, 
2003), their ability to attract funding from traditional external sources is 
limited. In addition to highly variable returns (Carpenter and Petersen, 
2002b), the evaluation of the quality of the assets and the assessment of the 
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feasibility of investment opportunities may be difficult for suppliers of external 
funds (Fazzari et al., 1988). As a result, fast-growing SMEs usually do not 
follow the previously described hierarchy in access to external funds. Berger 
and Udell (2002) suggest that debt might be the first choice to finance 
expansion in firms where adverse selection problems dominate. Conversely, 
they argue that an external equity issue should be the first option in firms that 
are most affected by moral hazard problems. Hovakimian et al. (2001) 
consider that firms should finance growth opportunities with more equity than 
debt, and the latter more than the former should be used to finance assets. 
The access of fast-growing SMEs to bank loans (Gregory et al., 2005) 
results in high costs (Berger and Udell, 1998; Titman and Wessels, 1988; 
Wald, 1999), complex contracts (Berger and Udell, 1998; Carpenter and 
Petersen, 2002a), and the risk of credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; 
Carpenter and Petersen, 2002a and 2002b). The credit contract may allow 
banks to renegotiate the terms of the covenants. So firms face the risk of the 
bank reducing the funds provided or, even, asking for an anticipated return. 
Additionally, even for creditworthy SMEs, firms may be discouraged from 
applying for credit in the first place if they are not confident about the 
outcome of the process or, even, about the time required to receive an answer 
(Levenson and Willard, 2000). Based on the previous ideas, the extensive use 
of debt may not be appropriate for SMEs (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002a), 
and then they might be forced to turn down an investment project because 
the expected return is wiped out by a high cost of capital.  
If long term debt is not available, fast-growing SMEs are compelled to 
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rely on short term debt (Chittenden et al., 1996; Weston and Brigham, 1991). 
However, the firm’s financial position would be compromised by not being able 
to match the maturities of accounts receivable and accounts payable. 
Similarly, short term bank loans are a relatively accessible source of funds for 
fast-growing SMEs but their high cost may be impossible for entrepreneurs to 
take on. Therefore, this type of funding has a significant effect on the liquidity 
level of these firms but places its financial stability in jeopardy. Additionally, 
bank lines of credit, also known as revolving credit facilities, represent an 
alternative short term source (Riddiough and Wu, 2009) whereby banks 
closely monitor the financial situation of the firm. Conditional on that credit 
capacity, the firm chooses to invest when opportunities are available 
(Riddiough and Wu, 2009). Nevertheless, covenant violation may involve a 
restriction in the availability of credit, or even the inability to access unused 
credit (Sufi, 2009).2 
In parallel, regarding outside equity, the stock market does not constitute 
an alternative for the financing of fast-growing SMEs, since it is relatively 
expensive and, even, out of the reach of smaller firms (Ang, 1991 and 1992; 
Kadapakkam et al., 1998) outside the US. With the exception of the UK, SMEs 
cannot easily raise equity capital in Europe (Weber and Posner, 2000). In the 
US, where the equity market is more developed, high-growth entrepreneurial 
firms can raise equity finance effectively through the NASDAQ. Nevertheless, 
the cost of a new share issue involving low volumes, including underwriting 
costs, registration fees and taxes, as well as selling and administrative 
                                                 
2  On a sample of US firms, Sufi (2009) finds that a covenant violation is associated with a 15 to 
25 per cent drop in the availability of both total and unused lines of credit. 
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expenses, can be unbearable (Fazzari et al., 1988).  
Due to the difficult access to the traditional, most established sources of 
external funding, the only alternative to the internally generated funds for 
financing SMEs’ investment opportunities is private placements of shares 
subscribed by business angels and venture capitalists. Nevertheless, most 
entrepreneurs are against dilution of ownership and loss of management 
control (Holmes and Kent, 1991; Chittenden et al., 1996). Based on the 
evolution over time of entrepreneurial attitudes towards control, Cressy 
(1995) identifies two groups of entrepreneurs: Stayers and Movers. Stayers 
are conservative entrepreneurs who prefer to maintain independence at the 
expense of abandoning growth opportunities. They generally experience low 
levels of external financing. On the other hand, Movers’ preferences towards 
control evolve over time. They seem to display a strong ambition to grow, 
which in turn leads to a greater need for capital. These entrepreneurs are 
more active in searching for alternatives for financing their expansion process 
(Olofsson, 1994). As control aversion diminishes, they will progressively 
borrow to finance expansion. This group of entrepreneurs tends to exhibit high 
levels of external financing. 
Entrepreneurs with a more open attitude tend to search for financial 
intermediaries able to deal effectively with adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems (Gompers, 1995), and to alleviate the problems of information 
asymmetries between SMEs and investors (Wright and Robbie, 1998; Gompers 
and Lerner, 2001; Hsu, 2004). Hogan and Hutson (2005) and Paul et al. 
(2007) find evidence of SME stock issues being the main source of external 
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financing, rather than debt, when equity capital was supplied earlier by 
specialised investors such as venture capitalists. 
 
1.2.2. VENTURE CAPITAL INSTITUTIONS AS FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES 
VC is a form of equity financing that is currently best suited to address 
the capital market imperfections inherent in the financing of firms’ growth 
(Carpenter and Petersen, 2002b).3 In some cases, it represents the only 
potential source of financing for high-risk firms, with significant intangible 
assets, expected years of negative earnings, and uncertain prospects 
(Gompers and Lerner, 1998; Scholtens, 1999). 
In order to select the most promising firms, VC investors spend a 
significant amount of time and effort collecting private information during the 
pre-investment screening (Rajan, 1992; Admati and Pfleiderer, 1994; Reid, 
1996; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003). Fried and Hisrich (1994) find evidence 
that venture capitalists spend, on average, three weeks of full-time effort in 
the process of evaluation and closing of the deal, and that nearly 100 days are 
required to complete the whole investment process. The lack or insufficiency 
of information forces VC investors to base their evaluation on the personality 
of the entrepreneur, the uniqueness of the idea, or the structure of the market 
(Tykvová, 2007). 
                                                 
3  In general, equity financing does not require collateralisable assets nor does it increase the 
probability of financial distress (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002a and 2002b; Brown et al., 
2009); and it does not face the moral hazard problems associated with leverage (Carpenter 
and Petersen, 2002a and 2002b). 
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During the screening process, venture capitalists carefully review the 
firm’s business plan and design contracts that minimise potential agency costs 
(Gompers, 1995). In this analysis, VC investors consider the attractiveness of 
the opportunity, the risk factors, the management team, and the contract 
terms (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989). At the same time, they identify areas in 
which they could add value through monitoring and support (Kaplan and 
Strömberg, 2003). Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) provide evidence that VC 
investors explicitly consider the attractiveness and the risks associated with 
the opportunity (market, strategy, technology, customer adoption, 
competition, and management). They highlight management risk as one of the 
most common sources of uncertainty identified by venture capitalists. 
Nevertheless, Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) find that VC investors are less 
concerned about undesirable characteristics of the entrepreneurs and about 
the management team being incomplete in some sense. 
When making an investment, VC investors structure the deal and set 
appropriate incentive and compensation systems (Sahlman, 1990; Kaplan and 
Strömberg, 2003). Based on the screening, venture capitalists adjust the 
allocations of control rights, and the staging of the funds committed (Kaplan 
and Strömberg, 2003). 
As a long term financing source, VC investors usually supply funds in the 
form of equity, or quasi-equity, instruments that involve holding minority stakes 
in growing SMEs (Sahlman, 1990; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009). Additionally, 
venture capitalists do not aim to become permanent shareholders in the 
investee firms. As temporary investors, they aspire to help the entrepreneurs 
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develop their growth plans and, then, implement a successful exit.  
Considering that venture capitalists invest in high risk ventures, they 
tend to limit investment to specific areas or stages of development (Barry, 
1994), or to a limited technology, product and market range (Tyebjee and 
Bruno, 1984), with which they are familiar.  
VC activity includes a wide range of activities in firms at different stages 
of development. Although Sahlman (1990), based on Plummer (1987), 
describe eight stages of VC investing, Jeng and Wells (2000), the European 
Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (EVCA),4 The National Venture 
Capital Association (NVCA),5 among others, only describe three stages: seed, 
start-up, and expansion. Firms at the seed stage usually apply the funds 
received to finance initial product research and development and to assess the 
commercial potential of ideas. They are still at a pre-manufacturing stage. In 
the case of firms at the start-up stage, they are bringing together a 
management team, refining the business plan, and preparing to manufacture, 
distribute, and sell their products. Usually these firms need more cash than 
the amount they generate.6 Firms at the expansion stage already have their 
products in the marketplace, although they sometimes might still be 
unprofitable and need additional funds to finance the growth of their 
manufacturing and distribution capacity, as well as further Research and 
                                                 
4  Established in 1983, the European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (EVCA) 
represents the European Private Equity and Venture Capital sector and promotes the asset 
class both within Europe and through out the world (EVCA, 2007). 
5  The National Venture Capital Association (NVCA) is the leading trade association that 
represents the U.S. Venture Capital industry. 
6  Investments at either seed or start-up stage are also referred to as early stage investments 
(Jeng and Wells, 2000). 
VC AND PE ON INVESTMENT-CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY OF SPANISH SMES 
CHAPTER 1: THE IMPACT OF VC AND PE INVOLVEMENT 
 31 
Development (R&D). 
 
1.2.3. NON-FINANCIAL SERVICES PROVIDED BY VENTURE CAPITAL INSTITUTIONS 
Throughout the investment process, venture capitalists provide a variety 
of non-financial services (Hellmann and Puri, 2000), which may considerably 
increase the probability of success of VC-backed firms (Chemmanur et al., 
2009). In this way, VC investors differ from traditional intermediaries, who 
limit their involvement to providing financial resources. 
In the investment process, venture capitalists face some industry-specific 
agency problems (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2004). Eventually, entrepreneurs 
and venture capitalists’ interests may not be perfectly aligned7 and the 
monitoring is costly if performed continuously (Gompers, 1995; Wright and 
Robbie, 1998). Thus, investors structure financial contracts to provide 
incentives for entrepreneurs to behave optimally (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003 
and 2004). 
In addition to tailor-made contracts, venture capitalists employ some 
mechanisms to exercise more control over the management. Sahlman (1990) 
argues that the most common mechanisms are: the use of convertible 
securities, syndication of investment with other venture capitalists, and 
staging of capital infusions rather than a completing one-off injection of funds 
(Wright and Robbie, 1998). Many VC investments are made as purchases of 
                                                 
7  The conflict between VC investors and entrepreneurs arises because entrepreneurs have 
information that VC investors do not have and because entrepreneurs make choices that are 
not fully known by VC investors (Barry, 1994). 
VC AND PE ON INVESTMENT-CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY OF SPANISH SMES 
CHAPTER 1: THE IMPACT OF VC AND PE INVOLVEMENT 
 32 
convertible preferred stock (Sahlman, 1990), which is a more flexible 
instrument to allocate incentives to venture capitalist and entrepreneurs 
(Cumming, 2006). Nevertheless, Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) provide 
evidence of venture capitalists using combinations of multiple classes of 
common stock and straight preferred stock. Additionally, VC investors use 
‘participating preferred’ stock (Sahlman, 1990; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003), 
which is a combination of preferred stock and common stock. It guarantees 
the stakeholder a predetermined sum of cash if the firm is sold or makes an 
Initial Public Offering (IPO) (EVCA, 2007). This variant of convertible preferred 
stock is better categorised as a position of straight preferred stock and 
common stock than as a position of convertible preferred stock (Kaplan and 
Strömberg, 2003). 
Regarding syndication, it represents more than a control mechanism. It 
allows the lead venture capitalist to share the investment risks with syndicate 
partners (Lerner, 1994; Wright and Robbie, 1998). As a consequence of the 
information shared by syndicate partners, Lerner (1994), Gompers and Lerner 
(2001) and Tykvová (2007) agree that syndication also helps to reduce 
uncertainty during the selection process and improve the selection of high 
quality projects. As Lerner (1994) argues, venture capitalists are more 
comfortable with a deal when other VC investors of similar experience are 
willing to invest as well. At the same time, when many high-profile co-investors 
constitute syndication, the alliance benefits from the reputation of the members 
of the group (De Clercq et al., 2008). Therefore, multifirm alliances imply 
greater market power for VC institutions and significant certification value to the 
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investee firms which the latter helps in accessing new customers, as well as 
other financial sources and enhance the chances of securing high-reputation 
underwriters (De Clercq et al., 2006; Stuart et al., 1999). 
Even though use of convertible securities and syndication of investment 
is a strong control mechanism, Sahlman (1990) considers that staging capital 
infusions is the most powerful control mechanism that VC investors can 
employ to prevent an inefficient use of the funding provided. The capital 
invested at each point should be sufficient to push the firm to the next stage 
of its development (Tykvová, 2007). Staging capital infusions allows venture 
capitalists to provide incentives to entrepreneurs, and at the same time, to 
discipline and apply strong sanctions. Gompers and Lerner (1998) and 
Gompers (1995) examine the staging of investments and find evidence to 
support the view that venture capitalists provide more financing and a greater 
number of rounds of financing in the most successful transactions and cut off 
new financing if the information about future returns is negative. Thus, staging 
provides venture capitalists with an option to wait and not pre-commit funds. 
It also allows for the opportunity to renegotiate the terms of the agreement if 
the performance of the firm is not as expected (Gompers, 1995; Kaplan and 
Strömberg, 2003). 
Another central feature of the financial contracts is the allocation of 
control rights between the VC investors and the entrepreneurs. Frequently, 
control rights are usually separated from VC investors’ ownership rights and 
are contingent on firm performance (Tykvová, 2007). If the firm performs 
poorly, board rights, voting rights, and liquidation rights leave full control to 
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the VC investors. As performance improves, the entrepreneur retains/obtains 
more control rights. If the firm performs very well, the VCs retain their cash 
flow rights, but relinquish most of their control and liquidation rights (Kaplan 
and Strömberg, 2003). 
After investment, the VC investors spend effort and time interacting with 
the investee firm (De Clercq et al., 2008). Post-investment VC actions include 
monitoring management, finding management, raising additional financing, 
offering strategic assistance, and providing advice (Gorman and Sahlman, 
1989; Wright and Robbie, 1998; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003).  
Usually, the role of advisor played by venture capitalists implies that the 
investor takes seats on the firm’s board of directors (Gompers and Lerner, 
1998 and 2001). Lerner (1995) finds that VC investors are more likely to join 
or be added to the boards of private firms in periods when the CEO changes 
and when the need for monitoring is greater. 
The information collection process continues after the initial investment. 
As Gompers (1995) argues, the monitoring activities depend on different 
characteristics of the firm: the lower the asset tangibility, the higher the 
growth options, or the greater the asset specificity of a firm, the closer the 
monitoring required by venture capitalists. 
In addition to the monitoring role, VC investors provide support for 
building up the internal organization (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Bygrave 
and Timmons, 1992; Hellmann and Puri, 2002). They frequently replace the 
original founder as CEO (Hellmann, 1998), and assist firms in recruiting senior 
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managers (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Bygrave and Timmons, 1992; 
Chemmanur et al., 2009). Thus, the experience of VC investors in managerial 
activities implies that they may collaborate in the establishing of the optimal 
structure of the firm and participate in organizational, financial, strategic, and 
other decisions (Tykvová, 2007). 
The continuous monitoring helps venture capitalists to reduce the 
information asymmetries as well as to provide certification to outside 
stakeholders (Sahlman, 1990). Venture capitalists also contribute with a 
network of contacts with suppliers, customers, financiers and or industry 
specialists with technical expertise (Tyebee and Bruno, 1984; Sahlman, 1990; 
Bygrave and Timmons, 1992; Barry, 1994; Gompers and Lerner, 1998; 
Chemmanur et al., 2009, among others), which help the investee firm create 
strategic alliances (Stuart et al., 1999) and access to additional finance 
(Sahlman, 1990; Admati and Pfleiderer, 1994; Wright and Robbie, 1998; 
Gompers and Lerner, 2001, Tykvová, 2007). This ability to raise additional 
long term funds increases the level of liquidity of fast-growing SMEs and 
releases their investment dependency on internally generated funds far 
beyond what was expected from the direct investment made by the VC firm.  
The value-added by VC investors is positively perceived by both the 
entrepreneurs (Hsu, 2004) and the financial markets (signalling effect, e.g., 
Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Stuart et al., 1999). As Hsu (2004) argues, when 
the quality of a firm cannot be directly observed, firm outsiders rely on the 
quality of firm’s affiliates as a signal of the firm’s own quality. Thus, the 
amount of capital that a firm can raise could be less important than the quality 
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of the VC investor (Bygrave and Timmons, 1992; Sahlman, 1990) and the 
certification that the former can provide.8  
 
1.3. PRIVATE EQUITY AND LATE STAGE INVESTMENTS 
1.3.1. GOVERNANCE ISSUES IN MATURE CORPORATIONS 
To a large extent financing problems exhibited by SMEs are not usually 
found in mature firms. Since this latter group of firms is less informationally 
opaque and less risky than SMEs, the capital structure decision between equity 
and debt is subject to different determinants in both groups (Berger and Udell, 
1998; Cassar and Holmes, 2003). The relative transparency of mature firms 
(Berger and Udell, 1998) implies that they have an easier access to external 
finance than SMEs do (Berger and Udell, 2002). While SMEs only have access 
to VC, business angels and short term debt, whenever possible, mature firms 
also have access to public markets (Berger and Udell, 1998) and long term 
debt. As Cassar and Holmes (2003) point out, financing opportunities are 
naturally available for mature, more established firms, due to their longevity 
and more demanding reporting abilities. Along with a relatively longer 
operating history (Jelic et al., 2005), it is also easier to get day-to-day 
information from them than from SMEs (Kadapakkam et al., 1998). 
Mature firms are usually more diversified and have less volatile profits. 
Therefore, they bear less risk and exhibit lower probability of default (Eriotis et 
                                                 
8  In a sample of entrepreneurial start-ups with multiple financing offers, Hsu (2004) finds that 
entrepreneurs are willing to forego offers with higher valuations in order to affiliate with more 
reputable VC investors. 
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al., 2007). With stable cash flows (Jensen, 1986; Wright et al., 2001; Jelic et 
al., 2005), mature firms in a given industry easily attract financial suppliers 
and face lower transactions costs than SMEs do (Cressy, 1995; Kadapakkam 
et al., 1998).  
When the ownership of mature firms is separated from control, the 
agency theory suggests that managers may pursue pecuniary and non-
pecuniary maximising behaviours to the detriment of shareholders. In the 
presence of high free cash flow9 and few attractive investment opportunities, 
the agency problems are more severe in this group of firms (Wright et al., 
2001). This situation may affect investment and financing decisions (Wright 
and Robbie, 1998). Since payouts to shareholders reduce the funds under 
managers’ control, as well as their power and, in some cases, managers’ 
compensation (Jensen, 1986 and 1989), managers tend to retain cash flow in 
excess rather than distributing it to shareholders (Jensen, 1989). Managers 
are tempted to invest large amounts of free cash flow in low-return 
investment projects and expand firm size beyond that which maximises 
shareholder wealth (Jensen, 1986). A larger size of the firm enhances the 
social prominence, public prestige, and political power of managers (Jensen, 
1986). These investments in firm growth tend to build ‘empires’ (Aggarwal and 
Samwick, 2006) that are more likely to destroy, rather than to create, value 
(over-investment problems). 
This situation cannot be easily perceived by stakeholders when managers 
                                                 
9  Jensen (1986 and 1989) defines free cash flow as cash flow in excess of what is required to 
fund all investment projects with positive net present values. 
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finance firm projects with internally generated funds (Jensen, 1986). If the 
ownership is so broadly dispersed across large numbers of shareholders, they 
experience a loss of control over the financial resources and cannot properly 
supervise managerial performance (Demsetz, 1983). When the conflicts 
described are especially severe, a financial restructuring might disgorge cash 
to stakeholders and resolve incentive and control problems through the 
introduction of new ownership and governance structures (Scholes et al., 
2009). 
On the other hand, ownership and control issues do not represent an 
important source of conflicts in owner-managed corporations. This ownership 
structure is typically found in family businesses in which ownership and 
management are assumed by a concentrated group of family members 
(Scholes et al., 2009). Nevertheless, closely-held firms without succession 
alternatives seek outside intermediaries for subsequent stages of 
organizational growth (Wright et al., 2001). Frequently, the owner wants his 
or her firm to remain independent but has not identified a top management 
successor (Wright et al., 2001). The founders of this group of firms may 
become overly conservative over time with the aim of preserving the wealth 
created, even though the firm may have attractive growth opportunities 
(Wright et al., 2001). That excessive conservatism could be based on owners’ 
fear of losing control over the firm (Cressy, 1995) and may lead to under-
investment problems. In some cases founders may be successful at starting a 
business but lack the required skills to manage a larger and more complex 
firm (Wright et al., 2001). 
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While stakeholders of mature firms with wide ownership-control 
separation demand a financial intermediary able to deal with the agency 
problems, owners of closely-held corporations want their firms to achieve 
growth by obtaining access to more professional managers. In both situations, 
PE investors represent an efficient alternative to mitigate the destruction or 
the downside of firm value as well as to survive over time. 
 
1.3.2. PRIVATE EQUITY INSTITUTIONS AND MATURE FIRMS 
The introduction of VC institutions in Europe did not lead to similar results 
to those found in the US. By the end of the 1980s most of the amount 
invested was allocated to mature, well established firms belonging to low and 
medium technology sectors (EVCA, 1993). As a result, the use of a new term, 
namely Private Equity (PE) soon became common, representing the new 
activities performed by those specialised investors. 
PE are ‘active investors’ focused on value creation, as VC firms are, but 
they concentrate on asset, cash and leverage management in consolidated 
firms. Since value creation cannot be based on fast growth, because target 
investee firms are mature, it is based on asset management in highly-levered 
transactions performed in firms with stable cash flows. As mentioned in the 
previous section, mature firms can be affected by agency problems, when 
shareholders are dispersed, or by excessive conservatism, in closely-held 
firms. Both situations lead to sub-optimal asset allocation and capital structure 
decisions. Over-investment problems in corporations with acute agency 
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problems as well as under-investment problems in owner-managed firms may 
have negative effects on the shareholders’ wealth. These problems may 
decrease the market value of the firm as well as the return to shareholders.  
After a process of negotiation among three parties, namely PE investors, 
the management team and the incumbent owner, a firm is acquired by using a 
relatively small portion of equity and a relatively large amount of debt 
(Jensen, 1986; Kaplan, 1989; Wright et al., 2001; Kaplan and Strömberg, 
2009). In a PE deal, known as buyout, the PE funds are committed to 
purchase the existing shares of a firm, with its price showing a significant 
increase (Jensen, 1986). The acquisition is carried out through an investment 
vehicle known as Newco, where the limited equity to be used in the acquisition 
is allocated. Since not all assets could be used as collateral, part of the debt 
used is unsecured, with subordinated debt being one of the most common 
financial instruments found. After the acquisition the Newco and the target 
firm will merge, usually retaining the original name of the target firm. 
Since the PE firm buys a majority stake of an existing or mature firm 
(Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009), the substitution of debt for equity in the 
capital structure also enables greater concentration in the ownership structure 
(Thompson et al., 1992; Thompson and Wright, 1995; Wright et al., 2001). At 
the same time, PE investors retain the control of the board of directors and 
monitor managers with detailed contractual restrictions (Wright et al., 2009). 
Thus, they become ‘active investors’ involved in governance of the investee 
firm (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009), with access to comprehensive and timely 
information (Wright et al., 2009). 
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Once the acquisition is completed, PE actions include sitting on the board 
of directors, monitoring and dismissing management (whenever necessary). 
As ‘active investors’, PE managers are also involved in the long term strategy 
of investee firms and, sometimes, manage the firms themselves (Jensen, 
1986 and 1989). 
The presence of a high level of debt represents a governance and control 
device (Wright et al., 2001). After a buyout deal, the ‘overleveraging’ 
approach might have a desirable and effective economic sense for investee 
firms (Jensen, 1989) since debt restrains managers from wasting resources on 
low-return investment projects (Jensen, 1986). Their actions focus on 
analysing the assets needed to support the core business and the basic 
sources of cash flow. The firm is forced to sell off parts of the business, 
refocuses its energies on a few core operations, and rethinks its entire 
strategy and structure in order to meet the debt service payments (Jensen, 
1989; Thompson and Wright, 1995; Wright et al., 2009). Non-core assets are 
then sold to raise additional cash and reduce debt exposure. The proceeds of 
the assets sold help reduce debt to more sustainable, normal or permanent 
levels, and, at the same time, to create a more efficient and competitive firm 
(Jensen, 1986 and 1989). 
PE deals provide a mean to improve managerial and employee incentives 
to unlock dormant firm resources that may have been blocked by prior 
ownership arrangements (Wright et al., 2001). The scheme of incentives of 
managers becomes a relevant issue for PE investors since they require 
meaningful investments that maximise the value of the investee firm 
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(Thompson and Wright, 1995; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009; Wright et al., 
2009). These decisions are reinforced by the pressure of interest and principal 
payments created by leverage (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009), where asset 
management generates the needed cash (Jensen, 1986) and stimulates 
strategic change (Wright et al., 2001).   
After a buyout deal, decision rights over strategic and operating choices 
are controlled by managers (Wright et al., 2001), who frequently receive 15-
20 per cent of the equity (Jensen, 1986). The latter play an important role in 
structuring the debt to finance the buyout and in monitoring management in 
the post-buyout firm (Cotter and Peck, 2001).  
As is common in VC funds, PE funds have a limited life span, therefore, 
they are committed to sell the firms they acquire and return the money to the 
limited number of partners (Norbäck et al., 2010). As a consequence, PE 
acquisitions are organised to complete the restructuring and value creation 
process in about three to five years. Then PE managers would ideally find an 
exit though an IPO or a trade sale, which could be made to another PE firm.  
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2.1. INTRODUCTION 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the level of information 
asymmetries faced by a firm determines its access to external funds and, at 
the same time, conditions investment decisions. As a consequence, the more 
informational opaque a firm is and the lesser the existence of tangible assets it 
has, the more difficult the access to external financial resources becomes. As a 
result, investment decisions basically rely on internally generated funds. In 
this framework, the available cash flows help explain investment decisions 
(Bond et al., 2003). 
The investment-cash flow relationship, as well as an adequate and 
reliable measure to quantify it, has been the focus of many empirical works. A 
heated debate has taken place about the interpretation of the correlation 
between investment and cash flow. On the one hand, firms who are pushed to 
rely mainly on their internally generated funds are believed to be financially 
constrained by the available cash flow (Bond et al., 2003), leading to a 
positive relationship between investment and cash flow. Conversely, in some 
empirical counterexamples provided by other studies, a positive investment-
cash flow has been exhibited by firms supposedly unconstrained. On the other 
hand, a positive relationship between investment and cash flow is observed in 
firms in which opportunist managers invest the excess of cash flow on 
unprofitable projects.  
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2.2. INFORMATION ASYMMETRIES 
AS EXPLANATION OF INVESTMENT SENSITIVITY TO CASH FLOW 
In the literature, Fazzari et al. (1988) were the first to test the link 
between investment and cash flow, as a proxy of internally generated funds, 
in a sample of listed manufacturing US firms. They consider that the 
investment of a firm would be more sensitive to fluctuations in their cash flows 
if it nearly exhausted all the internal funds. Under their assumptions, one 
would expect cash flow to play a stronger role in the investment of firms 
(Vogt, 1994) that are more likely to face financial constraints (Carpenter and 
Guariglia, 2008). Based on the long-term dividend payout ratio as a proxy for 
financial constraints, Fazzari et al. (1988) classify firms into three categories: 
firms that have a dividend payout ratio below 0.1 for at least ten years, firms 
that exhibit a payout ratio below 0.2 but over 0.1 for at least ten years, and 
the rest of firms. Firms exhibiting low payout ratios will be more likely to 
suffer from capital market imperfections and, thus, to display investment 
dependency on cash flow. After controlling for growth opportunities using 
Tobin’s q, their results provide evidence of a significantly and positive 
investment-cash flow relationship, which is greater in firms with low dividend 
payout ratios. The authors conclude that the strong positive effect of internal 
funds on investment is caused by the liquidity constraints. Holding constant 
the investment opportunities, a reduction in internally generated funds would 
reduce capital expenditures in firms facing information asymmetry costs 
(Ascioglu et al., 2008). The investment-cash flow sensitivity reflects the 
difficulties of accessing external financing when compared with internal 
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financing (Hovakimian, 2009), and firms must use internally generated funds 
to finance their investments rather than paying out dividends (Moyen, 2004). 
Since the seminal work by Fazzari et al. (1988), the existence of 
investment-cash flow sensitivity has been tested as evidence of financial 
constraints in a number of subsequent empirical studies.10 Because the level of 
financial constraints faced by firms is not observable, these studies apply an 
ex-ante classification according to different characteristics (dividend payout 
ratio, size, age, ownership structure, debt rating, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) 
index, affiliation with industrial groups, and others). These criteria can be seen 
as proxies of the extent to which firms are affected by information asymmetry 
problems, which lead to difficulties in obtaining external funds (Guariglia, 
2008). 
In Hoshi et al. (1991) the sorting criterion is the membership in a bank-
centred industrial group, which is unlikely to be correlated with growth 
potential. They find that the investment-cash flow sensitivity is lower for 
member firms, which have easier access to financing due to their close ties to 
a major bank.  
Whited (1992) and Bond and Meghir (1994) extend the Fazzari et al. 
(1988) approach. Whited (1992) studies a sample of US manufacturing firms 
facing debt financing constraints because of financial distress. She finds 
evidence of a strong relationship between cash flow and investment spending 
for firms with a high debt ratio or without rated debt. Focussing on a sample 
                                                 
10  For a comprehensive survey, see Hubbard (1998). 
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of UK manufacturing firms, Bond and Meghir (1994) find that the current 
firms’ investment is positively related to lagged cash flow. 
Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) find no excess investment dependency 
on cash flow for firms with easy access to publicly traded debt, as measured 
by the existence of either a debt or commercial paper rating. When small firms 
are compared to large firms, small firms displayed higher investment-cash 
flow sensitivity.  
High investment-cash flow sensitivity is also studied by Shin and Kim 
(2002) on a sample of US manufacturing firms. In this case, they observe the 
changes in patterns of quarterly capital expenditures. Their results provide 
evidence that the investment dependency on cash flow is more evident for 
small standalone firms with small cash holdings than for diversified large firms 
with large cash holdings. Similar results are obtained by Carpenter and 
Guariglia (2008) on a sample of UK firms. They distinguish firms into more 
and less likely to face financial constraints using employees as a measure of 
size. They also find that small firms exhibit a positive relationship between 
investment and cash flow. 
As Fazzari et al. (1988), Alti (2003) use the dividend payout ratio to 
classify firms as financial constrained or not. His findings are also consistent 
with the results by Fazzari et al. (1988). After controlling for growth 
opportunities, the investment is sensitive to cash flow. This dependency is 
particularly higher for newly created, small firms with high growth rates and 
low dividend payout ratios. 
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Whited and Wu (2006) construct a new index of financial constraints 
using Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimation of an Euler equation 
of investment. The index includes firm characteristics associated with external 
finance constraints, such as size, investment opportunities, asymmetries 
information, debt capacity, and financial health.11 They provide evidence that 
firms labelled as financially constrained exhibit characteristics typically 
associated with the exposure to external finance constraints. These firms are 
usually small, have low coverage by analysts, and do not have bond ratings. 
Guariglia (2008) studies, both jointly and separately, the effects of 
‘internal’ financial constraints (availability of internal funds) and ‘external’ 
financial constraints (access to external finance) on firms’ investment. The 
large panel of financial data on UK firms, of which over 99 per cent are not 
listed in the stock market, covers the period 1993-2003. Internal financial 
constraints are measured by firms’ cash flow and coverage ratio, and external 
financial constraints are measured by firms’ size and age. Their results 
suggest that the sensitivity is particularly large when external constraints are 
strong and internal constraints are weak. Thus, investment by successful 
recently established, small firms may be significantly constrained by the 
access to external finance. 
More direct measures of information asymmetries from the 
microstructure literature are used by Ascioglu et al. (2008) to assess the 
                                                 
11  In addition to the natural logarithm of assets, as a measure of firm’s size, Whited and Wu 
(2006) include sales growth and industry sales growth in the index as proxies of investment 
opportunities, analyst coverage as indicator of asymmetric information, both the firm-level 
and industry-level debt to assets ratios, and other four variables of financial health (ratio of 
cash flow to total assets, positive-dividend indicator, ratio of liquid assets to total assets, and 
Fama and French (2002) factors on market, size and book-to-market). 
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sensitivity of investment to cash flow. The first reference, relative effective 
spread, is a simple measure of information asymmetries, whereas the price 
impact of a trade and the probability of informed trading are more refined 
measures. Using these measures of informational problems, listed US firms of 
the sample are classified into three categories: definitely constrained, possibly 
constrained, and not constrained. The results suggest that firms with high 
information asymmetries have greater investment dependency on cash flow, 
especially when they use the probability of informed trade to classify firms as 
constrained.  
Hovakimian and Hovakimian (2009) explore the differences in the 
dynamics of investment and financing methods of US firms across periods of 
high and low cash flows. The firm’s investment-cash flow sensitivity is 
calculated as the difference between the cash flow-weighted time-series 
average investment of a firm and its simple arithmetic time-series average 
investment. Their results provide evidence of investment-cash flow sensitivity 
in firms that face financial constraints, but the severity of these constraints 
varies across the cash flow cycle. Firms whose investments are sensitive to 
cash flow invest less in low cash flow years, while they invest more in high 
cash flow years. The constraints are binding in low cash flow periods when the 
shortage of internally generated funds is exacerbated by lower availability of 
external capital. 
The study of investment dependency to cash flow has been extended to 
different areas. Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) analyse Research and 
Development (R&D) investment sensitivity to cash flow. Their findings provide 
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evidence of a significant relationship between R&D expenditures and internal 
finance. As a consequence of information asymmetries, which are more likely 
to exist in this type of investment, firms face a difficult access to external 
finance. Therefore, cash flow represents an important determinant of 
investments in both tangible and intangible assets. 
Finally, Carpenter and Petersen (2002) analyse if the growth of firms is 
often constrained by the quantity of internal finance in a panel of small 
manufacturing firms. They find evidence that most small firms that retain all of 
their income and raise relatively little external finance exhibit a strong 
relationship between growth12 and internal finance. These results suggest that 
the growth of most small firms is constrained by internal finance, together 
with a small leverage effect. In contrast, the small fraction of firms that makes 
heavy use of new share issues exhibit growth rates far above what can be 
supported by internal finance. The relationship between growth and internal 
finance is weak in these firms, suggesting a relaxation of the internal finance 
constraints. 
Contrary to the findings by Fazzari et al. (1988), and subsequent studies, 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) consider that sensitivity of investment to cash 
flow should not be taken as evidence of financial constraints. They disagree on 
the interpretation of low dividend payout ratios as being a signal of financial 
                                                 
12  Unlike Fazzari et al. (1988) and most of the subsequent literature, in the Carpenter and 
Petersen (2002) regression the dependent variable is the growth rate of the firm, and not the 
fixed investment ratio commonly used. Firm growth is measured by the log change in total 
assets. By examining the growth of total assets, the authors pretend to capture a broad 
range of activities undertaken by the firm: As firms grow, they expand not only their physical 
capital, but also gross working capital (such as inventories, cash and equivalents, and 
accounts receivable). 
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constraints. They argue that the firm’s dividend policy is a choice of managers 
since they could choose to pay low dividends or not. From a subset of firms in 
the sample used by Fazzari et al. (1988), Kaplan and Zingales (1997) pre-
classify firms as financially constrained or not using both quantitative and 
qualitative information and then test the sensitivity between investment and 
cash flow. They find that investments in firms with lower financial constraints 
exhibit more sensitivity to changes in cash flow. They argue that the 
investment dependency on cash flow might not increase monotonically with 
the level of cash flow, making an average sensitivity difficult to interpret. 
Kaplan and Zingales (2000) later argue that investment-cash flow sensitivity 
can (at least partially) be caused by an excessive conservatism of managers.13 
The contributions by Kadapakkam et al. (1998), Cleary (1999, 2006), and 
Hovakimian (2009) support the findings of Kaplan and Zingales (1997). 
Kadapakkam et al. (1998) examine the degree to which the relationship 
between investment and cash flow is affected by size in six OECD countries 
(Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Japan and the United States). They 
examine firms in each country and find that internally generated resources 
affect firm investment in all six countries, as argued by Fazzari et al. (1988). 
Nevertheless, when the sample is sorted using three measures of firm size, 
the investment-cash flow sensitivity is generally highest in the large firm size 
group and smallest in the small firm size group.  
Cleary (1999) finds results that are similar to those found in Kaplan and 
                                                 
13  Fazzari et al. (1997) consider that the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) approach is inconsistent 
because the small sample is not heterogeneous enough and firms are classified as financially 
constrained or not using a fairly subjective set of criteria. 
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Zingales (1997) in a diversified sample of US firms. He classifies the firms 
based on an index that estimates the strength of a firm’s financial position. 
This index combined a number of financial variables strongly related to firms’ 
internal funds. His results suggest that the investment decisions of firms with 
a stronger financial position are much more sensitive to the availability of cash 
flow than those that are less creditworthy. Later, Cleary (2006) provides new 
findings on an international framework that also support the approach by 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997). The sample includes firms from Australia, 
Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the UK, and the US. His results suggest that 
firms with stronger financial positions are more investment-cash flow sensitive 
even after controlling for size and dividend payout. In addition, after 
controlling for size and financial strength, higher payout firms exhibit much 
more investment dependency to cash flow than lower payout firms.  
Without relying on an ex-ante classification of the sample into 
constrained and unconstrained groups, Hovakimian (2009) examines the 
determinants of investment-cash flow sensitivity on a sample of US 
manufacturing firms. She uses firm-level estimates of investment-cash flow 
sensitivity to classify firms into groups with high, low, and negative cash flow 
sensitivity.14 The results suggest that firms classified as negative cash flow 
sensitive have the lowest cash flows, highest growth opportunities, and appear 
as the most financially constrained. Otherwise, cash flow insensitive firms 
have the highest cash flows, lowest growth opportunities, and appear the least 
                                                 
14  A set of characteristics that reflect the severity of the firms' financial constraints, their 
internal liquidity, growth opportunities, and their investment and financing behaviour is 
examined for each investment-cash flow sensitivity category. 
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financially constrained. 
Based on listed US firms, the empirical results of Cleary et al. (2007) are 
consistent with both Fazzari et al. (1988) and Kaplan and Zingales (1997) 
approaches. They demonstrate that the measures used to classify firms as 
constrained or not are relevant to test the investment dependency to cash 
flow. When firms are classified based on information asymmetries indexes, the 
degree of information asymmetries increases the investment-cash flow 
sensitivity. On the other hand, when firms are classified based on their 
internal funds, firms with negative or low cash flow exhibit negative 
investment sensitivity to cash flow. 
 
2.3. DIFFERENT METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO ANALYSE THE 
INVESTMENT-CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY 
The standard approach to test the investment dependency on cash flow is 
based on the traditional model of investment for firms suffering from capital 
market imperfections. This idea is expressed through the Q model of 
investment. This investment model includes both Tobin’s q, as a proxy for the 
availability of investment opportunities, and cash flow, as a measure of 
internally generated funds.  
The Q model of investment requires assumptions under which the 
unobserved shadow value of capital is simply related to the observed firm’s 
market value or Tobin’s q (Bond and Van Reenen, 2007). Thus, this approach 
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is based on the idea that market valuation of firm’s assets is an important 
determinant of investment. The model allows relating the influence of 
expectations on current investment decisions (Bond and Van Reenen, 2007). 
The typical specification of the Q model of investment is: 
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where Ii,t measures the level of investments of firm i in period t; Ki,t is the end-
of-period-t net value of firm i’s invested assets; CFi,t is firm i’s cash flow in 
period t; Qi,t represents the value of Tobin’s q at the beginning of the period 
and is defined as the market value of equity and debt less the value of 
inventories divided by the replacement cost of capital stock, adjusted for 
corporate and personal tax considerations. In addition to the conventional 
fixed-effects, within-group estimator, the Q model of investment is estimated 
using lagged Tobin’s q as an instrument for Tobin’s q, and using first 
differences and second differences to address measurement-error problems 
(Fazzari et al., 1988). The conceptual advantage of this framework in 
modelling the effects of internal finance on investment is that Tobin’s q 
controls for the market’s evaluation of the firm’s investment opportunities 
(Fazzari et al., 1988). Since marginal investment opportunities are hard to 
measure, investment-cash flow sensitivity may be observed even in 
frictionless markets for reasons other than financial constraints (Hovakimian 
and Hovakimian, 2009). 
Since the market value of firms is difficult to estimate (Bertoni et al., 
2008), the Q model of investment is applicable only to listed firms. In the case 
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of unlisted firms, growth opportunities are measured in different ways in the 
literature. As Titman and Wessels (1988) point out, the percentage change in 
total assets is used as an indicator of growth. The growth in assets is a direct 
measure of current investment and, if investment is persistent, it is also a 
proxy for expected investment (Fama and French, 2002). Nevertheless, this 
measure is could be more representative of past growth. Another indicator of 
the growth opportunities is the ratio of R&D to total assets (Fama and French, 
2002).15 Since R&D expenditures generate future investment, this ratio is 
considered as a proxy for expected investment (Titman and Wessels, 1988; 
Fama and French, 2002). Based on the previous ideas, Michaelas et al. (1999) 
and Manigart et al. (2003) include intangible assets ratio as measure of 
growth opportunities. 
Since Tobin’s q is also affected by measurement errors (Erickson and 
Whited, 2000),16 Abel and Blanchard (1988) introduced the sales accelerator 
model.17 This model is based on the traditional acceleration principle, which 
links the demand for capital goods to the level or change in a firm’s output or 
sales (Fazzari et al., 1988). In this model it is assumed that investment grows 
along with total sales, with the latter being a measure of a firm’s output 
(Manigart et al., 2003). Thus, sales are a proxy for growth in product demand 
and future profitability (Kadapakkam et al., 1998). The accelerator effect 
comes from contemporary and lagged values for sales included in the model:  
                                                 
15  Titman and Wessels (1998) defined the R&D ratio as quotient between R&D expenditures and 
sales. 
16  Even in the absence of financing frictions, Alti (2003) and Moyen (2004) provide evidence of 
the measurement errors and identification problems, which lead to significant investment-
cash flow sensitivity. 
17  This approach is also analyzed by Fazzari et al. (1988) in their seminal work. 
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where Ii,t measures the level of investments of firm i in period t, Ki,t is the end-
of-period-t net value of firm i’s invested assets, ∆Si,t (∆Si,t-1) is the current 
(lagged) one-year change of the logarithm of sales , and CFi,t is firm i’s cash 
flow in period t. 
The sales accelerator model is estimated using the first-difference GMM 
estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). This technique takes 
unobserved firm heterogeneity into account by estimating the equation in 
first-differences, and controls for possible endogeneity problems by using 
variables lagged two or more periods as instruments (Manigart et al., 2003; 
Guariglia, 2008). In this estimation procedure, explanatory variables could be 
treated as strictly exogenous, predetermined or endogenous (Engel and 
Stiebale, 2009): the explanatory variables are uncorrelated with all 
realizations of the error term, only correlated with past realizations of the 
error term or, correlated with present shocks, respectively. 
The sales accelerator model has been applied by Manigart et al. (2003), 
Guariglia (2008), and Engel and Stiebale (2009). Manigart et al. (2003) use it 
to test the investment-cash flow sensitivity in a panel of unlisted Belgian firms. 
More recently, the model estimated by Guariglia (2008) to study the 
investment-cash flow sensitivity of UK firms18 includes both present and 
lagged logarithms of real sales as regressors. Similarly, the empirical model is 
applied by Engel and Stiebale (2009) in a panel of French and British firms at 
                                                 
18  Over 99 per cent of sample firm are unlisted on the stock market. 
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the expansion and buyout stages. The accelerator effect on investment is also 
considerer by Hoshi et al. (1991). The regressions estimated include lagged 
production19 to reflect an output accelerator effect on investment. 
Some studies combine the Tobin’s q and sales accelerator models in 
order to control for the effect of sales growth on investment expenditures. This 
technique has been applied by Kadapakkam et al. (1998), Shin and Kim 
(2002), Cleary et al. (2007) and Wei and Zhang (2008). In those cases, they 
regress investment on lagged sales, among other control variables.  
The sales accelerator model has the advantage of allowing to explicitly 
separate the specification of long run determinants of investment from short 
run adjustment and expectation lags (Mairesse et al., 1999). However, the 
model does not incorporate the relative price of capital or capital services in 
the empirical specification (Fazzari et al., 1988). 
As in the sales accelerator model, the Euler investment equation 
approach (Bond and Meghir, 1994) does not rely on the Tobin’s q to estimate 
growth opportunities. In this model, the level of investment is considered as a 
function of the discounted expected future investment adjusted for the impact 
of the expected changes in the input prices and net marginal output (Manigart 
et al., 2003). The model is represented by the following equation: 
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where Ii,t measures the level of investments of firm i in period t, Ki,t is the end-
                                                 
19  Hoshi et al. (1991) define production as sales plus the change in final goods inventories. 
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of-period-t net value of firm i’s invested assets, CFi,t is firm i’s cash flow in 
period t, Si,t is firm i’s sales during period t and Di,t is firm i’s end-of-period-t 
total debts. The Euler equation approach is applied by Whited (1992), Bond 
and Meghir (1994), Alti (2003), Whited and Wu (2006), and Bertoni et al. 
(2008), among others.  
The Euler equation approach governs the firm’s decision on how much to 
invest today relative to investment tomorrow (Whited and Wu, 2006). 
Additionally, this approach has the advantage of allowing an assessment of the 
effects of debt (Whited, 1992). However, since the Euler equation approach is 
restricted period-to-period (Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995), the model is 
unable to detect constraints when firms are as constrained today as they are 
in the future (Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995; Almeida and Campello, 2007).  
The most widely-used technique to estimate the Euler as well as the 
Sales Accelerator equations is GMM estimation. The use of GMM estimation 
allows us to explicitly model endogeneity between covariates and the 
investment rate (Bertoni et al., 2008). There are two alternative approaches, 
namely two step System-GMM (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 
1998) and Difference-GMM (Arellano and Bond, 1991). The System-GMM 
estimator is more efficient and less affected by weak instruments, especially 
when the dependent variable displays high persistence (Bertoni et al., 2008; 
Engel and Stiebale, 2009). Therefore, our empirical analyses will be based on 
that approach. 
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2.4. AN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION: 
AGENCY PROBLEMS AND JENSEN’S (1986) FREE CASH FLOW THEORY 
A positive relationship between investment and cash flow could arise in 
the presence of agency conflicts between shareholders and managers. In the 
case of managers’ interests not being perfectly aligned with the interests of 
shareholders, Jensen’s free cash flow hypothesis (1986) maintains that the 
existence of substantial free cash flow could be an incentive for managers to 
increase the firm’s size beyond the optimal. Managers tend to invest the 
excess of internally generated funds in unprofitable investment opportunities 
rather than paying out those funds in the form of dividends (Vogt, 1994). The 
opportunistic behaviour by managers could be explained by pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary benefits of an increase in firm size. Based on the 
manager/shareholder agency problems, Kadapakkam et al. (1998) explain 
their empirical results. They affirm that managers of large firms tend to 
expand firm’s size whenever internal funds are available. 
Using a sample of US manufacturing firms, Vogt (1994) tests whether the 
investment-cash flow sensitivity is caused by information asymmetries or, 
else, by managerial overinvestment of free cash flow. Their results suggest 
that the investment behaviour of large firms is consistent with Jensen’s (1986) 
free cash flow hypothesis. These firms exhibit low Tobin’s q values and follow 
low-dividend-payout policies. In the case of small firms, the low investment 
level could be explained by information asymmetries. They exhibit high Tobin 
q values and maintain low-dividend-payout policies. 
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Additional support of the free cash flow hypothesis is provided by Pawlina 
and Renneboog (2005), who analyse a large sample of UK-listed firms. Their 
findings support the Jensen’s free cash hypothesis as the main source of the 
firm investment dependency on cash flow. They conclude that this magnitude 
depends on insider ownership in a non-monotonic way. 
The empirical results of Wei and Zhang (2008), which are based on East 
Asian emerging markets before the Asian financial crisis, are also in line with 
the free cash flow hypothesis. They find that the sensitivity of a firm's capital 
investment to its cash flow decreases as the cash flow rights of its largest 
shareholders increase. At the same time, this sensitivity is positively 
associated with the divergence between the control rights and cash flow rights 
of the firm's largest shareholders, particularly among firms with lower returns 
on assets. 
In conclusion, either if it is caused by information asymmetries or by 
agency problems, as Pawlina and Renneboog (2005) argue, the existence of a 
positive firm investment dependency on internally generated funds is 
confirmed in the literature. It remains to be determined under which 
circumstances it is related the liquidity constraints. 
 
2.5. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF INVESTMENT-CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY AFTER 
VENTURE CAPITAL AND PRIVATE EQUITY FINANCING 
There are few empirical works that assess the role of Venture Capital 
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(VC, hereafter) and Private Equity (PE, hereafter) financing in the investment 
dependency on cash flow of investee firms. The controversy found in the 
finance literature is also present in the VC and PE field because the results 
found are mixed.  
Manigart et al. (2003) empirically test the role that VC investors play 
alleviating the investment sensitivity to cash flow in newly established and 
mature, Belgian unlisted firms. The sample includes VC-backed firms, which 
received VC funds between 1987 and 1997, and a comparable group of non-
VC-backed firms. Using an unbalanced panel data, the relationship is tested 
with a modified sales accelerator model that is estimated using the first-
difference GMM methodology. Manigart et al. (2003) find that the investment-
cash flow sensitivity in Belgian unlisted firms is not reduced, but it rather 
increases, when firms received VC funds. This dependency is higher for VC-
backed firms than for their non-VC-backed counterparts, particularly in 
recently created VC-backed firms. Their results are not in line with the 
expected role played by VC, which would relieve investee firms from their 
previous investment dependency on cash flow. Nevertheless, there are two 
possible explanations for the unexpected outcome of their study. First, most of 
their post-investment observations are concentrated on a period when most 
firms were suffering from financial constraints due to the economic crisis that 
started in the early nineties. Second, the investments performed in Europe are 
far more diverse across stages of development than those found in the US. 
Therefore, the mixed results found could be explained by the differential 
situations of firms at different stages of development. 
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Bertoni et al. (2008) assess whether VC financing influences the 
investment dependency on cash flow in Italian new-technology-base firms, 
also analysing if this effect depends on the type of VC investor involved. Two 
types of investors are considered: independent VC funds and corporate VC 
investors. The sample includes unlisted Italian firms, both VC- and non-VC-
backed, over the 10-year period starting from 1994 (or since their founding) 
to 2003. They estimate an Euler equation and apply a two-step System-GMM. 
After receiving VC financing, Bertoni et al. (2008) observe that firms exhibit 
low and statistically not significant investment-cash flow sensitivity. They also 
find an increase in the level of investment when the investor involved is an 
independent VC firm. Conversely, in firms backed by a corporate VC institution 
investment remains sensitive to shocks in cash flow, indicating that 
investment sensitivity to cash flow is not removed. For non-VC-backed firms, 
the findings provide evidence of a significant investment dependency on cash 
flow, particularly for the smaller ones. 
More recently, Engel and Stiebale (2009) study the impact of VC and PE 
investors on investment-cash flow sensitivity in British and French firms over 
the period 1998-2007. They rely on a sales accelerator model that is 
estimated by Difference-GMM techniques using lagged levels of the regressors 
as instruments. Engel and Stiebale (2009) provide evidence that British and 
French investee firms display higher investment levels and a lower 
dependence on internal funds after expansion financing. Nevertheless, they 
also find that buyouts financed by PE firms are neither associated with a 
decrease in investment spending nor with an increase in the dependence on 
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cash flow. While investments and sensitivity in buyout firms are not 
significantly different from those of non-PE-financed firms in France, in the UK 
the results are similar to those found in firms at the expansion stage, with PE-
buyouts showing greater investment rates and lower dependency on cash 
flows. The authors argue that the difference between France and the UK 
depends on the different targets of buyouts and on supply-side conditions. 
Certain characteristics like financial soundness, growth opportunities and 
attitudes of the owners or the management can be different in both countries. 
Additionally, size and structure of PE markets in France and UK differ. 
Particularly, the UK history of financing buyouts is remarkably longer than that 
of the French market. 
The findings of Bertoni et al. (2008) and Engel and Stiebale (2009) on 
investment-cash flow sensitivity before VC/PE financing are in line with those 
of Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995), Shin and Kim (2002), Carpenter and 
Petersen (2002), Whited and Wu (2006), Carpenter and Guariglia (2008), and 
Hovakimian (2009), among others. The impact of cash flow on investment 
spending is greater for smaller firms, where the problems of information 
asymmetry become more acute. On the other hand, mature, large firms with 
high level of cash flow, and lower growth opportunities exhibit no significant 
dependence between investments and cash flows.  
In the following chapters we aim to test that dependency before and after 
VC/PE involvement in Spanish firms over the period 1995-2007. We will also 
consider a one-by-one matched sample of firms that did not attract VC/PE 
investors as a control group. 
VC AND PE ON INVESTMENT-CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY OF SPANISH SMES 
CHAPTER 2: AN OVERVIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF INVESTMENT TO CASH FLOW 
 73 
2.6. REFERENCES 
Abel, A. and Blanchard, O. (1988) ‘Investment and sales: Some empirical 
evidence’, in Barnett, W.A.; Berndt, E.R. and White, H. (Ed.), Dynamic 
econometric modelling, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK). 
Almeida, H. and Campello, M. (2007) ‘Financial constraints, asset tangibility, and 
corporate investment’, Review of Financial Studies, 20(5): 1429–1460. 
Alti, A. (2003) ‘How sensitive is investment to cash flow when financing is 
frictionless?’, The Journal of Finance, 58(2): 707-722. 
Arellano, M. and Bond, S. (1991) ‘Some tests of specification for panel data: 
Monte Carlo evidence and an application to employment equations’, 
Review of Economic Studies, 58(2): 277-297.  
Arellano, M. and Bover, O. (1995) ‘Another look at the instrumental variables 
estimation of error-components models’, Journal of Econometrics, 68(1): 29–51. 
Ascioglu, A.; Hegde, S.P. and McDermott, J.B. (2008) ‘Information asymmetry 
and investment-cash flow sensitivity’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 
32(6): 1036-1048. 
Bertoni, F.; Colombo, M. G. and Croce, A. (2008) ‘The effect of Venture Capital 
financing on the sensitivity to cash flow of firm’s investments’, European 
Financial Management, forthcoming. 
Blundell, R. and Bond, S.R. (1998) ‘Initial conditions and moment restrictions 
in dynamic panel data models’, Journal of Econometrics, 87(1): 115–143. 
VC AND PE ON INVESTMENT-CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY OF SPANISH SMES 
CHAPTER 2: AN OVERVIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF INVESTMENT TO CASH FLOW 
 74 
Bond, S.; Elston, J.A.; Mairesse, J. and Mulkay, B. (2003) ‘Financial factors 
and investment in Belgium, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom: A 
comparison using company panel data’, Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 85(1): 153-165. 
Bond, S.R. and Meghir, C. (1994) ‘Dynamic investment models and the firm’s 
financial policy’, The Review of Economic Studies, 61(2): 197–222. 
Bond, S.R. and Van Reenen, J. (2007) ‘Microeconometric models of investment 
and employment’, in Heckman, J.J. and Leamer, E.E. (Ed.) Handbook of 
econometrics, Volume 6, Elsevier, Amsterdam. 
Carpenter, R. and Guariglia, A. (2008) ‘Cash flow, investment, and investment 
opportunities: New tests using UK panel data’, Journal of Banking and 
Finance, 32(9): 1894-1906. 
Carpenter, R.E. and Petersen, B.C. (2002) ‘Is the growth of small firms 
constrained by internal finance?’, Review of Economics and Statistics, 
84(2): 298–309. 
Cleary, S. (1999) ‘The relationship between firm investments and financial 
status’, The Journal of Finance, 54(2): 673–692. 
Cleary, S. (2006) ‘International corporate investment and the relationships 
between financial constraint measures’, Journal of Banking & Finance, 
30(5): 1559–1580. 
Cleary, S.; Povel, P. and Raith, M. (2007) ‘The U-shaped investment curve: 
VC AND PE ON INVESTMENT-CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY OF SPANISH SMES 
CHAPTER 2: AN OVERVIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF INVESTMENT TO CASH FLOW 
 75 
Theory and evidence’, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 
42(1): 1-39. 
Engel, D. and Stiebale, J. (2009) ‘Private Equity, investment and financial 
constraints: Firm–level evidence for France and the United Kingdom’ (July 
23, 2009). Ruhr Economic Paper No. 126. URL (consulted January, 
2010): http://ssrn.com/abstract=1438037. 
Erickson, T. and Whited, T. (2000) ‘Measurement error and the relationship 
between investment and q’, Journal of Political Economy, 108(5): 1027-1057. 
Fama, E.F. and French, K. (2002) ‘Testing Trade–Off and Pecking Order 
predictions about dividends and debt’, The Review of Financial Studies, 
15(1): 1–33. 
Fazzari, S.M.; Hubbard, R.G. and Petersen, B.C. (1988) ‘Financing constraints 
and corporate investment’, Brooking Papers on Economic Activity, 
1998(1): 141–206. 
Gilchrist, S. and Himmelberg, C. (1995) ‘Evidence on the role of cash flow for 
investment’, Journal of Monetary Economics, 36(3): 541-572. 
Guariglia, A. (2008) ‘Internal financial constraints, external financial 
constraints, and investment choice: Evidence from a panel of UK firms’, 
Journal of Banking & Finance, 32(9): 1795-1809. 
Himmelberg, C.P. and Petersen, B.C. (1994) ‘R&D and internal finance: A 
panel study of small firms in high-tech industries’, The Review of 
VC AND PE ON INVESTMENT-CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY OF SPANISH SMES 
CHAPTER 2: AN OVERVIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF INVESTMENT TO CASH FLOW 
 76 
Economics and Statistics, 76(1): 38-51. 
Hoshi, T.; Kashyap, A. and Scharfstein, D. (1991) ‘Corporate structure, 
liquidity, and investment: Evidence from Japanese industrial groups’, The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(1): 33-60. 
Hovakimian, A. and Hovakimian, G. (2009) ‘Cash flow sensitivity of 
investment’, European Financial Management, 15(1): 47-65. 
Hovakimian, G. (2009) ‘Determinants of investment cash flow sensitivity’, 
Financial Management, 38(1): 161–183. 
Hubbard, R.G. (1998) ‘Capital-market imperfections and investment’, Journal 
of Economic Literature, 36(1): 193-225. 
Jensen, M.C. (1986) ‘Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and 
takeovers’, American Economic Review, 76(2): 323-329. 
Kadapakkam, P., Kumar, P. and Riddick, L.A. (1998) ‘The impact of cash flows 
and firm size on investment: The international evidence’, Journal of 
Banking & Finance, 22(3): 293-320. 
Kaplan, S. and Zingales, L. (1997) ‘Do investment-cash flow sensitivities 
provide useful measures of financing constraints?’, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 112(1): 169-215. 
Kaplan, S. and Zingales, L. (2000) ‘Investment-cash flow sensitivities are not 
valid measures of financing constraints’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
115(2): 707-712. 
VC AND PE ON INVESTMENT-CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY OF SPANISH SMES 
CHAPTER 2: AN OVERVIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF INVESTMENT TO CASH FLOW 
 77 
Mairesse, J.; Hall, B.H. and Mulkay, B. (1999) ‘Firm-level investment in France 
and the United States: An exploration of what we have learned in twenty 
years’, Annales d'Économie et de Statistique, (55/56): 27-67. 
Manigart, S.; Baeyens, K. and Verschueren, I. (2003) ‘Financing and 
investment interdependencies in unquoted Belgian firms: The role of 
Venture Capital’, in Butzen, P. and Fuss, C. (Ed.) Firms’ investment and 
finance decision, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham (UK). 
Michaelas, N.; Chittenden, F. and Poutziouris, P. (1999) ‘Financial policy and 
capital structure choice in U.K. SMEs: Empirical evidence from firm panel 
data’, Small Business Economics, 12(2): 113–130. 
Moyen, N. (2004) ‘Investment-cash flow sensitivities: Constrained versus 
unconstrained firms’, Journal of Finance, 59(5), 2061-2092. 
Pawlina, G. and Renneboog, L. (2005) ‘Is investment-cash flow sensitivity 
caused by agency costs or asymmetric information? Evidence from the 
UK’, European Financial Management, 11(4): 483–513. 
Shin, H. and Kim, Y.H. (2002) ‘Agency costs and efficiency of business capital 
investment: Evidence from quarterly capital expenditures’, Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 8(2): 139-158. 
Titman, S. and Wessels, R. (1988) ‘The determinants of capital structure 
choice’, The Journal of Finance, 43(1): 1–19. 
Vogt, S. (1994) ‘The cash flow/investment relationship: Evidence from U.S. 
VC AND PE ON INVESTMENT-CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY OF SPANISH SMES 
CHAPTER 2: AN OVERVIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY OF INVESTMENT TO CASH FLOW 
 78 
manufacturing firms’, Financial Management, 23(2): 3-20. 
Wei, K. and Zhang, Y. (2008) ‘Ownership structure, cash flow, and capital 
investment: Evidence from East Asian economies before the financial 
crisis’, Journal of Corporate Finance, 14(2): 118-132. 
Whited, T.M. (1992) ‘Debt, liquidity constraints, and corporate investment: 
Evidence from panel data’, The Journal of Finance, 47(4): 1425-1460. 
Whited, T.M. and Wu, G. (2006) ‘Financial constraints risk’, Review of Financial 
Studies, 19(2): 531-559. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
INVESTMENT-CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY IN 
SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES 
AT THE EXPANSION STAGE* 
                                                 
*  A first version of this work was presented in the ‘9th Global Conference on Business & 
Economics 2009’ (Cambridge-UK, October 2009) and in the ‘I Jornadas de Investigación 
sobre la Pequeña y Mediana Empresa e Iniciativa Empresarial’ (Madrid, December 2009), in 
which it was awarded the ‘Quality Mention’. We would like to thank Pedro Martínez-Solano 
(Universidad de Murcia) and Rukhsana Kalim (University of Management and Technology) 
for their helpful comments and Álvaro Tresierra Tanaka for his research assistance 
(Universidad de Piura). 
VC AND PE ON INVESTMENT-CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY OF SPANISH SMES 
CHAPTER 3: INVESTMENT-CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY IN SMES AT THE EXPANSION STAGE 
 80 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
Given that access to external funding of a firm depends upon a greater or 
lesser presence of the problems stemming from asymmetrical information, it is 
to be expected that mature firms with a long financial history and a significant 
amount of fixed assets will not experience restraints in obtaining funding. The 
characteristics of this group of firms, as far as size and the availability of 
information are concerned, make it easier for them to access funds provided 
by capital markets. Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs, hereafter), on 
the contrary, suffer constraints when attempting to obtain financial resources 
to fund growth because public information concerning their history and 
financial track record is lacking, as are assets to put on the table as collateral. 
With no access to the stock market, SMEs attempt to obtain funding from 
debt markets to finance growth opportunities. Nevertheless, debt markets 
provide resources at a high cost (Berger and Udell, 1998; Titman and Wessels, 
1988; Wald, 1999), demand a fair amount of assets as collateral, and require 
complex contracts (Berger and Udell, 1998; Carpenter and Petersen, 2002a) 
which in some cases are difficult, or even impossible, for SMEs to take on. 
As a consequence, constraints in obtaining financial resources force SMEs 
to fund their expansion through funds coming from people surrounding the 
entrepreneurs, such as family and friends (Ang, 1991), and internally 
generated resources (Paul et al., 2007). Nonetheless, the latter may not be 
sufficient, thus highlighting their problems in financing growth opportunities.  
As regards those limitations faced by SMEs, venture capitalists may play 
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a critical role in funding their expansion. Their financial limitations are 
lessened not just by the resources directly supplied by the venture capitalist. 
The presence of these specialised investors also adds value to the firm, which 
may materialise in different ways (Sahlman, 1990; Hellmann and Puri, 2002; 
Chemmanur et al., 2009; among others), and is positively assessed by 
entrepreneurs (Hsu, 2004). For the purposes of this chapter, a key 
contribution of venture capitalists is the increased credibility of SMEs in their 
relation with third parties, such as potential shareholders, creditors, customers 
and suppliers, making it easier for them to negotiate financial terms and 
conditions. 
In this context, the period prior to the venture capitalist’s joining the firm 
is characterised by investment decisions being conditioned to the available 
resources, basically represented by internally generated funds. The 
relationship between investment and cash flow, as a proxy for internally 
generated funds, is interpreted by Fazzari et al. (1988) and later studies as 
evidence of the presence of financial constraints. However, Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997) raised the discussion about investment sensitivity to cash flow 
being a signal of financial constraints in firms which, due to their 
characteristics, have easy access to external finance. The controversial aspect 
of these contributions focuses on the discussion regarding the pre-
classification of firms as financially constrained or not, when all firms 
considered in both articles were listed.  
This pre-classification issue is addressed in this chapter by selecting a 
sample of unlisted SMEs at the expansion stage that were subject to a Venture 
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Capital (VC, hereafter) deal and a one-by-one matched sample of similar non-
VC-backed firms. We aim to measure the sensitivity between investment and 
cash flow in those firms prior to the entry of the venture capitalist. In this 
way, the aim is also to compare whether what was suggested by Fazzari et al. 
(1988) is true or not; or whether, on the contrary, the relationship they 
establish is not important in explaining the existence of financial constraints.  
We conduct our analysis on a representative sample of unlisted Spanish 
SMEs belonging to the manufacturing sector. Firms that received VC between 
1995 and 2007 are analysed, tracing them back to at least three years before 
the entry of the investor.  
The results confirm that the existence of financial constraints in firms 
from the sample is linked with the investment-cash flow sensitivity. In the 
same direction, an increase in long term debt has a positive effect on 
investment. This circumstance, also detected in firms without VC involvement, 
albeit with lower coefficients, stresses the justification for searching for other 
external sources of funds, such as VC, to continue taking advantage of growth 
opportunities.  
The main contribution of this study to the literature is the empirical 
demonstration of the financial constraints suffered by SMEs as a determining 
factor in the quest for an alternative source of external funding, such as VC. 
Secondly, from a sample of firms which are presumably subject to financial 
constraints, new evidence is provided on the sensitivity of investment to 
changes in cash flow, as hypothesised by Fazzari et al. (1988). Similarly, it 
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must be stressed that it is the first work about this issue carried out in firms 
before receiving VC, and we are aware that only Manigart et al. (2003), 
Bertoni et al. (2008), Guariglia (2008), and Engel and Stiebale (2009) have 
ventured forth into this analysis for unlisted firms, albeit with a different 
approach.  
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 focuses on the 
problems on the financing of SMEs and on the debate about the interpretation 
of the correlation between investment and cash flow and presents our 
hypotheses. Section 3.3 includes the description of the sampling process and 
the methodology used, whilst the results are presented in the fourth section. 
Finally, the main findings are highlighted and discussed in the fifth section.  
 
3.2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
3.2.1. FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS FACED BY SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES 
The problems stemming from information asymmetries, described by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers and Majluf (1984) and Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981), among others, imply that interest groups in the firm do not have the 
same access to information. The lack of sufficient information to assess the 
quality of different investment projects in the firm as well as the quality of 
management in making investment decisions determines the level of risk that 
creditors and/or equity investors face. The level of risk is then reflected by a 
high cost of capital, plus the requirement of additional collateral and/or the 
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limitation of the amounts supplied.  
According to Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984), when additional 
financing is required there is a hierarchy in the use of funds which is based on 
information asymmetry. Whenever possible, funding a firm should be covered 
by internally generated funds, which are not affected by adverse selection 
problems. If these were not enough, debt would be the next option, with stock 
issues something to be avoided, since the risk associated with the latter is 
greater than that of debt. Thus, firms with high levels of internally generated 
funds will not have such a strong need to seek external finance. This occurs in 
the presence of considerable financial slack (Myers and Majluf, 1984). The 
availability of cash and/or liquid assets enables the firm to take advantage of 
growth opportunities with no need to access external funds.  
In the particular case of SMEs, problems stemming from information 
asymmetries are acute (Ang, 1991; Carpenter and Petersen, 2002a). Beyond 
the shareholders’ motivation of avoiding ownership becoming diluted and their 
desire to keep control of the business, the growth and survival of SMEs are 
affected by various issues. Among others we could highlight the following 
(Ang, 1991; Chittenden et al., 1996; Berger and Udell, 1998): hidden 
information, the lack or low level of collateral and the lack of any history or 
financial track record to characterise them. The evaluation of the quality of 
assets and investment opportunities by suppliers of external funds may be 
difficult (Fazzari et al., 1988), so obtaining resources to finance SMEs growth 
is limited to certain funding sources. From the entrepreneur’s point of view, if 
stock issues are compared with debt, the original stockholders will tend to 
VC AND PE ON INVESTMENT-CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY OF SPANISH SMES 
CHAPTER 3: INVESTMENT-CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY IN SMES AT THE EXPANSION STAGE 
 85 
prefer the latter, since they are against dilution of ownership and loss of 
management control (Holmes and Kent, 1991; Chittenden et al., 1996; López-
Gracia and Aybar-Arias, 2000). Additionally, the stock market does not 
constitute an alternative for SME financing, since it is relatively expensive and, 
even out of reach for smaller firms (Ang, 1991 and 1992; Kadapakkam et al., 
1998). 
On the other hand, information asymmetry problems in the SMEs’ access 
to bank loans (Gregory et al., 2005) and the lack of collateral (Chittenden et 
al., 1996) result in high costs (Berger and Udell, 1998; Titman and Wessels, 
1988; Wald, 1999) and complex contracts (Berger and Udell, 1998). The firm 
could then be forced to turn down an investment project because the expected 
return is wiped out by a high cost of capital. The latter could make firm growth 
dependent on the internally generated funds available. 
Since long term debt is, generally, out of reach for SMEs, short term debt 
becomes the only feasible alternative (Chittenden et al., 1996). Regarding 
commercial credit, SMEs must find a proper matching between the maturity of 
the cash conversion period and the maturity of accounts payable. On the other 
hand, short term bank loans could also be accessed by SMEs, albeit at a high 
cost. Additionally, SMEs’ future viability would be conditioned by the bank’s 
willingness to renew short term credit lines over time. As a result, funding 
growth basically with short term debt increases the likelihood of the firm 
suffering most from any external shock in the economy or in the financial 
system.  
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In spite of the ideas of Myers and Majluf (1984), Hogan and Hutson 
(2005) and Paul et al. (2007) find evidence of SMEs’ main source of external 
financing being stock issues rather than debt when equity capital is supplied 
by specialised investors such as venture capitalists. Unlike other financial 
intermediaries, venture capitalists can alleviate the problems of information 
asymmetries and provide funds that the SMEs cannot obtain from other 
sources (Gompers and Lerner, 2001). At the same time they add value to the 
firms they are investing in (Sahlman, 1990; Gompers and Lerner, 1998; Jain, 
2001; Hellmann and Puri, 2002; Chemmanur et al., 2009; among others). The 
likelihood of losing independence and control of the firm is offset by the 
benefits provided by external funding (Paul et al., 2007). Opportunities for 
growth are favoured not only by the arrival of financial resources, since 
choosing a good investor adds value to the firm (Hsu, 2004). Additionally, this 
source of finance would not require collateral. 
 
3.2.2. THE SENSITIVITY OF INVESTMENT TO CASH FLOW AS A 
MEASURE OF FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS 
When the access to external funds to attain further firm growth is difficult 
then the firm’s future development is limited to internally generated funds. In 
this line, Fazzari et al. (1988) argue that a positive relationship between 
investment and internally generated funds signals the existence of financial 
constraints. They analyse the relationship on a sample of US listed firms, 
which are classified as financially constrained or not on the basis of the 
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dividend payout ratio. Their work is based on a model relating investment to 
available cash flow, with Tobin’s q being a proxy of the firm’s growth 
opportunities. Their results show that investment in firms with low dividends 
shows greater sensitivity to available cash flow. 
To test the existence of investment-cash flow sensitivity as evidence of 
financial constraints, a number of subsequent empirical studies follow the work 
of Fazzari et al. (1988). Because the level of financial constraints is not 
observable, these studies categorised firms according to characteristics such 
as dividend payout (Moyen, 2004), size or age (Vogt, 1994; Gilchrist and 
Himmelberg, 1995), availability of debt rating (Whited, 1992), ownership 
structure (Pawlina and Renneboog, 2005), affiliation with industrial groups 
(Hoshi et al., 1991), cross-country comparison (Kadapakkam et al., 1998; 
Bond et al., 2003), and other firm characteristics. 
Higher investment-cash flow sensitivity is also observed in firms that are 
new or small (Shin and Kim, 2002; Carpenter and Petersen, 2002a; Carpenter 
and Guariglia, 2008; Hovakimian and Hovakimian, 2009); independent firms, 
as opposed to firms affiliated with industrial groups (Hoshi et al., 1991; Shin 
and Park, 1999); firms with high growth rates and low dividend pay-out ratios 
(Alti, 2003); firms with high debt ratio or a high interest coverage ratio, or 
without rated ratio (Whited, 1992); firms with low probability of informed 
trading (Ascioglu et al., 2008); and firms in high-tech sectors (Carpenter and 
Petersen, 2002b).20  
                                                 
20  For a comprehensive survey, see Hubbard (1998). 
VC AND PE ON INVESTMENT-CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY OF SPANISH SMES 
CHAPTER 3: INVESTMENT-CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY IN SMES AT THE EXPANSION STAGE 
 88 
Contrary to the findings of Fazzari et al. (1988), and subsequent studies, 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) consider that sensitivity of investment to cash 
flow should not be taken as evidence of financial constraints, and a firm’s 
dividend policy is a choice variable since firms could choose to pay low 
dividends or to pay out more. From a subset of firms in the sample used by 
Fazzari et al. (1988), Kaplan and Zingales (1997) pre-classify firms as 
financially constrained or not using both quantitative and qualitative 
information and then test the sensitivity between investment and cash flow. 
They find that investments in firms with lower financial constraints exhibit 
more sensitivity to changes in cash flow. They argue that investment 
dependency on cash flow might not increase monotonically with the level of 
cash flow, making an aggregate sensitivity difficult to interpret. Kaplan and 
Zingales (2000) argue that investment-cash flow sensitivity could (at least 
partially) be caused by excessive conservatism on the part of managers.21 The 
contributions of Devereux and Schiantarelli (1990), Kadapakkam et al. (1998), 
Cleary (1999 and 2006), Almeida and Campello (2007), and Hovakimian 
(2009) support the findings of Kaplan and Zingales (1997). 
In spite of the controversy regarding the validity of the approach by 
Fazzari et al. (1988), it is still accepted in the literature as a valid way of 
analysing financial constraints (Pawlina and Renneboog, 2005).  
Given the information asymmetries that external investors face when 
deciding about the funding of SMEs, we anticipate a positive and significant 
                                                 
21  Fazzari et al. (1997) argue that the approach of Kaplan and Zingales (1997) is inconsistent 
because the small sample is not heterogeneous enough to support meaningful conclusions, 
and, furthermore, firms are classified as financially constrained or not using a fairly subjective 
set of criteria.  
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relationship between investment and internally generated cash flows in those 
firms. Accordingly, our first hypothesis would stand as: 
Hypothesis 3.1:  SMEs exhibit a positive relationship between cash flow and 
investment. 
Since VC firms are able to reduce the information asymmetries in SMEs, 
we anticipate that those suffering most from the inability to obtain external 
funding would then approach VC. In this line, we also anticipate that the 
investment-cash flow sensitivity should be greater in firms that later receive 
VC in the period prior to the entry of the venture capitalist. Therefore, our 
second hypothesis would be as follows. 
Hypothesis 3.2:  SMEs that later receive VC show a greater investment 
dependency on cash flow than similar firms that do not profit 
from that source of external equity. 
The empirical evidence on investment-cash flow sensitivity in VC-backed 
firms is limited. Manigart et al. (2003) study the investment dependency on 
cash flow in unlisted Belgian VC-backed firms and a matched sample of non-
VC-backed firms. They do not find a significant reduction in the investment-
cash flow sensitivity in the group of VC-backed firms. Their results could be 
affected, however, by the lack of distinction of firms across stages of 
development. Another factor influencing the results could be the concentration 
of post-investment observations in a period after the economic downturn of 
the early nineties, when banks were more reluctant to grant credit to SMEs. 
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Bertoni et al. (2008) analyse the investment-cash flow sensitivity in 
unlisted Italian new-technology-based firms. They find that both VC- and non-
VC-backed technology-based firms exhibit a positive relationship between 
investment and cash flow, which is reduced in the former due to VC 
involvement. More recently, Engel and Stiebale (2009) also find that VC 
contributes to the reduction in investment sensitivity to cash flow in a sample 
of UK and French firms at the expansion stage. 
Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to test 
whether the dependency of investment to cash flow before the VC investment 
event is greater in firms that later receive VC than in similar growing firms 
that do not have access to that source of funding. 
 
3.3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3.3.1. THE SAMPLING PROCESS 
The presence of investment-cash flow sensitivity in SMEs that were later 
financed by venture capitalists is tested on a sample of Spanish manufacturing 
SMEs22 at the expansion stage. The period of analysis includes VC investments 
performed between 1995 and 2007. 
In accordance with the data obtained from the Spanish Private Equity and 
Venture Capital Association (ASCRI), 2,651 VC investments were recorded in 
                                                 
22  SMEs are defined according to the European Union criteria. A SME provides work for fewer 
than 250 employees and has an annual turnover not exceeding 50 million Euros or total 
assets not exceeding 43 million Euros. 
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Spain in that period, including all stages but excluding the financial and real 
estate sectors. Finding information on these was possible in the case of 2,230 
firms on the AMADEUS Database, which records information on 1,202,363 
Spanish firms. 757 of them were at the expansion stage23 at the time of the 
initial VC investment.  
In order to have sufficient information about the pre-investment period, 
413 firms which did not have at least three years of accounting data before 
the initial VC investment were dropped from the sample. We also restrict 
sectoral heterogeneity by focusing on the manufacturing sector. The previous 
process reduced the sample to a total of 168 firms, accounting for 22 per cent 
of the population, even though some of them have missing data about some 
variables. 
To test the investment-cash flow sensitivity as a common characteristic 
of SMEs, 168 firms with no VC funding and comparable one-by-one with the 
previously identified firms were selected. Comparable firms were randomly 
chosen from the AMADEUS Database, matching the sector, by means of the 
NACE Rev2 code (4-digit code), the number of employees, the revenues, the 
asset volumes, and the age, whenever possible, in the year before the initial 
VC investment performed, as well as its location in a geographical area with a 
similar level of development, when possible. 
 
                                                 
23  Firms at the expansion stage are defined by EVCA (2007) as operating firms that require 
financing for growth, and which may or may not be breaking even or trading profitably. 
According to NVCA (2009), these firms are characterised by a complete management team 
and a substantial increase in revenues. 
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3.3.2. METHODOLOGY 
According to Fazzari et al. (1988) the presence and importance of 
financial constraints in the firms analysed depends on the relationship between 
investment, as the dependent variable, and internally generated resources and 
growth opportunities, as independent variables. Investment refers to the 
formation or net increase of capital. Changes in fixed assets are interpreted as 
a reflection of conscious decision-making by the managers (Kadapakkam et 
al., 1998). 
Regarding the independent variables, the capacity to generate resources 
internally is proxied by cash flow. Given the limited access to external finance, 
the firm’s capability of taking advantage of growth opportunities might be 
heavily dependent on cash flow.  
Originally, Fazzari et al. (1988) used the Market-to-Book ratio as a proxy 
of growth opportunities, because their sample records data from listed firms. 
This ratio has the advantage of incorporating market judgment regarding the 
future profit-generating capability of the firm (Kadapakkam et al., 1998; 
Andrés-Alonso et al., 2000), which could then reduce the difficulties found in 
accessing additional finance. On the contrary, if growth opportunities are not 
very promising, access to external funding is limited. Vogt (1994) finds 
evidence that the latter happens in firms with low Tobin q ratios.  
We do not have any listed firms in our sample for which we could obtain 
a market value. Therefore, regarding the numerator, we could estimate 
market values by applying average EBITDA multiples selected from merger 
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and acquisitions (M&A). The multiples obtained would then be used to 
estimate the market values of the firms in the sample, all of them unlisted and 
with no observable market value. As a result, it would be possible to have a 
market value estimate for each firm analysed that changes over time. 
Nevertheless, since this reference is based on the firm’s EBITDA, the result 
would be highly correlated with a key independent variable: cash flow. As a 
result, we use the EBITDA multiple alone as a measure of the aggregate shifts 
in economic prospects. 
We also add a dummy variable to the original approach by Fazzari et al. 
(1988), which takes the value 1 when the firm receives a VC investment. 
Additionally, we include the interaction between this latter variable and cash 
flow to test whether firms that later receive VC exhibit a different investment-
cash flow sensitivity when compared with the non-VC ones. Likewise, other 
variables are added to control for size, age and the geographical location of 
the firm. The model, which would also incorporate time dummies, would be 
represented as follows: 
Iit = β0 + β1CFit + β2EBITDAit + β3Sizeit + β4Agei + β5Ri +  
β6VCi + β7VCi*CFit + εit 
(3.1) 
where i is the firm’s indicator and t is a time indicator, which is set to 0 in the 
year of the initial VC investment for both the firm that later receives VC and 
the one-by-one matched control group firm. The investment variable (Iit) is 
given by the ratio of the difference between the book value of the net fixed 
assets of the firm in year t and t-1 plus the depreciation expenditure of the 
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year t (Morgado and Pindado, 2003; Pawlina and Renneboog, 2005; Bertoni et 
al., 2008), divided by the beginning-of-period-t total assets of the firm i. Cash 
flow (CFit-1) is measured by the ratio of the firm’s net earnings in year t plus 
the depreciation of the firm’s assets in year t-1 (Carpenter and Petersen, 
2002a; Shin and Kim, 2002) divided by the beginning-of-period-t total assets 
of the firm i.  
Regarding EBITDA multiples, the source of information is the 
Mergermarket Database, from which 2,887 complete M&A in non-financial 
Spanish firms for the period 1992-2007 are taken. From this sample, a 
random selection is made of at least one deal per sector and year. In parallel, 
the accounting information is extracted for each of the selected acquired firms 
to calculate the EBITDA multiple of the transaction. The source of accounting 
information is the AMADEUS Database. This operation is repeated for all the 
Mergermarket Database subsectors, and an average of the EBITDA multiples 
for each of the years being studied is calculated. 
We also control for size, age, and location of the firm. Sizeit is measured 
by the natural logarithm of the total number of employees of the firm in the 
period t and Ageit is measured by the age of the firm at the period t. The 
variable Ri is a dummy taking value 1 if the firm is located in a region of Spain 
with per capita income below 75 per cent of the European Union average 
(Objective 1 region), or zero otherwise. VCi takes value 1 if the firm receives 
VC funding in the following years, or 0 otherwise.  
The previous model can be completed to control for the effect of leverage 
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on investment. As Lang et al. (1996) argue, a relation should exist because 
high leveraged firms might not be able to take advantage of growth 
opportunities. Thus, Hovakimian (2009) follows this approach and, as well as 
Lang et al. (1996), measures leverage using the total debt ratio. Following 
Hovakimian (2009), there may be diverse effects from the interaction of 
leverage with available cash flows. Low debt levels may be interpreted as a 
signal of financial constraints and, at the same time, as evidence of limited 
access to funds provided by borrowers. However, high levels of debt reduce 
future available cash flow for investment. 
Nevertheless, we find that SMEs mostly rely on short term debt rather 
than on long term debt. Furthermore, most of the short term debt is 
represented by commercial debt, namely accounts payable. Since our purpose 
is to measure long term investment sensitivity to cash flow, the controlling 
role of debt should be played by long term debt. In this case, the model to be 
estimated is the following: 
Iit = β0 + β1CFit + β2EBITDAit + β3LTDit + β4Sizeit + β5Agei + β6Ri +  
β7VCi + β8VCi*CFit + εit 
(3.2) 
where LTDit-1 is the ratio between the long term debt and the total assets, both 
at the beginning of year t.  
The use of the estimated EBITDA multiples found in M&A, however, might 
not properly represent market value multiples in our sample, which only 
includes unlisted firms. A further extension is applied in the two models 
outlined above introducing intangible assets as an alternative approach to 
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control for growth opportunities. Fama and French (2002) argue that Research 
and Development (R&D) expenditures generate future investments, thus, they 
indicate the growth potential of firms (Manigart et al., 2003). Therefore, 
following Michaelas et al. (1999) and Manigart et al. (2003), we use the 
volume of intangible assets as a proxy of growth opportunities.24 Intangible 
assets (Intangit) are defined by the ratio between net intangible assets of the 
firm i in year t, and the beginning-of-period-t total assets of the firm i. Table 
3.1 summarises the definition of the variables to be used.  
TABLE 3.1. 
DEFINITION OF THE VARIABLES 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
Iit Increase in book value of net fixed asset plus depreciation divided by beginning-
of-period total assets. 
CFit Net earnings plus depreciation divided by beginning-of-period total assets. 
EBITDAt Average EBITDA multiple for the period. 
Intangit Intangible fixed assets normalised by beginning-of-period total assets. 
LTDit Total long term debt divided by the beginning-of-period total assets. 
Sizeit Natural logarithm of total the number of employees of the firm i in the period t. 
Agei Age of the firm i at the period t. 
VCi Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm was subject to a VC investment in 
the following years. 
Ri Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm is located in a region classified as 
Objective 1. 
 
Since our data refer to time series observations on a number of unlisted 
firms, the panel data methodology will be employed to estimate the models. 
                                                 
24  Titman and Wessels (1988) introduce the percentage of change in total assets as an 
alternative measure of growth opportunities. Nevertheless, this measure could be more 
representative of past growth (Balboa et al., 2009). 
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Regarding the estimation method, some papers have discussed whether the 
individual effects should be treated as fixed or random variables. However, 
this is not an important distinction because we can always treat the individual 
effects as random variables without loss of generality (Mundlak, 1978; 
Arellano and Bover, 1990). Furthermore, one of the variables of interest in this 
analysis is the dummy that represents whether the firm later receives VC. If a 
fixed effect approach is employed, all variables with constant values over time 
are dropped from the analysis. From a different perspective, since the model is 
tested on a representative sample of unlisted firms, with and without VC 
involvement, the results would not change if a given individual were randomly 
replaced by another. 
 
3.3.3. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 3.2 shows the descriptive statistics for the whole sample, for the 
subsample of firms that later receive VC backing and for the subsample of 
firms which do not have any VC involvement. All ratios are winsorised at the 2 
per cent threshold. All accounting information is shown in constant 2005 Euro 
using the Harmonised Consumer Price Index as deflator. Accounting 
information includes data from 1991 to 2007.  
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TABLE 3.2.  
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE VARIABLES  
FOR THE SAMPLE OF MANUFACTURING UNLISTED SPANISH SMES  
(PRE-INVESTMENT PERIOD)  
VARIABLES OBSERVATIONS FIRMS MEAN STD. DEVIATION 
Investment     
All firms 2,046 336 0.1181*** 0.1967 
VC-backed firms 1,048 168 0.1348*** 0.2110 
Non-VC-backed firms 998 168 0.1006*** 0.1789 
Difference 2,046 336 0.0343*** 0.0086 
Cash flow     
All firms 2,046 336 0.0976*** 0.0861 
VC-backed firms 1,048 168 0.0930*** 0.0836 
Non-VC-backed firms 998 168 0.1024*** 0.0884 
Difference 2,046 336 -0.0094**** 0.0038 
EBITDA multiple     
All firms 2,342 336 6.0302*** 1.7304 
VC-backed firms 1,195 168 6.0159*** 1.7182 
Non-VC-backed firms 1,147 168 6.0451*** 1.7436 
Difference 2,342 336 -0.0292**** 0.0716 
Intangible assets     
All firms 2,046 336 0.0559*** 0.0886 
VC-backed firms 1,048 168 0.0664*** 0.0959 
Non-VC-backed firms 998 168 0.0449*** 0.0788 
Difference 2,046 336 0.0215*** 0.0039 
Debt     
All firms 2,046 336 0.7904*** 0.3564 
VC-backed firms 1,048 168 0.8531*** 0.3600 
Non-VC-backed firms 998 168 0.7246*** 0.3405 
Difference 2,046 336 0.1286*** 0.0155 
Short term debt     
All firms 2,046 336 0.6331*** 0.2935 
VC-backed firms 1,048 168 0.6732*** 0.3021 
Non-VC-backed firms 998 168 0.5909*** 0.2781 
Difference 2,046 336 0.0824*** 0.0128 
Long term debt     
All firms 2,046 336 0.1512*** 0.1601 
VC-backed firms 1,048 168 0.1723*** 0.1606 
Non-VC-backed firms 998 168 0.1290*** 0.1566 
Difference 2,046 336 0.0433*** 0.0070 
The table reports descriptive statistics on winsorised (2% each tail) values of the variables. Except Market value and 
EBITDA multiple, all variables are normalised by using beginning-of-period-t stock of total assets. We test the null 
hypothesis that means are equal between VC-backed and Non-VC-backed groups assuming unequal variance. ***, ** and 
* indicate, respectively, significance levels <1%, <5% and <10%. 
On average, the investment ratio of firms that were subject to VC 
backing later is relatively high compared to that for firms without VC 
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involvement (0.1348 against 0.1006). Even though both groups include 
growth firms, the greater investment ratio found in firms that later receive VC 
might be a sign of the faster expansion process of this latter group, which 
triggers the need to obtain external funds. Conversely, the cash flow ratio for 
non-VC-backed firms (0.1024) is, on average, greater than that of firms which 
become VC-backed later (0.0930), with the difference being significant at the 
10 per cent level.  
Regarding the proxies to control for growth opportunities, the market 
value reference estimated is not significantly different between firms that later 
receive VC and the control group. Nevertheless, the average of intangible 
assets stands at 0.0664 in the former, which is significantly greater than the 
0.0449 found in the latter.  
Regarding debt, we also find significant differences between both groups, 
which may also be interpreted as a signal of the greater need to access 
external equity to fund further growth. Firms that later receive VC are more 
levered than those belonging to the control group, with total debt ratio 
representing 0.8531 of total assets. The reference in the control group is 
estimated at 0.7246 of total assets. Regarding long term debt, firms that were 
later subject to a VC investment exhibit a higher ratio than control group 
firms, with the values being 0.1723 and 0.1290 of total assets, respectively.  
Interestingly, both groups of firms show high levels of short term debt, 
with the group of firms which are not subject to a VC investment later showing 
a greater share of short term rather than long term debt. When we compare 
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short and long term debt in both groups, we find that, on average, short term 
debt represents 80.32 per cent of total debt in firms that later receive VC, 
whereas it accounts for 84.14 per cent in the group without VC-backing. 
Pairwise correlations among all variables are reported in Table 3.3.  
TABLE 3.3.  
CORRELATION MATRIX 
 CASH FLOW 
EBITDA 
MULTIPLE 
INTANGIBLE 
ASSETS 
LONG  
TERM DEBT 
CASH FLOW -1.0000*    
     
EBITDA 
MULTIPLE -0.0168* -1.0000*   
  0.4488    
INTANGIBLE 
ASSETS -0.2753* -0.0214* -1.0000*  
  0.0000  0.3339   
LONG  
TERM DEBT -0.0959* -0.0311* -0.2646* 1.0000 
  0.0000  0.1597  0.0000  
The table reports pairwise correlations among all independent variables. The variables are: (1) Cash flow: net 
earnings plus depreciation divided by beginning-of-period total assets; (2) EBITDA multiple: average EBITDA 
multiple for the period; (3) Intangible assets: intangible fixed assets normalised by beginning-of-period total 
assets; (4) LTD: total long term debt divided by the beginning-of-period total assets. * indicates significance 
levels of <10%. 
 
3.4. RESULTS 
Table 3.4 shows the results obtained from the estimation of the models 
specified for the whole sample. As expected, all the models provide evidence 
of a positive, significant relationship between available cash flow and 
investment, thus verifying our Hypothesis 3.1. According to Fazzari et al. 
(1988), this circumstance would be signalling the presence of financial 
constraints in firms in the sample, although significant differences seem to 
appear in the two groups being analysed.  
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TABLE 3.4. 
REGRESSION RESULTS OF THE  
INVESTMENT-CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY  
FOR THE FULL SAMPLE OF UNLISTED SPANISH SMES  
(PRE-INVESTMENT PERIOD) 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE: INVESTMENT 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
WITHOUT THE EFFECT OF  
LONG TERM DEBT 
WITH THE EFFECT OF  
LONG TERM DEBT 
CFit 0.5099*** 0.4788*** 0.4691*** 0.4615*** 
 (0.1087) (0.1086) (0.0979) (0.0990) 
EBITDAit 0.0069***  0.0049***  
 (0.0077)  (0.0068)  
Intangit  0.4733***  0.1414*** 
  (0.0820)  (0.0849) 
LTDit   0.6167*** 0.5951*** 
   (0.0479) (0.0524) 
Sizeit -0.0234*** -0.0204*** -0.0201*** -0.0194*** 
 (0.0074) (0.0069) (0.0067) (0.0066) 
Agei -0.0018*** -0.0015*** -0.0008*** -0.0007*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Ri 0.0006*** 0.0125*** -0.0073*** -0.0035*** 
 (0.0140) (0.0134) (0.0125) (0.0121) 
VCi 0.0188*** 0.0065*** -0.0054*** -0.0083*** 
 (0.0171) (0.0162) (0.0169) (0.0165) 
VCi*CFit 0.2329*** 0.2311*** 0.2209*** 0.2206*** 
 (0.1198) (0.1156) (0.1215) (0.1209) 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept 0.1438*** 0.1458*** 0.0537*** 0.0756*** 
 (0.0548) (0.0320) (0.0475) (0.0301) 
Nº observations 2,028 2,029 2,028 2,029 
Nº groups 335 335 335 335 
The table reports Generalised Least Squares, random effects, estimation of the model. The 
dependent variable is the ratio between investments (i.e. increase in net fixed assets of the 
firm i in year t plus depreciation in year t) and beginning-of-period total assets of the firm. 
The independent variables are: (1) CFit-1: net earnings plus depreciation divided by 
beginning-of-period total assets; (2) EBITDAit: average EBITDA multiple for the period; (3) 
Intangit: intangible fixed assets normalised by beginning-of-period total assets; (4) LTDit-1: 
total long term debt divided by the beginning-of-period total assets; (5) Sizeit: natural 
logarithm of total the number of employees of the firm i in the period t; (6) Agei: age of the 
firm i at the period t; (7) Ri: dummy variable indicating firms located in Objective 1 region; 
(8) VCi: dummy variable indicating firms in the VC-backed group (i.e. 0 for firms in the 
control group). All ratios are winsorised at the 2% threshold. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate, respectively, significance levels of <1%, 
<5% and <10%. 
Regarding our proxies measuring growth opportunities, the EBITDA 
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multiple is not significant in any of the models, either with or without debt. 
This finding might be caused by the inability of the measure to estimate the 
market value of these unlisted firms. Nevertheless, when growth opportunities 
are proxied by intangible assets, the coefficient of this variable is positive and 
significant. Since our sample firms are not traded on the stock market, this 
latter measure could be more representative of their growth opportunities. 
When the long term debt is brought into the estimation process, we find 
evidence of its positive effect on investment. Given the limited access to debt 
and the low level of available cash flow, this result may explain why 
entrepreneurs access VC investors as an alternative source for financing the 
expansion process.  
The results obtained are robust after controlling for size, age and time 
dummies, as well as dummies relative to the location of the firm.  
But our purpose is to check whether the sensitivity between investment 
and cash flow is significant in the supposedly more constrained firms, namely 
the group that receives VC backing later. The positive coefficient found in 
Table 3.4 anticipates significant differences in the investment-cash flow 
relationship between the groups of firms with and without VC involvement 
(see Tables 3.5 and 3.6, respectively). For the subsample of firms that later 
receive VC funding, the results of which are recorded in Table 3.5, the 
existence of financial constraints is confirmed by the presence of a positive 
and significant cash flow coefficient. Furthermore, its value is much greater 
than the one registered for the sample of SMEs as a whole and for the firms 
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without VC involvement. This finding is robust in the two models considered, 
which also include time and location dummies. These results provide evidence 
of the difficulties involved in obtaining additional funds, either because they 
are not available or because the cost is high.  
In the same vein, long term debt exhibits a positive coefficient in both 
groups of firms. Nevertheless, the coefficients found in firms that later receive 
VC are much greater than those of the firms without VC involvement. This 
finding supports the idea of firms accessing VC funding to go ahead with their 
expansion projects when they exhaust their debt capacity. Conversely, lower 
cash flow and long term debt coefficients are consistent with a gentle growth 
rate in firms that are not subject to VC investments in the near future. 
 
3.5. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
The controversy about the link between financial constraints and 
investment-cash flow sensitivity has basically relied on listed firms that were 
subject to some qualitative or quantitative pre-classification procedures. While 
Fazzari et al. (1988) maintain that the relationship between investment and 
cash flow explains financial constraints, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) affirm 
that the former relationship does not necessarily explain that a firm is 
financially constrained. Since all sample firms were listed, with potential 
access to long term external funding, the pre-classification was a requisite so 
as to define which of them were supposedly financially constrained. 
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TABLE 3.5. 
REGRESSION RESULTS OF THE  
INVESTMENT-CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY  
FOR THE SUBSAMPLE OF UNLISTED SPANISH SMES  
THAT WERE SUBJECT TO A VC INVESTMENT LATER  
(PRE-INVESTMENT PERIOD) 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE: INVESTMENT 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
WITHOUT THE EFFECT OF  
LONG TERM DEBT 
WITH THE EFFECT OF  
LONG TERM DEBT 
CFit 0.7252*** 0.6891*** 0.6810*** 0.6670*** 
 (0.1365) (0.1290) (0.1290) (0.1268) 
EBITDAit 0.0122***  0.0076***  
 (0.0117)  (0.0106)  
Intangit  0.6142***  0.3380*** 
  (0.1059)  (0.1062) 
LTDit   0.6437*** 0.5866*** 
   (0.0649) (0.0692) 
Sizeit -0.0343*** -0.0284*** -0.0226*** -0.0205*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0096) (0.0102) (0.0097) 
Agei -0.0021*** -0.0016*** -0.0015*** -0.0013*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0005) 
Ri -0.0220*** 0.0015*** -0.0267*** -0.0150*** 
 (0.0194) (0.0176) (0.0177) (0.0163) 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept 0.1947*** 0.1922*** 0.0690*** 0.0869*** 
 (0.0857) (0.0461) (0.0743) (0.0461) 
Nº observations 1034 1034 1034 1034 
Nº groups 167 167 167 167 
The table reports Generalised Least Squares, random effects, estimation of the model. The 
dependent variable is the ratio between investments (i.e. increase in net fixed assets of the 
firm i in year t plus depreciation in year t) and beginning-of-period total assets of the firm. 
The independent variables are: (1) CFit-1: net earnings plus depreciation divided by 
beginning-of-period total assets; (2) EBITDAit: average EBITDA multiple for the period; (3) 
Intangit: intangible fixed assets normalised by beginning-of-period total assets; (4) LTDit-1: 
total long term debt divided by the beginning-of-period total assets; (5) Sizeit: natural 
logarithm of total the number of employees of the firm i in the period t; (6) Agei: age of the 
firm i at the period t; (7) Ri: dummy variable indicating firms located in Objective 1 region; 
(8) VCi: dummy variable indicating firms in the VC-backed group (i.e. 0 for firms in the 
control group). All ratios are winsorised at the 2% threshold. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate, respectively, significance levels of <1%, 
<5% and <10%. 
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TABLE 3.6. 
REGRESSION RESULTS OF THE  
INVESTMENT-CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY  
FOR THE SUBSAMPLE OF UNLISTED SPANISH SMES  
WITHOUT FUTURE VC INVOLVEMENT  
(PRE-INVESTMENT PERIOD) 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE: INVESTMENT 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
WITHOUT THE EFFECT OF  
LONG TERM DEBT 
WITH THE EFFECT OF  
LONG TERM DEBT 
CFit 0.6097*** 0.5942*** 0.5532*** 0.5688*** 
 (0.1229) (0.1243) (0.1054) (0.1050) 
MBit     
     
EBITDAit 0.0005***  0.0020***  
 (0.0100)  (0.0088)  
Intangit  0.1805***  -0.2204*** 
  (0.1060)  (0.1157) 
LTDit   0.5645*** 0.5982*** 
   (0.0709) (0.0769) 
Sizeit -0.0119*** -0.0114*** -0.0169*** -0.0178*** 
 (0.0089) (0.0088) (0.0084) (0.0085) 
Agei -0.0018*** -0.0017*** -0.0001*** -0.0002*** 
 
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Ri 0.0264*** 0.0292*** 0.0128*** 0.0085*** 
 (0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0159) (0.0160) 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept 0.1097*** 0.1004*** 0.0284*** 0.0508*** 
 (0.0612) (0.0402) (0.0556) (0.0364) 
Nº observations 994 995 994 995 
Nº groups 168 168 168 168 
The table reports Generalised Least Squares, random effects, estimation of the model. The 
dependent variable is the ratio between investments (i.e. increase in net fixed assets of the 
firm i in year t plus depreciation in year t) and beginning-of-period total assets of the firm. 
The independent variables are: (1) CFit-1: net earnings plus depreciation divided by 
beginning-of-period total assets; (2) EBITDAit: average EBITDA multiple for the period; (3) 
Intangit: intangible fixed assets normalised by beginning-of-period total assets; (4) LTDit-1: 
total long term debt divided by the beginning-of-period total assets; (5) Sizeit: natural 
logarithm of total the number of employees of the firm i in the period t; (6) Agei: age of the 
firm i at the period t; (7) Ri: dummy variable indicating firms located in Objective 1 region; 
(8) VCi: dummy variable indicating firms in the VC-backed group (i.e. 0 for firms in the 
control group). All ratios are winsorised at the 2% threshold. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate, respectively, significance levels of <1%, 
<5% and <10%. 
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Our approach is to focus on unlisted SMEs, which do not have access to 
capital markets, to be better able to test the investment-cash flow sensitivity 
as a signal of the presence of financial constraints. Even if we assume that 
most SMEs are potentially financially constrained, due to the limited access, if 
any, to long term external sources of finance, we also need some sort of pre-
classification. One source of external funds available in developed countries is 
VC, which aims to invest in growing SMEs on a temporary basis. When 
approaching a venture capitalist, SMEs aim to raise funds as well as to benefit 
from the value-added that the former may provide. Therefore, one of the key 
reasons for SMEs’ accessing VC is the lack of internally generated funds to 
finance their growth. As a result, we adopt a pre-classification procedure of 
SMEs by selecting a group of firms that were later subject to a VC investment. 
We conduct our analysis on a representative sample of 168 Spanish 
manufacturing SMEs at the expansion stage that received a VC investment 
over the period 1995-2007. We compare the results with a one-by-one 
matched sample of similar SMEs with no VC involvement, which was randomly 
selected from the AMADEUS Database. We find evidence of a positive and 
significant relationship between investment and cash flow when all firms, both 
VC- and non-VC-backed, are included in the analysis. We also find that the 
investment dependency on internally generated funds in the firms that later 
received VC is greater than that found in control group firms.  
Our results also show a positive coefficient of the long term debt, which 
provides evidence of the positive effect of debt on future investment. 
Nevertheless, the use of debt might not be a viable financial resource for 
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SMEs, which are the most affected by information asymmetry problems. This 
fact may be interpreted as one of the reasons that entrepreneurs have to 
approach VC investors. 
Regarding growth opportunities, the EBITDA multiple is neither significant 
for the whole sample nor for the subsamples of firms with and without VC 
involvement. This can be motivated by the estimation procedure applied, since 
no observable market value is available on all sample firms. Nevertheless, the 
variable measuring growth opportunities through intangible assets is 
significant for the whole sample and also for the two subsamples considered 
individually, with the coefficients being greater in the group of firms that later 
receive VC. 
The contributions of this chapter are three. First, we provide an empirical 
financial justification to explain VC intervention, since SMEs with high 
investment-cash flow sensitivity may solve their financial constraints by 
accessing an external source of funds. Second, we provide new evidence to 
the controversy about the sensitivity between investment and cash flow. To 
identify the presence of financial constraints we rely on VC involvement as a 
pre-classification procedure of more financially constrained firms. Finally, we 
test our hypotheses on unlisted European SMEs that were later financed by a 
venture capitalist. With the exception of Manigart et al. (2003), Bertoni et al. 
(2008), Guariglia (2008), and Engel and Stiebale (2009), the previous 
literature focuses on listed firms. Furthermore, none of these papers 
addresses the analysis of the dependency between investment and cash flow 
prior of the VC investment event. 
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Regarding the limitations, since we focus on unlisted firms, we do not 
have access to market values to represent growth opportunities through the 
Market-to-Book ratio. We had to estimate market values by computing EBITDA 
multiples in acquisitions disclosed in the media over the whole period. Those 
multiples were then used to estimate the evolution of market values of 
unlisted firms over time. A second limitation is related to the methodology, 
since we base our estimation on static random effects models, due to the lack 
of sufficient observations per firm in our sample.  
The implications of the chapter are various. For policymakers and 
practitioners, the investment sensitivity to changes in cash flow could be 
viewed as a tool for identifying financial constraints in SMEs. Additionally, our 
findings could be interpreted as a way to justify the role of venture capitalists 
in covering the financing gap of SMEs in their growth process. 
For future research, new proxies for growth opportunities should be 
tested in order to better explain the evolution of investments in unlisted firms. 
Similarly, when more observations are available, it would be interesting to 
check the robustness of our findings using dynamic models. Finally, it should 
also be interesting to test whether our findings, which are related to Spanish 
SMEs, could also be similar to those found in other developed countries. 
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4.1. INTRODUCTION 
Access to external financing is particularly difficult for Small and Medium-
Sized Enterprises (SMEs, hereafter). Due to information asymmetries and 
control aversion, internal and external finance are not perfect substitutes and 
the former is usually preferred to the latter. On the one hand, SMEs are 
particularly exposed to information asymmetries which make external 
financing more costly (Ang, 1991; Chittenden et al., 1996; Berger and Udell, 
1998; Carpenter and Petersen, 2002a). On the other, most SMEs are owned 
and managed by entrepreneurs who are reluctant to dilute their ownership 
and lessen their control (Holmes and Kent, 1991; Chittenden et al., 1996) and 
prefer to rely upon internal finance rather than be subject to scrutiny and 
interference by external investors (López-Gracia and Aybar-Arias, 2000; 
Hogan and Hutson, 2005; Chittenden et al., 1996). As a consequence, 
investment expenditures of SMEs rely primarily on internally generated 
resources. 
Under some circumstances, however, SMEs find it optimal to seek 
external financing. This occurs when the expected return of investment 
opportunities which would be unattainable without external financing offsets 
both the additional cost of external money due to information asymmetries 
and the loss in control which is implied by the involvement of external 
investors. As to this latter aspect, it should be noted that entrepreneurs differ 
both in terms of their attitude towards interference from external stakeholders 
(Berggren et al., 2000) and in their strong ambition to grow (Olofsson, 1994) 
so that when the former is low and the latter high, they will exhibit a stronger 
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propensity to look for financial intermediaries able to alleviate and manage 
information asymmetries (Gompers, 1995; Wright and Robbie, 1998; Gompers 
and Lerner, 2001; Hsu, 2004).  
As specialised investors, Venture Capital (VC, hereafter) institutions are 
the best option for fast-growing firms (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002a). In 
addition to financial resources, VC investors provide value-added services that 
help firms to raise additional long-term funds to finance their growth and add 
value through monitoring and mentoring initiatives (Sahlman, 1990; Gompers 
and Lerner, 1998).  
As a consequence, VC-backed SMEs should be able to reduce their 
natural dependency on internally generated funds to finance their growth 
opportunities. The aim of this chapter is to verify the positive role played by 
VC on investee firms by testing the relationship between investments and cash 
flows on a sample of unlisted Spanish SMEs. We study the extent to which VC 
changes the sensitivity to cash flows of firm’s investments in a sample 
composed of 322 SMEs that received VC between 1995 and 2004 and on a 
one-by-one matched sample of similar SMEs that did not receive VC in that 
period.  
Only a few papers have focused on the investment sensitivity to cash 
flow in VC-backed firms and they obtained mixed results about the actual 
impact of VC (Manigart et al., 2003; Bertoni et al., 2008; Engel and Stiebale, 
2009). Notably, this is the first work that analyses the change in the 
investment sensitivity to cash flow in Spanish growing SMEs, including both VC 
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and comparable non-VC-backed firms. 
Our results strongly confirm that VC does reduce SME’s investment 
dependency on internally generated funds. We find consistent results across 
different specifications that SMEs at the expansion stage exhibit a positive and 
significant relationship between investments expenditures and cash flow prior 
to the VC deal. This investment dependency on cash flows becomes less 
significant in the post-investment period. VC-backed firms show a positive, 
significant relationship between investment and intangible assets, as a proxy 
of growth opportunities. By splitting the sample across sectors, we find that 
results are particularly strong for low and medium tech manufacturing and 
services firms. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 presents a 
brief review of the literature and develops our research hypotheses. Section 
4.3 describes the sampling process and the econometric methodology, and 
reports descriptive statistics and preliminary evidence of the evolution of 
investment patterns due to VC investment. Results of econometric models are 
presented in section 4.4. Finally, the main findings are highlighted and 
discussed in section 4.5. 
 
4.2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
SMEs are typically owner-managed (Ang, 1991; Cressy, 1995). For many 
entrepreneurs, the primary motive for starting a business is the desire for 
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‘independence’ (Cressy, 1995; Paul et al., 2007). Since the key source of 
financing for these firms comes from the entrepreneur’s savings (Ang, 1992; 
Berger and Udell, 1998), the distinction between entrepreneur’s and firm’s 
resources fades and, at the same time, business risk is no longer separable 
from personal risk (Ang, 1992). In addition to personal wealth of the 
entrepreneurs, financing is often provided by their family and friends (Berger 
and Udell, 1998).  
As firms grow, additional funds are required. Nevertheless, entrepreneurs 
tend to be reluctant to take on external finance (Cressy, 1995; Reid, 1996). 
Equity financing is often considered as an intrusion into the business (Paul et 
al., 2007), whereas debt is usually available only against personal collateral 
and guarantees given by the entrepreneurs (Berger and Udell, 1998). Once 
personal resources are exhausted, investment opportunities depend on 
available internally generated funds (Chittenden et al., 1996; Michaelas et al., 
1999; Carpenter and Petersen, 2002b; Watson and Wilson, 2002; among 
others). These resources may still not be sufficient, especially when growth 
opportunities are significant, in which case SME’s growth and, sometimes, 
survival depend on their access to external funds (Cressy, 1995) which, in 
turn, depend on information asymmetries and control aversion. Whereas 
conservative entrepreneurs remain independent to external control, at the 
expense of limiting firm growth (Cressy, 1995), entrepreneurs that believe 
that a firm’s growth is necessary (or who perceive a firm’s investment 
opportunities as above-average) will do whatever is necessary to grow 
(Berggren et al., 2000). This group of entrepreneurs is less reluctant to raise 
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funds from external sources. Control aversion typically decreases over time, 
and, alongside, the level of external financing increases (Cressy, 1995).  
VC is a source of long term financing, usually supplied in the form of 
equity, or quasi-equity, instruments that involves holding minority stakes in 
growing SMEs (Sahlman, 1990). Venture capitalists do not aim to become 
permanent shareholders in investee firms but, rather, help entrepreneurs in 
developing their growth potential and, then, sell the shares received at the 
time of the investment (hopefully realising a capital gain). This minority and 
temporary approach may limit an entrepreneur’s reluctance to let an external 
investor become a permanent shareholder of the firm.  
Nevertheless, prior to the entry of VC investors, the dependency of 
investments on internally generated funds would apply in all growing SMEs, 
regardless of the future involvement, or not, of a VC investor. Accordingly, we 
expect the following. 
Hypothesis 4.1:  The relationship between investments and cash flows should 
be positive and significant in all non-VC-backed SMEs, 
regardless of whether they will eventually receive VC or not. 
Once entrepreneurs decide to access external funds, they actively seek 
for investors that provide both financial resources and value-added (Paul et 
al., 2007; Hsu, 2007). In presence of asymmetries in information, venture 
capitalists are the best agents to address adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems found in SMEs (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002a). Hogan and Hutson 
(2005) and Paul et al. (2007) find that equity issues are the main source of 
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external financing for VC-backed firms, rather than debt. VC is an alternative 
financing source for small and recently created fast-growing firms, which 
typically posses few tangible assets, operate in markets that change very 
rapidly, are plagued by high levels of uncertainty, and have large information 
asymmetries between entrepreneurs and investors (Gompers and Lerner, 
2001). VC investors also provide non-financial services which contribute 
significantly in the development and success of the investee firm (Tyebjee and 
Bruno, 1984; Sahlman, 1990; Gompers and Lerner, 1998; Wright and Robbie, 
1998; Hellmann and Puri, 2000). After the initial investment, VC investors 
monitor a firm’s performance, help in recruiting managers, and providing 
strategic financial and legal advice (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Kaplan and 
Strömberg, 2001). Besides, VC makes it easier for investee firms to find 
additional long-term resources (Sahlman, 1990; Admati and Pfleiderer, 1994; 
Wright and Robbie, 1998; Gompers and Lerner, 2001, Tykvová, 2007). With 
access to external financial funds, the level of liquidity of fast-growing SMEs 
increases and the investment dependency on their internally generated funds 
diminishes. On these grounds, our second hypothesis is the following. 
Hypothesis 4.2:  After VC financing the relationship between investments and 
cash flows should be significantly reduced, or even 
disappear, in VC-backed growing SMEs. 
The empirical evidence of investment-cash flow sensitivity on VC-backed 
firms is very limited and shows mixed results. Manigart et al. (2003) study the 
investment-cash flow sensitivity in unlisted Belgian VC-backed firms and a 
matched sample of non-VC-backed firms. Contrary to expectations, their 
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results provide evidence of an increase in the sensitivity after the initial VC 
investment. Nevertheless, their results might be affected by the 
heterogeneous nature of VC investments included in their sample, ranging 
from early stage financing to buyouts. Furthermore, financial constraints faced 
by all firms during the 1991-1995 economic crisis may affect most of their 
post-VC investment observations and, thus, their empirical results. 
Bertoni et al. (2008) analyse the dependency of investment on cash flows 
on VC-backed and non-VC-backed unlisted Italian high-tech firms. They find 
that, before receiving VC money, firms suffer from appreciable financial 
constraints. Nevertheless, after receiving VC financing, firms exhibit low and 
statistically not significant investment-cash flow sensitivity when the investor 
involved is an independent VC firm. Their results are similar to what we expect 
to find. Conversely, in firms backed by a corporate VC, investment remains 
sensitive to shocks in cash flow, indicating that investment constraints are not 
completely removed. 
More recently, Engel and Stiebale (2009) find that UK and French 
portfolio firms display positive and significant investment sensitivity to cash 
flow before expansion financing. On the other hand, investee firms display 
higher investment levels and a lower dependence on internal funds after VC 
investment. These findings are in line with our hypotheses. 
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4.3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
4.3.1. THE SAMPLING PROCESS 
The presence of investment-cash flow sensitivity on SMEs is tested in a 
sample of unlisted Spanish SMEs at the expansion stage. The sample includes 
firms which received VC expansion investments during the period 1995-2004 
and a matched sample of non invested firms. 
In accordance with data obtained from the Spanish Private Equity and 
Venture Capital Association (ASCRI), between 1995 and 2004, 1,572 VC 
investments were recorded in Spain, including all stages but excluding 
financial and real-estate sectors (Martí et al., 2010). For 259 firms we could 
not find any accounting information, which reduces the accessible population 
to 1,313 VC-backed firms (83.5 per cent of the initial population). Out of 
these, we drop 575 early stage deals and 159 buyouts and are left with 579 
expansion investments. From the remaining firms in this latter group, we 
gather accounting information from the AMADEUS Database, which records 
information on 1,202,363 Spanish firms. In order to make estimation more 
robust, we select only firms for which at least three consecutive years of 
accounting data, including the year in which VC investment occurs, are 
available. Some six firms operating in the primary industry are excluded from 
the analysis since they would constitute a very different category from the rest 
of the sample which would however be characterised by too few observations 
to be studied separately. This leads us to a sample of 322 firms, accounting 
for 56 per cent of the fully identified firms that were financed at the expansion 
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stage in Spain between 1995 and 2004. 
A one-by-one matched sample of 322 firms with no VC funding was then 
created. Comparable firms were drawn from the AMADEUS Database among 
those matching the investee firm sector (NACE Rev2 4-digit code). Among this 
cohort of firm-year observations, we select the one which is closer to the 
characteristics of the investee firm in the year before VC investment (number 
of employees, revenues, total asset, age). When possible we also selected 
firms incorporated in areas with the same level of local development 
(Objective 1 region25 or not). To check the robustness of the matching process 
we control ex post that the characteristics in the year before VC investment 
are the same between the two cohorts. We perform t-tests on number of 
employees, revenues, total asset, age and a dummy indicating whether the 
firm is incorporated in an Objective 1 region, and in no case did we find any 
significant difference between the two groups.26 For further robustness we also 
perform a joint test by estimating a probit model where the dependent 
variable is a dummy indicating whether a firm is in the VC-backed group or in 
the control group and the dependent variables are, again, number of 
employees, revenues, total asset, age and a Objective 1 region dummy. A 
Wald test reveals that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that all the 
coefficients are jointly zero (χ2(5)=8.82; p-value 0.14). Table 4.1 reports the 
distribution of sample firms across industries. 
                                                 
25  Objective 1 regions are defined as those regions that exhibit an average income below 75 per 
cent of the European Union average. 
26  T-tests are performed under the conservative assumption of unequal variances. p-values for 
the null hypothesis that the mean is equal between the two samples are the following: 
number of employees 0.17; revenues 0.39; total asset: 0.20; age 0.91; Objective 1 region 
0.62. 
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TABLE 4.1. 
DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE FIRMS ACROSS SECTORS 
TOTAL SAMPLE 
VC-BACKED 
FIRMS 
NON-VC-BACKED 
FIRMS SECTOR 
n % n % n % 
Technology,  
media and telecommunications 92 14 46 7 46 7 
Medium and Low Tech Manufacturing 336 51 168 26 168 26 
Medium and Low Tech Services 216 33 108 17 108 17 
Total 644 100 322 50 322 50 
The table reports the distribution according to industry of a sample of 656 unlisted Spanish firms. 
Percentages in the ‘Total sample’, ‘VC-backed firms’ and ‘Non-VC-backed firms’ columns are related to the 
total number of sample firms. 
 
4.3.2. METHODOLOGY 
In order to analyse the relationship between investments and cash flows 
in VC- and non-VC-backed firms we build on the classical approach by Fazzari 
et al. (1988). Models to estimate investment sensitivity to cash flows (see 
Fazzari et al., 1998 and Bond and Van Reenen, 2007 for a review and in-depth 
discussion) consider investments as a dependent variable and internally 
generated resources and growth opportunities as key independent variables 
(alongside other control variables). Broadly speaking these models differ in the 
way in which they measure unobserved growth opportunities. When using 
panel data with a sufficiently long time span, dynamic models (e.g. Euler 
equation and sales accelerator) can be used to control for unobserved growth 
opportunities. However when data are cross-sectional or, as in our case, do 
not have a sufficient time breadth, static models have to be used, as in the 
original work by Fazzari et al. (1988). Investments are normally measured by 
changes in fixed assets, and the capacity to generate resources internally is 
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proxied by cash flows. Fazzari et al. (1988) measure growth opportunities by 
including in the estimates firm Tobin’s q. The use of Tobin’s q (which is also 
criticised by many, see for instance Bond and Van Reenen, 2007) is impossible 
in our sample since it only includes unlisted firms. We thus need to rely upon 
an alternative measure of growth opportunities. Fama and French (2002) 
argue that R&D expenditures signal firm’s unobserved growth opportunities. 
Building on this idea, and following Michaelas et al. (1999) and Manigart et al. 
(2003), we use the volume of intangible assets (normalised by total assets) as 
a proxy of growth opportunities.27 
We include, as control variables, firm size and age.28 The model that we 
estimate is then the following: 
Iit = β0 + β1CFit + β2Intangit + β3Sizeit + β4Ageit +  
 β5VCi + β6VCi*CFit+ Dit + εit 
(4.1) 
where i is the firm’s indicator while t is a time indicator which is set to 0, for 
VC-backed firms, in the year of VC investment and, for control group firms, in 
the year in which they are matched to their VC-backed ‘twin’ firm. Negative 
(positive) values of t indicate years before (after) the investment event 
occurs. Iit is the ratio between investments (i.e. increase in net fixed assets of 
the firm i in year t plus depreciation in year t) and beginning-of-period total 
assets of the firm. CFit is the ratio between firm’s cash flows (i.e. net earnings 
                                                 
27  Several other measures for growth opportunities exist. Following Titman and Wessels (1988), 
we also consider asset growth as a measure of future growth opportunities (this approach is 
however criticised by Balboa et al., 2009). Results are qualitatively similar to the ones 
presented here and are available from authors upon request.  
28  Firm investments could also be affected by leverage, as argued by Lang et al. (1996) and 
Hovakimian (2009). However, leverage (i.e. total debt over total assets) proves to be 
excessively correlated with other regressors (especially cash flows and intangible assets) to 
be included in the analysis. 
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plus depreciation) in year t and beginning-of-period total assets. Intangit 
measures the ratio between intangible assets and total assets in year t. Sizeit 
is measured by the natural logarithm of firm’s employees in year t. Ageit is the 
firm’s age in year t. Dit is a set of year dummies; formally Dit=τy dity where τy is 
a parameter capturing calendar year-specific shocks in investments (i.e. the 
fact that, other things being equal, aggregate investments fluctuate over time 
according to changes in expectations about, for instance, future economic 
growth of the economy as a whole) and dity=1 if year t for firm i corresponds 
to calendar year y. 
The most important variable in equation (4.1), for the purpose of this 
work, is VCi: a dummy variable that takes value 1 if firm i is in the VC-backed 
group. The dummy is included both in level and in interaction with cash flows, 
to control respectively for a different intercept and slope of investment-cash 
flow sensitivity relationship. Specifically β5 captures the extent to which firms 
in the VC-backed group invest more than firms in the control group, other 
things being equal. Coefficient β6, instead, captures the difference in the 
sensitivity to cash flows of investments for firms in the two subsamples, with 
negative values indicating that sensitivity is lower for firms in the VC-backed 
group. 
We also estimate an augmented version of equation (4.1) in which we 
control for possible differences between investment patterns in high tech and 
non high tech (i.e. medium and low tech) firms. This control is particularly 
crucial since VC investments span a wide variety of sectors characterised by 
substantially different levels of information asymmetry which might also differ 
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in the extent of financial frictions. Moreover, in Continental Europe, the 
fraction of VC investments in low and medium technology sectors is not 
negligible. We then add to equation (4.1) a dummy variable (TMTi), both in 
level and in interaction with cash flows, which takes value 1 if the firm 
operates in technology, media and telecommunications (TMT) sector, and 0 
otherwise. Finally, we also estimate equation (4.1) separately on different 
sectors. 
Table 4.2 summarises the definition of the variables to be used.  
TABLE 4.2. 
DEFINITION OF THE VARIABLES 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
Iit Increase in book value of net fixed asset plus depreciation divided by beginning-
of-period total assets. 
CFit Net earnings plus depreciation divided by beginning-of-period total assets. 
Intangit Intangible fixed assets normalised by beginning-of-period total assets. 
Sizeit Natural logarithm of the number of employees of the firm i in year t. 
Ageit Age of the firm i at time t. 
TMTi Dummy variable indicating firms which operate in the technology, media and 
telecommunications. 
VCi Dummy variable indicating firms in the VC-backed group (i.e. 0 for firms in the 
control group). 
 
We estimate equation (4.1) separately for t<0 (pre-investment period) 
and t≥0 (post-investment period). Let us indicate with a ‘-’ and ‘+’ superscript 
the parameters estimated in the two time subsamples. We can translate 
Hypotheses 4.1 and 4.2 reported above in terms of parameters in (4.1) 
estimated in the two subsamples. First, according to Hypothesis 4.1, cash flow 
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sensitivity should be positive in both groups leading to 01 >−β  and −6β  not 
significantly different from zero. Note that we have no hypothesis on −5β  (i.e. 
the extent to which investment of firms which eventually receive VC is higher, 
other things being equal, than those of control group firms). However, if firms 
which receive VC are characterised by better investment opportunities, which 
are not completely captured by their level of intangible assets, this parameter 
should be positive. When estimating equation (4.1) on the post-investment 
period, instead, we should find, according to Hypothesis 4.2, that 06 <+β , 
which means that the reliance upon internally generated funds is lower for VC-
backed firms than for control group firms after VC is received. 
Equation (4.1) is estimated on a panel dataset, which means that error 
terms εit should not be considered i.i.d. but, rather, potentially correlated over 
i. As regards the estimation method, we opt for a random effects model which 
splits the error term into two components εit= ηi + µit, where ηi is a firm-
specific error term and µit is an idiosyncratic white noise. Provided that ηi is 
independent from the vector of covariates, the estimator is consistent and 
does not require individual fixed effects to be estimated (see Mundlak, 1978; 
Arellano and Bover, 1990). Including fixed effects would shrink the time 
dimension even further (if using first-differences) or, similarly, increase the 
number of parameters to estimate by an order of magnitude (if using firm-
specific dummies). Moreover we would not be able to directly observe the 
impact of time-constant firm characteristics on firm’s investments. 
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4.3.3. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 4.3 shows the descriptive statistics for the whole sample, the 
subsample of VC-backed firms, and the non-VC-backed firms selected as 
control group distinguishing between the pre-investment (Panel A) and the 
post-investment (Panel B) period. All ratios are winsorised with a 2 per cent 
threshold cut-off for each tail, to reduce the potential influence of outliers. All 
accounting information is converted in real terms (constant 2005 Euro) using 
the Harmonised Consumer Price Index as deflator. Accounting information 
includes data from 1991 up to 2007 whenever possible. On average, we have 
about 5 years of observation in both the pre- and the post-investment period 
per firm. 
Focusing on Panel A, we observe that during the pre-investment period, 
for the pooled sample, investments are on average 0.1245, which is higher 
than cash flows 0.0968. This indicates that firms in our sample have recourse 
to external financing only marginally since internal cash flows can potentially 
cover more than three quarters of firm’s investments. On average, the 
investment ratio of firms that eventually become VC-backed is 0.1444, which 
is significantly larger than that of firms in the control group 0.1039. This may 
well be a sign that firms which receive VC have better investment 
opportunities.  
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TABLE 4.3. 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS BY PERIOD 
PANEL A: PRE-INVESTMENT PERIOD (t<0) 
VARIABLES OBSERVATIONS FIRMS MEAN STD. DEVIATION 
Investment     
All firms 3,115 643 0.1245*** 0.2175 
VC-backed firms 1,584 322 0.1444*** 0.2344 
Non-VC-backed firms 1,531 321 0.1039*** 0.1965 
Difference 3,115 643 0.0404*** 0.0078 
Cash flow     
All firms 3,115 643 0.0968*** 0.1152 
VC-backed firms 1,584 322 0.0908*** 0.1187 
Non-VC-backed firms 1,531 321 0.1031*** 0.1112 
Difference 3,115 643 -0.0122**** 0.0041 
Intangible assets     
All firms 3,113 643 0.0637*** 0.1077 
VC-backed firms 1,584 322 0.0800*** 0.1191 
Non-VC-backed firms 1,529 321 0.0467*** 0.0915 
Difference 3,113 643 0.0333*** 0.0038 
PANEL B: POST-INVESTMENT PERIOD (t≥0) 
VARIABLES OBSERVATIONS FIRMS MEAN STD. DEVIATION 
Investment     
All firms 3,345 644 0.1026*** 0.1841 
VC-backed firms 1,629 322 0.1307*** 0.2115 
Non-VC-backed firms 1,716 322 0.0759*** 0.1487 
Difference 3,345 644 0.0548*** 0.0064  
Cash flow     
All firms 3,345 644 0.0776*** 0.1076 
VC-backed firms 1,629 322 0.0619*** 0.1101 
Non-VC-backed firms 1,716 322 0.0924*** 0.1029 
Difference 3,345 644 -0.0305*** 0.0037  
Intangible assets     
All firms 3,346 644 0.0695*** 0.1110 
VC-backed firms 1,630 322 0.0913*** 0.1231 
Non-VC-backed firms 1,716 322 0.0489*** 0.0936 
Difference 3,346 644 0.0423*** 0.0038 
The table reports descriptive statistics on winsorised (2% each tail) values of the variables. All variables are normalised by 
using beginning-of-period stock of total assets. We test the null hypothesis that means are equal between VC-backed and 
Non-VC-backed groups assuming unequal variance. ***, ** and * indicate, respectively, significance levels  <1%, <5% 
and <10%. 
 
Interestingly, on average, cash flows to total assets are significantly 
larger for firms in the control group (0.1031) than for those in the VC-backed 
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group (0.0908). In other words, firms in the VC-backed sample invest more 
and with lower cash flows in the pre-investment window, which means they 
have to rely more heavily on external financing. This could lead to both lower 
control aversion of entrepreneurs and higher benefit from VC, making these 
firms more prone to seek VC in the first place. Intangible assets are also 
significantly larger for firms in the VC-backed groups (0.0800 against 0.0467 
for the control group) and this, again, supports the idea that these firms have 
better investment opportunities. 
Moving to the post-investment period (Table 4.3, Panel B) we see that 
VC-backed firms are still investing significantly more than control group firms 
(0.1307 against 0.0759) and that the wedge between the two groups has 
actually widened (from 0.0404 to 0.0548). Moreover, cash flows to total 
assets of VC-backed firms continue to be significantly lower than those of 
control group firms (0.0619 against 0.0924) and, again, the difference is wider 
than before the investment event (-0.0305 vs. -0.0122). A similar pattern is 
found for the ratio of intangible assets, which is still significantly higher in VC-
backed firms (0.0913 against 0.0489) and even higher than before investment 
(0.0423 vs. 0.0333). VC seems to amplify the differences in the investment 
pattern between VC-backed and matched firms. 
To have more robust, yet still descriptive, evidence on this, we estimate 
a difference-in-difference (diff-in-diff) model on investments, cash-flows, and 
intangible assets. The diff-in-diff approach consists of comparing the different 
change in one variable between the pre and post-investment period across the 
two groups. To avoid potential underestimation of standard errors due to 
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serially correlated outcomes (see Bertrand et al., 2004), we average figures in 
the pre and post-investment windows for each firm and then estimate diff-in-
diff on these averaged values. Results are reported in Table 4.4. 
TABLE 4.4. 
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE OF KEY PARAMETERS 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
INVESTMENT CASH FLOW 
INTANGIBLE  
ASSETS 
VC 0.0487 *** -0.0091  0.0326 *** 
 
(0.0154)  (0.0080)  (0.0082)  
Post -0.0579 *** -0.0121 ** -0.0065  
 
(0.0098)  (0.0051)  (0.0044)  
Post*VC 0.0082  -0.0237 *** 0.0133 * 
 
(0.0155)  (0.0078)  (0.0072)  
Intercept 0.1312 *** 0.1031 *** 0.0542 *** 
 (0.0102)  (0.0051)  (0.0053)  
Nº observations 1,311 1,311 1,311 
The table reports Ordinary Least Square diff-in-diff regression on firm’s investments, cash flows and 
intangible assets. Investment is defined as the increase in book value of net fixed asset plus 
depreciation divided by beginning-of-period total assets, Cash flow as net earnings plus depreciation 
divided by beginning-of-period total assets, Intangible assets as intangible fixed assets normalised by 
beginning-of-period total assets. VC and Post are dummy variables which identify respectively firms 
in the VC-backed group and observations in the post-investment window, respectively. All ratios are 
winsorised at the 2% threshold. Each observation in the regression is the average of the respective 
variable in the relative (i.e. pre- or post-investment) period. Standard errors are robust and clustered 
by firm. ***, ** and * indicate, respectively, significance levels  <1%, <5% and <10%. 
 
Diff-in-diff regression broadly confirms the intuition obtained by 
comparing the descriptive statistics across groups. The diff-in-diff coefficient 
(Post*VC), which indicates the different change in the outcome (namely 
investments, cash flows or intangible assets), always exhibits the same sign as 
the VC coefficient, which indicates the average difference between the two 
groups. In other words, between the pre and post-investment period 
differences between the two groups are amplified. The coefficient is 
significantly different from zero at conventional levels only in the cash-flow 
and intangible asset regressions, while it is not significant for investments.  
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Overall these results are consistent with the idea that VC does allow VC-
backed firms to maintain their above-average investment level and to grow in 
assets far quicker than their growth in cash flows (which explains why cash 
flow ratio to total assets decreases in the post-investment window for VC-
backed firms); this increase in investments seems to be relatively more 
concentrated in R&D, which is consistent with the increase in the fraction of 
intangible assets in the post-investment window. 
It is also worth analysing whether some differences across sectors can be 
found. Descriptive statistics by sector, period and group are reported in Table 
4.5. 
Figures in Table 4.5 confirm that results shown in Table 4.4 are robust 
across sectors. In all sectors firms in the VC-backed group invest more that 
control group firms despite their having lower cash flows to total assets and 
the differences grow larger after the investment event. We observe, however, 
that TMT firms exhibit more extreme behaviour.  
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TABLE 4.5. 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS BY SECTOR AND PERIOD 
PANEL A: PRE-INVESTMENT PERIOD (t<0) 
 SECTOR 
 
TECHNOLOGY, MEDIA AND 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
MEDIUM AND LOW TECH 
MANUFACTURING 
MEDIUM AND LOW TECH  
SERVICES 
VARIABLES N MEAN N MEAN N MEAN 
Investment       
All firms 66 0.1471*** 300 0.1165*** 190 0.1202*** 
VC-backed firms 33 0.1725*** 150 0.1328*** 95 0.1419*** 
Non-VC-backed firms 33 0.1188*** 150 0.0992*** 95 0.0987*** 
Difference 66 0.0537*** 300 0.0336*** 190 0.0432*** 
Cash flow       
All firms 66 0.1325*** 300 0.0936*** 190 0.0923*** 
VC-backed firms 33 0.1240*** 150 0.0904*** 95 0.0870*** 
Non-VC-backed firms 33 0.1420*** 150 0.0969*** 95 0.0976*** 
Difference 66 -0.0180**** 300 -0.0065**** 190 -0.0106**** 
Intangible Assets       
All firms 66 0.1020*** 300 0.0560*** 190 0.0596*** 
VC-backed firms 33 0.1291*** 150 0.0742*** 95 0.0730*** 
Non-VC-backed firms 33 0.0718*** 150 0.0370*** 95 0.0462*** 
Difference 66 0.0573*** 300 0.0372*** 190 0.0268*** 
PANEL B: POST-INVESTMENT PERIOD (t≥0) 
 SECTOR 
 
TECHNOLOGY, MEDIA AND 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS MANUFACTURING SERVICES 
VARIABLES N MEAN N MEAN N MEAN 
Investment       
All firms 66 0.1293*** 300 0.0901*** 191 0.0985*** 
VC-backed firms 33 0.1615*** 150 0.1177*** 95 0.1184*** 
Non-VC-backed firms 33 0.0979*** 150 0.0637*** 96 0.0799*** 
Difference 66 0.0636*** 300 0.0540*** 191 0.0385*** 
Cash flow       
All firms 66 0.0948*** 300 0.0760*** 191 0.0710*** 
VC-backed firms 33 0.0746*** 150 0.0668*** 95 0.0507*** 
Non-VC-backed firms 33 0.1144*** 150 0.0847*** 96 0.0899*** 
Difference 66 -0.0398**** 300 -0.0179**** 191 -0.0392**** 
Intangible Assets       
All firms 66 0.1274*** 300 0.0530*** 191 0.0688*** 
VC-backed firms 33 0.1689*** 150 0.0736*** 95 0.0936*** 
Non-VC-backed firms 33 0.0871*** 150 0.0334*** 96 0.0456*** 
Difference 66 0.0818*** 300 0.0402*** 191 0.0480*** 
The table reports descriptive statistics on winsorised (2% each tail) values of the variables. All variables are normalised by 
using beginning-of-period stock of total assets. We test the null hypothesis that means are equal across different Period 
subsamples. ***, ** and * indicate, respectively, significance levels of <1%, <5% and <10%. 
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While investment ratios are higher for VC-backed firms in all sectors, the 
wedge between the two groups is particularly wide in the TMT sector (0.0537 
pre-investment which increases to 0.0637 post-investment period). At the 
same time TMT firms are those for which the difference in the (negative) cash 
flow ratio between VC-backed and control group firms is larger in absolute 
terms and becomes sizeably larger after-investment (-0.0180 vs. -0.0398). 
The intangible assets ratio for VC-backed firms is always higher than for 
control group firms, regardless of the sector, and again TMT sectors show the 
most extreme difference (0.0573 and 0.0818 in the pre and post- investment 
periods respectively). 
 
4.4. RESULTS 
Table 4.6 shows the results obtained from the estimation of the models 
described in section 4.3.2 on the whole sample, splitting the pre and post-
investment period.  
Consistently with Hypothesis 4.1, we find evidence of a positive and 
significant relationship between investments and cash flows in both 
specifications and sub-periods. Non-VC-backed firms in our sample, thus, 
seem to be significantly financially dependent on internally generated cash 
flows. In the pre-investment period the VC coefficient is positive and 
significant while the VC*CF interaction term is not significant. Firms which 
eventually receive VC, thus, invest more but do not appear to be more 
sensitive to their level of cash-flows than control group firms.  
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TABLE 4.6. 
REGRESSION RESULTS OF THE INVESTMENT-CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY 
FOR PRE AND POST-INVESTMENT PERIOD: 
WHOLE SAMPLE DIVIDED BY INVESTMENT PERIOD 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE: INVESTMENT 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
PRE-INVESTMENT PERIOD POST-INVESTMENT PERIOD 
CFit 0.4335 *** 0.4598 *** 0.2339 *** 0.2384 *** 
 (0.0602)  (0.0621)  (0.0465)  (0.0454)  
Intangit 0.8930 *** 0.8990 *** 0.5946 *** 0.5986 *** 
 (0.0688)  (0.0685)  (0.0519)  (0.0534)  
Sizeit  -0.0093  -0.0084  -0.0010  -0.0009  
 (0.0063)  (0.0063)  (0.0030)  (0.0030)  
Ageit -0.0022 *** -0.0023 *** -0.0008 ** -0.0008 ** 
 (0.0007)  (0.0007)  (0.0003)  (0.0003)  
TMTi   -0.0236    -0.0112  
   (0.0215)    (0.0115)  
TMTi *CFit   -0.0435    0.0375  
   (0.0400)    (0.0341)  
VCi 0.0252 * 0.0234 * 0.0403 *** 0.0421 *** 
 (0.0137)  (0.0137)  (0.0081)  (0.0081)  
VCi*CFit 0.0001  0.0018  -0.0472 ** -0.0762 *** 
 (0.0063)  (0.0046)  (0.0224)  (0.0295)  
Intercept 0.1096 *** 0.1084 *** 0.0849 *** 0.0855 *** 
 (0.0260)  (0.0269)  (0.0182)  (0.0185)  
Nº observations 3,088 3,088 3,324 3,324 
Nº groups 639 639 643 643 
The table reports the Generalised Least Squares, random effects, estimation of the model. The dependent variable is the 
ratio between investments (i.e. increase in net fixed assets of the firm i in year t plus depreciation in year t) and beginning-
of-period total assets of the firm. The independent variables are: (1) CFit-1: net earnings plus depreciation divided by 
beginning-of-period total assets; (2) Intangit: intangible fixed assets normalised by beginning-of-period total assets; (3) 
Sizeit: natural logarithm of total the number of employees of the firm i in the period t; (4) Agei: age of the firm i at the 
period t; (5) TMTi: dummy variable indicating firms which operate in the technology, media and telecommunications.; (6) 
VCi: dummy variable indicating firms in the VC-backed group (i.e. 0 for firms in the control group). All ratios are winsorised 
at the 2% threshold. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate, respectively, significance 
levels of <1%, <5% and <10%. 
In the post-investment period, instead, VC-backed firms continue to 
invest more than control group firms (and the wedge seems to have widened, 
consistently with preliminary evidence presented in section 4.4) and, more 
interestingly, their investment level is less sensitive to current cash flows, as 
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shown by the negative and significant coefficient of the VC*CF covariate. This 
is consistent with our Hypothesis 4.2: after VC financing the relationship 
between investments and cash flows is significantly reduced.  
Our control for growth opportunities, the ratio of intangible assets, is 
always positive and significant, reassuring us on the fact that it captures firm’s 
investment opportunities as suggested by Manigart et al. (2003). Age and Size 
are, as expected, negative (older and larger firms invest relatively less) 
despite only Age being significant at usual confidence levels. 
Surprisingly the coefficients of TMT and TMT*CF are negative, although 
not significant. TMT firms, contrary to expectations, do not seem to invest 
more than medium and low tech firms once investment opportunities have 
been controlled for, and they do not seem to be more dependent on cash 
flows. This might be reflecting easier access to alternative sources of money, 
such as innovation subsidies provided by public-sector-related bodies, as 
argued by Di Giacomo (2004). 
To control for possible biases in our results due to possible imperfections 
in the matching process (which is by definition only made on observable 
characteristics), we also estimate equation (4.1) (and its augmented version 
including TMT and TMT*CF) on the restricted sample of VC-backed firms, 
excluding the control group (Table 4.7). We find that the CF coefficient is 
positive and highly significant before VC investment (consistently with 
Hypothesis 4.1), and that, while it is still positive after VC investment, it 
shows a sharp reduction, consistently with Hypothesis 4.2. Other variables 
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follow a similar pattern to that shown in Table 4.6, thus confirming that our 
results should not be driven by unobservable and uncontrolled differences 
between the two samples. 
The significance of the TMT*CF term in Table 4.7 suggests that 
investment patterns, as well as cash flow sensitivity, might be substantially 
different across industries. Accordingly, we re-estimate equation (4.1) splitting 
by sectors on the whole sample (Table 4.8) and on the VC-backed sample only 
(Table 4.9).  
The pattern found in firms belonging to the manufacturing and service 
sectors shown in Table 4.8 is similar to that shown in Table 4.6. Firms included 
in those two groups experience a sharp reduction in the CF coefficient after 
the investment occurs even though with a different dynamic: VC-backed 
manufacturing firms are more dependent on cash flows before VC investment 
than control group firms while this difference disappears after the initial VC 
investment; VC-backed service firms do not exhibit a different sensitivity 
before investment but a lower sensitivity after the VC investment. In either 
case, though, VC reduces investment sensitivity. These results are confirmed 
by figures shown in Table 4.9, where a substantial reduction in the CF 
coefficient is found in the period after the investment in both groups.  
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TABLE 4.7. 
REGRESSION RESULTS OF THE INVESTMENT-CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY 
FOR VC-BACKED FIRMS FOR PRE AND POST-INVESTMENT PERIOD 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE: INVESTMENT 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
PRE-INVESTMENT PERIOD POST-INVESTMENT PERIOD 
CFit 0.4274 *** 0.5088 *** 0.2073 *** 0.2394 *** 
 (0.0847)  (0.0857)  (0.0646)  (0.0643)  
Intangit 0.9383 *** 0.9247 *** 0.6864 *** 0.6928 *** 
 (0.0847)  (0.0825)  (0.0718)  (0.0734)  
Sizeit  -0.0156 * -0.0123  -0.0096 * -0.0102 * 
 (0.0090)  (0.0091)  (0.0056)  (0.0056)  
Ageit -0.0026 * -0.0027 *** -0.0011 ** -0.0010 ** 
 (0.0008)  (0.0008)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  
TMTi   -0.0427    -0.0161  
   (0.0268)    (0.0195)  
TMTi*CFit   -0.1211 ***   -0.0382 ** 
   (0.0209)    (0.0177)  
Intercept 0.1617 *** 0.1468 *** 0.1671 *** 0.1670 *** 
 (0.0387)  (0.0399)  (0.0337)  (0.0341)  
Nº observations 1,572 1,572 1,614 1,614 
Nº groups 320 320 321 321 
The table reports the Generalised Least Squares, random effects, estimation of the model. The dependent variable is the 
ratio between investments (i.e. increase in net fixed assets of the firm i in year t plus depreciation in year t) and beginning-
of-period total assets of the firm. The independent variables are: (1) CFit-1: net earnings plus depreciation divided by 
beginning-of-period total assets; (2) Intangit: intangible fixed assets normalised by beginning-of-period total assets; (3) 
Sizeit: natural logarithm of total the number of employees of the firm i in the period t; (4) Agei: age of the firm i at the 
period t; (5) TMTi: dummy variable indicating firms which operate in the technology, media and telecommunications.; (6) 
VCi: dummy variable indicating firms in the VC-backed group (i.e. 0 for firms in the control group). All ratios are winsorised 
at the 2% threshold. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate, respectively, significance 
levels of <1%, <5% and <10%. 
As regards TMT, results are, again, different from those found in the 
other two sectors and somewhat less clear-cut. In Table 4.8, results show that 
the CF coefficient is only significant in the period before the investment and 
becomes insignificant after the investment. When only the TMT VC-backed 
group is considered, in Table 4.9 however, in neither of the two periods is the 
CF coefficient significant; yet, the limited number of observations of this group 
limits the validity of this result. The interaction term between VC and cash flow 
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shows a negative sign in both periods in Table 4.8. This result may reinforce 
evidence shown in Table 4.7, and could be compatible with TMT firms getting 
sizeable subsidies that distort investment sensitivity to cash flows. An 
alternative explanation could be related to the low cash flow generation of TMT 
firms in the early stages, when these firms rely much more on entrepreneur’s 
personal resources than on firm’s cash flows. In this phase cash flows could 
not be a valid proxy for the availability of financial resources.  
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TABLE 4.8. 
REGRESSION RESULTS OF THE 
INVESTMENT-CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY FOR PRE AND POST-INVESTMENT PERIOD: 
WHOLE SAMPLE DIVIDED BY SECTOR 
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TABLE 4.9. 
REGRESSION RESULTS OF THE 
INVESTMENT-CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY FOR PRE AND POST-INVESTMENT PERIOD: 
SAMPLE OF VC-BACKED FIRMS DIVIDED BY SECTOR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
A
B
L
E
 4
.9
. 
R
E
G
R
E
S
S
IO
N
 R
E
S
U
L
T
S
 O
F
 T
H
E
 
IN
V
E
S
T
M
E
N
T
-C
A
S
H
 F
L
O
W
 S
E
N
S
IT
IV
IT
Y
 F
O
R
 P
R
E
 A
N
D
 P
O
S
T
-I
N
V
E
S
T
M
E
N
T
 P
E
R
IO
D
: 
S
A
M
P
L
E
 O
F
 V
C
-B
A
C
K
E
D
 F
IR
M
S
 D
IV
ID
E
D
 B
Y
 S
E
C
T
O
R
 
 
D
E
P
E
N
D
E
N
T
 V
A
R
IA
B
L
E
: 
IN
V
E
S
T
M
E
N
T
 
T
E
C
H
N
O
L
O
G
Y
, 
M
E
D
IA
 A
N
D
 
T
E
L
E
C
O
M
M
U
N
IC
A
T
IO
N
S
 
M
A
N
U
F
A
C
T
U
R
IN
G
 
S
E
R
V
IC
E
S
 
IN
D
E
P
E
N
D
E
N
T
 
V
A
R
IA
B
L
E
S
 
P
R
E
-I
N
V
E
S
T
M
E
N
T
 
P
E
R
IO
D
 
P
O
S
T
-I
N
V
E
S
T
M
E
N
T
 
P
E
R
IO
D
 
P
R
E
-I
N
V
E
S
T
M
E
N
T
 
P
E
R
IO
D
 
P
O
S
T
-I
N
V
E
S
T
M
E
N
T
 
P
E
R
IO
D
 
P
R
E
-I
N
V
E
S
T
M
E
N
T
 
P
E
R
IO
D
 
P
O
S
T
-I
N
V
E
S
T
M
E
N
T
 
P
E
R
IO
D
 
C
F i
t 
0
.0
4
6
3
  
0
.0
9
5
7
  
0
.5
8
3
9
 *
*
*
 
0
.2
8
0
9
 *
*
 
0
.4
2
1
0
 *
*
*
 
0
.2
8
5
0
 *
*
*
 
 
(0
.1
4
4
5
) 
 
(0
.1
0
9
1
) 
 
(0
.1
3
3
7
) 
 
(0
.1
1
7
8
) 
 
(0
.1
4
4
7
) 
 
(0
.1
0
1
0
) 
 
In
ta
n
g
it
 
1
.1
3
6
2
 *
*
*
 
0
.9
0
9
3
 *
*
*
 
0
.7
3
4
4
 *
*
*
 
0
.5
5
5
4
 *
*
*
 
1
.1
9
7
3
 *
*
*
 
0
.7
6
7
7
 *
*
*
 
 
(0
.1
5
0
2
) 
 
(0
.1
1
1
4
) 
 
(0
.1
1
9
5
) 
 
(0
.1
0
6
2
) 
 
(0
.1
4
1
8
) 
 
(0
.1
4
9
3
) 
 
S
iz
e
it
  
-0
.0
0
9
3
  
-0
.0
0
9
8
  
-0
.0
3
5
1
 *
*
 
-0
.0
2
0
4
 *
*
 
-0
.0
0
2
4
  
-0
.0
0
2
5
  
 
(0
.0
2
1
3
) 
 
(0
.0
2
4
8
) 
 
(0
.0
1
4
8
) 
 
(0
.0
0
9
2
) 
 
(0
.0
1
2
4
) 
 
(0
.0
0
6
8
) 
 
A
g
e i
t 
-0
.0
0
1
1
  
0
.0
0
0
3
  
-0
.0
0
1
9
 *
*
 
-0
.0
0
0
6
  
-0
.0
0
4
2
 *
*
 
-0
.0
0
2
3
 *
*
*
 
 
(0
.0
0
1
9
) 
 
(0
.0
0
2
0
) 
 
(0
.0
0
0
9
) 
 
(0
.0
0
0
6
) 
 
(0
.0
0
1
9
) 
 
(0
.0
0
0
9
) 
 
In
te
rc
ep
t 
0
.1
6
4
6
 *
 
0
.1
2
6
6
  
0
.2
3
1
9
 *
*
*
 
0
.1
7
4
6
 *
*
*
 
0
.0
9
9
1
 *
 
0
.1
9
6
3
 *
*
*
 
 
(0
.0
8
5
2
) 
 
(0
.0
9
3
3
) 
 
(0
.0
6
3
8
) 
 
(0
.0
4
8
2
) 
 
(0
.0
5
6
1
) 
 
(0
.0
6
2
3
) 
 
N
º 
o
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s 
1
8
8
 
2
3
0
 
8
5
3
 
8
4
2
 
5
3
1
 
5
4
2
 
N
o
 g
ro
u
p
s 
4
6
 
4
6
 
1
6
7
 
1
6
7
 
1
0
7
 
1
0
8
 
T
h
e 
ta
b
le
 r
ep
or
ts
 t
h
e 
G
e
n
e
ra
lis
e
d
 L
e
as
t 
S
q
u
a
re
s,
 r
an
d
o
m
 e
ff
ec
ts
, 
es
ti
m
a
ti
on
 o
f 
th
e
 m
o
d
el
. 
T
h
e
 d
e
p
en
d
en
t 
va
ri
a
b
le
 i
s 
th
e 
ra
ti
o
 b
et
w
ee
n
 i
n
ve
st
m
en
ts
 (
i.
e.
 i
n
cr
e
as
e
 i
n
 n
et
 f
ix
ed
 a
ss
e
ts
 o
f 
th
e
 
fi
rm
 i
 i
n
 y
e
ar
 t
 p
lu
s 
d
ep
re
ci
at
io
n
 i
n
 y
ea
r 
t)
 a
n
d
 b
eg
in
n
in
g
-o
f-
p
er
io
d
 t
ot
al
 a
ss
et
s 
o
f 
th
e
 f
ir
m
. 
T
h
e 
in
d
ep
en
d
en
t 
va
ri
ab
le
s 
a
re
: 
(1
) 
C
F i
t-
1
: 
n
et
 e
ar
n
in
g
s 
p
lu
s 
d
ep
re
ci
at
io
n
 d
iv
id
e
d
 b
y 
b
eg
in
n
in
g
-
of
-p
er
io
d
 t
o
ta
l 
a
ss
et
s;
 (
2
) 
In
ta
n
g
it
: 
in
ta
n
g
ib
le
 f
ix
ed
 a
ss
et
s 
n
or
m
a
lis
e
d
 b
y 
b
e
g
in
n
in
g
-o
f-
p
e
ri
o
d
 t
ot
a
l 
a
ss
et
s;
 (
3
) 
S
iz
e
it
: 
n
at
u
ra
l 
lo
g
ar
it
h
m
 o
f 
to
ta
l 
th
e
 n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
em
p
lo
ye
es
 o
f 
th
e 
fi
rm
 i
 i
n
 t
h
e
 
p
er
io
d
 t
; 
(4
) 
A
g
e i
: 
a
g
e 
of
 t
h
e 
fi
rm
 i
 a
t 
th
e 
p
er
io
d
 t
; 
(5
) 
T
M
T
i:
 d
u
m
m
y 
va
ri
a
b
le
 i
n
d
ic
at
in
g
 f
ir
m
s 
w
h
ic
h
 o
p
e
ra
te
 i
n
 t
h
e
 t
e
ch
n
ol
og
y,
 m
ed
ia
 a
n
d
 t
e
le
co
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n
s.
; 
(6
) 
V
C
i:
 d
u
m
m
y 
va
ri
ab
le
 
in
d
ic
at
in
g
 f
ir
m
s 
in
 t
h
e 
V
C
-b
ac
ke
d
 g
ro
u
p
 (
i.
e.
 0
 f
or
 f
ir
m
s 
in
 t
h
e 
co
n
tr
ol
 g
ro
u
p
).
 A
ll 
ra
ti
o
s 
ar
e
 w
in
so
ri
se
d
 a
t 
th
e 
2
%
 t
h
re
sh
o
ld
. 
R
ob
u
st
 s
ta
n
d
ar
d
 e
rr
or
s 
a
re
 r
e
p
or
te
d
 i
n
 p
a
re
n
th
e
si
s.
 *
*
*
, 
*
*
 
an
d
 *
 i
n
d
ic
a
te
, 
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
, 
si
g
n
if
ic
a
n
ce
 l
ev
e
ls
 o
f 
<
1
%
, 
<
5
%
 a
n
d
 <
1
0
%
.  
VC AND PE ON INVESTMENT-CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY OF SPANISH SMES 
CHAPTER 4: FINANCIAL MARKET IMPERFECTIONS, CONTROL AVERSION AND VC IN SPANISH SMES 
 146 
To sum up, we find firm evidence that investments are sensitive to cash 
flows in all SMEs, including firms that are later invested by VC, consistently 
with Hypothesis 4.1. Regarding the period after the investment, we find that 
the investment-cash flow sensitivity is significantly reduced in the VC-backed 
group, with the interaction term showing a significantly smaller dependency in 
that group when compared with the control group, consistently with our 
Hypothesis 4.2. VC institutions thus effectively alleviate the investment 
dependency on internally generated funds in growing SMEs. Finally, all the 
results shown in this section are robust to an alternative measure of growth 
opportunities, namely growth of sales. The regressions are available upon 
request to authors. 
 
4.5. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
SMEs have a difficult access to external funding due to both problems 
stemming from information asymmetries, which limit the supply of external 
capital towards them, and problems deriving from control aversion of 
entrepreneurs, which limit their own demand for external capital in the first 
place. Information asymmetries cause suppliers of financial resources to 
demand enough assets as to be used as collateral and high interest rates, thus 
conditioning the ability of SMEs to take advantage of their growth 
opportunities. The fear of losing control on their businesses also limits the 
interest of entrepreneurs in finding external equity. As a result, most SMEs 
basically rely on their internally generated funds to finance growth.  
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VC is a long term source of external equity, which also brings value-
added in the form of corporate governance and mentoring activities. Those 
value-added activities enhance the reliability of investee’s financial statements 
and of the business itself. The increased equity base and the more solid 
accounts help entrepreneurs to raise long term resources, thus reducing the 
investment dependency on internally generated funds. Additionally, the 
temporary nature of the holding period of minority stakes by VC investors, 
also diminishes the control aversion shown by entrepreneurs. 
In this work we analyse to what extent VC investors reduce the 
investment dependency on cash flow in fast-growing SMEs. We carry out our 
analyses on a sample of 322 growing Spanish SMEs that received a VC 
investment over the period 1995-2004. Our results are compared with a one-
by-one matched sample of similar SMEs with no VC involvement.  
After controlling for growth opportunities, size, age and sector, we find 
evidence of a positive and significant relationship between investment and 
cash flow when all firms, both VC-backed and not, are included in the analysis. 
As regards VC-backed firms, a significant reduction in the investment 
dependency on cash flows is found after the initial VC investment event. 
Although the relationship between investment and cash flow is positive and 
significant in both pre and post-investment periods, except in the group of 
TMT firms, the value of the coefficient decreases sharply after the entry of 
venture capitalists. 
Our contribution to the literature is threefold. First, we provide new 
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evidence to the scarce and mixed results found in this field (Manigart et al., 
2002; Bertoni et al., 2008; and Engel and Stiebale, 2009). Second, we provide 
a separate view in different sectors, highlighting the role of VC investors in low 
and medium technology sectors such as manufacturing and general services, 
while the sectoral dimension is often neglected in the literature. Finally, this is, 
to our knowledge, the first study about the investment behaviour of VC- and 
non-VC-backed Spanish SMEs and, as such, it is based on a totally unexplored 
population. 
Regarding our limitations, we base our analyses on a static random 
effects model, building on the classical model by Fazzari et al. (1988), and 
using an alternative measure of growth opportunities. Since we aim to fully 
separate the pre and post-investment periods, the lack of data prevents us 
from using other approaches, such as the sales accelerator model (Abel and 
Blanchard, 1988) or the Euler equation model (Bond and Meghir, 1994), which 
require a larger time window to converge. However, our results are consistent 
across estimates and are not significantly affected when we estimate the 
models on difference sub-samples, which reassures us on their robustness. 
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5.1. INTRODUCTION 
Venture Capital (VC, hereafter) is a source of external equity aiming at 
new firms with high growth potential. These unlisted firms are often 
considered to be financially constrained. On the one hand, they have very 
limited access to both debt and external equity when compared with listed 
firms. On the other hand, their ability to generate free cash flows from 
operations (i.e. internal financing) is often, especially for high-tech firms, out 
of reach (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002b). In parallel, the Private Equity (PE, 
hereafter) focus of investments moved away from newly created fast-growing 
firms and increasingly oriented towards large, mature firms, mostly related to 
low and medium technology sectors (EVCA, 1988-2008). In most cases the 
purpose of PE transactions is to provide an exit for the existing shareholders in 
firms that are no longer experiencing high growth rates, but have stable cash 
flows to pay back debt. 
VC and PE investments include a wide scope of activities in firms at 
different stages, from funding start ups or firms at the expansion stage to 
structuring levered acquisitions, and the role played by these investors 
changes dramatically as well. VC and PE investments are also performed in a 
wide variety of sectors, including low and high technology, with the former 
having, at least in Europe, a larger share.  
The aim of this chapter is to identify the different role played by VC and 
PE investors by analysing the investment-cash flow sensitivity in investee 
firms operating in low and medium technology firms, before and after the 
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investment event. We centre on a very large sample of Spanish low and 
medium tech manufacturing and services firms that were invested in between 
1995 and 2004 at the expansion (VC) or buyout stages (PE). We estimate 
several specifications of an Euler equation relying on different assumptions 
about the extent of the ‘structural break’ which is caused by VC and PE 
investments.  
We find consistent results across different specifications that low and 
medium technology firms at the expansion stage that were eventually funded 
by VC investors showed a positive and significant relationship between 
investments and cash flows before the investment event. Investment-cash 
flow sensitivity becomes almost insignificant in the post-investment period, 
suggesting that VC does reduce firm’s dependency of investments on 
internally generated cash flows. On the contrary, we find that late stage low 
and medium tech firms did not show any significant investment-cash flow 
sensitivity before they were acquired by a PE investor but that positive 
relationship between investment and cash flows emerges subsequently. This 
latter piece of evidence is particularly new to the literature and is consistent 
with our hypotheses (see the discussion in section 5.2). VC invests in firms 
that exhibit a positive correlation between investments and cash flow, and 
subsequently eases that dependency. PE, on the contrary, invests in firms that 
are not dependent on internally generated cash flows, and engages in asset 
management activities which, combined with a substantial increase in 
leverage, put managers under the pressure of debt repayment. In other 
words, we show that while VC is eventually successful in alleviating the above-
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mentioned dependency faced by new unlisted firms at the expansion stage 
(Carpenter and Petersen, 2002a), PE causes investment-cash flow sensitivity 
to wipe up management conservatism in consolidated firms. 
 
5.2. RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
Obtaining financing is one of the necessary conditions to spur growth in 
fast-growing firms. These firms face important information asymmetries 
(Frank and Goyal, 2003), due to both the lack of a reliable financial track 
record (Ang, 1991; Chittenden et al., 1996; Berger and Udell, 1998) and the 
uncertainty of future growth opportunities (Berger and Udell, 2002), which 
derive from adverse selection and moral hazard problems that limit their 
ability to attract funding from traditional external sources. As a result, these 
firms are likely to be more constrained than others in financing their growth 
opportunities with only internally generated funds. VC, however, arises as an 
alternative source of external equity for a number of fast-growing firms. 
Allegedly, firms which eventually are invested in by venture capitalists, should 
then exhibit high investment sensitivity to cash flows. Hypothesis 5.1 follows 
naturally from this discussion. 
Hypothesis 5.1:  The relationship between cash flow and investment should 
be positive and significant in firms that are either funded by 
a VC institution later or not. 
The contribution of PE to the investment-cash flow sensitivity of mature 
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firms is likely to be dramatically different from that of VC. Before the 
acquisition by a PE organisation, mature firms are far less dependent on 
external financing to finance their investment projects because they are less 
affected by information asymmetries than newly created firms without any 
track record (Frank and Goyal, 2003). These firms have a relatively longer 
operating history (Jelic et al., 2005), assets that can be used as collateral 
(Harris and Raviv, 1991), low gearing (Smith, 1990; Wright, Gilligan and 
Amess, 2009), stable cash flows, and more limited investment opportunities 
(Smith, 1990; Wright et al., 2001; Jelic et al., 2005). As Wright et al. (1992) 
point out, these target firms exhibit great capacity to generate financial 
resources, together with limited growth prospects. On these grounds, no 
significant dependence between investments and cash flows should be found 
in these firms before the PE investment event. Eventually, the reason itself 
why PE investors find these firms an interesting target might be the fact that 
they are not sufficiently ‘under pressure’ from financial constraints and, hence, 
end up being managed with excessive conservatism, as suggested by their low 
pre-investment productivity (Litchenberg and Siegel, 1987; Harris et al., 
2005). Accordingly, we expect the following. 
Hypothesis 5.2:  Before a PE acquisition the dependency of firm’s investments 
to cash flows should be marginally significant. 
Moving now to the post-investment period, significant changes are 
expected in both VC and PE-backed firms. As an alternative source of external 
funding, and unlike other financial intermediaries, VC investors can also 
alleviate the problems of information asymmetries in fast-growing firms 
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(Gompers and Lerner, 2001; Hsu, 2004) by gaining private information on 
projects during the pre-investment screening (Rajan, 1992; Admati and 
Pfleiderer, 1994; Reid, 1996). In parallel, they add value to the firms they 
invest in (Sahlman, 1990; Gompers and Lerner, 1998; Jain, 2001; Hellmann 
and Puri, 2002; Chemmanur et al., 2009; among others).29 The value-added 
by VC investors is positively perceived by both the entrepreneurs (Hsu, 2004) 
and other stakeholders (e.g. signalling effect: Megginson and Weiss, 1991; 
Stuart et al., 1999). The impact of VC on firm’s financial constraints is, hence, 
expected to result in a very strong reduction in the extent to which firms have 
to rely on internally generated cash flows to fund their investments. 
Hypothesis 5.3:  After VC financing the sensitivity of firm’s investment to cash 
flows should be significantly reduced, or even disappear. 
Money committed by PE investors is, instead, mainly spent in buying 
existing shares from incumbent shareholders, with leverage representing 60 to 
90 per cent of the price paid (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009). This implies that 
normally no financial resource is conveyed to the firm itself. PE investors 
commit their share alone or accompanied by new and/or the existing 
managerial team. After the acquisition, there is active asset management 
aimed at enhancing the return on assets and raising cash to deleverage. 
Similarly, there is an active involvement in the management of the firm to 
control and monitor operational cash flow generation. In parallel, the high debt 
                                                 
29  As active investors, venture capitalists provide many value added services to investee firms 
such as monitoring and advisory services, as well as reputational capital (Sahlman, 1990; 
Gompers and Lerner, 1998). The type of assistance included (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989): 
help with obtaining additional financing; strategic planning; management recruitment; 
operational planning; introductions to potential customers and suppliers; and resolving 
compensation issues.  
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levels limit the possibility of accomplishing high growth rates after the 
acquisition.30 As a result, due to the asset management activities performed, 
which usually involve selling non-core assets (Wright et al., 2009), and the 
limited capacity to attract additional long term financing, we may find that 
positive investment sensitivity to cash flow arises after the acquisition. We 
hence expect the following. 
Hypothesis 5.4:  After a buyout in mature firms, the high level of debt used in 
the acquisition and the tight asset management carried out 
should lead to positive and significant investment-cash flow 
sensitivity. 
 
5.3. METHODOLOGY 
Several econometric models have been developed and adopted in the 
past few years to analyse the investment–cash flow sensitivity of firms (see 
Hubbard (1998), and Bond and Van Reenen (2007) for extensive reviews on 
this topic). The main distinction among different models is how they control 
for unobservable investment opportunities (which determine how much a firm 
should invest if no financial constraints were present). Controlling for 
investment opportunities is fundamental in this field, since they are likely to 
be correlated with current cash flows, which are used as a measure of the 
availability of internal capital. Consequently a relationship between current 
                                                 
30  The exception to that rule is Buy and Build operations, also known as Leveraged Build-ups, 
where the leverage raised is used to spur growth though simultaneous acquisitions to gain 
size rapidly. 
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investment and cash flows can be nothing but a spurious correlation due to 
time varying unobserved heterogeneity (e.g. an increase in productivity will 
increase the profitability of investment opportunities, which will in turn 
translate into higher investments, and, at the same time, will boost cash 
flows; thus a positive correlation between investments and cash flows would 
be found even in the absence of financial constraints). In theory, investment 
opportunities could be captured by including the firm’s marginal Tobin’s q in 
the model. This is, however, difficult to estimate empirically, even for listed 
firms (see Hubbard, 1998), and virtually impossible for unlisted firms. Other 
alternative approaches have been proposed in the literature. For instance, 
Abel and Blanchard (1988) used a sales accelerator model which, with some 
modifications, is adopted by Manigart et al. (2003) and by Engel and Stiebale 
(2009). An alternative approach is to estimate an Euler equation (Bond and 
Meghir, 1994). This latter approach is followed by Whited (1992), Bond and 
Meghir (1994), Alti (2003), Whited and Wu (2006), and Bertoni et al. (2008), 
among others. In addition to the alternative reference to the Tobin’s q as an 
estimate of growth opportunities, properly controlling unobserved growth 
opportunities, the effects of debt may also be assessed.  
The basic specification of the Euler equation for firm’s investments is as 
follows (Bond and Meghir, 1994): 
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where Ii,t measures the level of investments of firm i in period t, Ki,t is the end-
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of-period-t net value of firm i’s invested assets; CFi,t is firm i’s cash flow in 
period t; Si,t is firm i’s sales during period t and Di,t is firm i’s end-of-period-t 
total debts. If there are capital market imperfections and the external capital 
supply curve is upward sloping, 3β  should be positive and statistically 
significant, otherwise it should not be statistically different from zero. Equation 
(5.1) includes the lagged value of the dependent variable (and its square) 
among the regressors and, consequently, needs to be estimated by using a 
technique which controls for endogeneity since both Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) and fixed-effects panel estimates would be biased (Bond et al., 2001). 
The technique which is most often used in recent years is the Generalised 
Method of Moments (GMM) estimation. In this work we use two step System-
GMM estimation (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) with 
finite-sample correction (Windmeijer, 2005). The choice of System-GMM, as 
opposed to Difference-GMM, is motivated by the better performance in terms 
of precision of estimates which this technique is commonly found to give, 
especially when the dependent variable, as in this case, is highly persistent.31  
To understand whether investment–cash flow sensitivity is affected by VC 
and PE financing, we estimate a set of augmented versions of equation (5.1), 
each of them corresponding to different hypotheses regarding the evolution of 
the parameters. The most general version of our model is as follows: 
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31  We also run all our estimates using Difference-GMM and the results are surprisingly similar to 
the ones we find using System-GMM.  
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where 
iINV
t is the time when a VC or PE investor first invests in the firm. 
Equation (5.2) allows all parameters to vary throughout the investment. Our 
hypotheses can be easily translated in terms of tests made on coefficients in 
equation (5.2). The parameter of interest for Hypotheses 5.1 and 5.2 is PRE3β , 
which is expected to be positive and significant in the expansion sample and 
non significantly different from zero in the buyout sample. Hypotheses 5.3 and 
5.4 translate, instead, in tests on POST3β and the extent to which it is different 
from zero. According to Hypothesis 5.3, POST3β  should be close to zero, or at 
least positive but smaller than PRE3β , in the subsample of VC-backed firms at 
the expansion stage. According to Hypothesis 5.4, POST3β should be positive and 
significant, or at least greater than PRE3β , in the subsample of PE-backed 
buyouts. 
Estimating equation (5.2) proves to be complicated by the fact that 
iINV
t  
itself is not exogenous but endogenous, i.e. correlated with unobservable 
shifts in investment opportunities (which increase investments and attract 
external investors). To circumvent this problem we rely on different estimates 
for (5.2) and expect that results which hold across different models are, 
indeed, robust. 
First, we estimate the two equations separately on the pre-investment 
and post-investment window. This estimation allows all coefficients to vary 
and would lead to correct estimates if 
iINV
t  was exogenous. However, even 
with an exogenous timing of investment, this technique leads to a serious 
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reduction in the efficiency of estimates. Making no assumptions at all on the 
coefficients of (5.2) leads to a serious reduction in the degrees of freedom 
available. This is true especially for the two α  parameters which capture, 
broadly speaking, the ‘trend’ in firm’s investments. By allowing PREiα  to differ 
from POSTiα , we basically allow each firm to change its trend in investment 
after it receives VC or PE. While this is clearly a more conservative assumption 
than imposing a fixed structure on the relationship between PREiα  and POSTiα it 
calls for the estimation of N2  intercepts, where N indicates the number of 
firms in the panel. Imposing more structure, for instance by allowing 
δαα += PREiPOSTi , would only entail the estimation of 1+N  parameters. When N 
is large (in our case N=324) and T (the time horizon) is short (in our case it 
averages at 9.5), the loss of efficiency freedom is huge. This is made even 
worse by the fact that equation (5.2) includes the lagged dependent variable 
among the regressors. This means that in the post-investment period all 
observations in time 
iINV
tt =  are dropped from estimation, thus reducing 
degrees of freedom by a further N.  
At the other extreme, we estimate a model in which only the cash flow 
coefficient and the intercept are allowed to change across the VC or PE 
investment. 
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where 
iINVtt
I ≥ is an indicator (dummy) variable which equals 1 after the 
investment is made and PREi
POST
i ααδ −=  is the acceleration (assumed constant 
across firms) in firms’ investments after the investment is made. Equation 
(5.3) has two significant advantages over the splitting of the sample. The first 
is that equation (5.3) allows a significant increase in efficiency estimation, 
including only 2 parameters to estimate on top of those of a pooled equation 
and there is no loss of observations across 
iINV
t . The second, methodologically 
more interesting, advantage is that some control for the endogeneity of 
iINV
t  
can be included in the estimates. The main advantage of the GMM approach is 
that it allows for a vast flexibility about the assumption on the exogeneity of 
each variable. By assuming that 
iINVtt
I ≥  is endogenous, and hence including its 
lagged values as instruments in the first differenced equations and its lagged 
first differences as instrument for the level equations, we can control, albeit 
imperfectly, for the endogeneity of external investments. However, we reckon 
that equation (5.3) does impose an excessive structure on the model by 
forcing all other coefficients in (5.2) not to vary after the investment is made.  
The intertemporal first-order condition from which the Euler equation 
derives, suggests to us that changes in firm’s productivity or cost of capital will 
translate into shifts in the coefficients and, especially in 4β  and 5β . We hence 
estimate the following specification of equation (5.2): 
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Equation (5.4) allows, according to us, to the best compromise between 
model flexibility and estimation efficiency. It also allows us, just as we had for 
equation (5.3) to include the presence of an external investor as endogenous 
variable, thus allowing us to partially control for the endogenous switching 
between the ‘non-invested’ and the ‘invested’ status. 
As will be shown in section 5.4, although our VC and PE subsamples are 
quite balanced across industries, so that biases arising from different sectoral 
compositions are unlikely to arise, we include a further estimate to control 
how cash flow sensitivity pre and post-investment evolves in different 
industries. This allows us to see whether VC and PE backed firms in different 
industries exhibit different investment behaviours before and after they are 
invested. To do so, we augment equation (5.3) by including sectoral 
interaction terms: 
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where 
iss
I = is an indicator (dummy) variable equal to 1 when firm i is in sector 
s and zero otherwise. The reason why we chose equation (5.3) as the basis to 
build equation (5.5), rather than using equation (5.4) which is more general, 
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is that interacting coefficients with sectoral classification boosts geometrically 
the number of coefficients to estimate. We hence only decided to allow the 
interaction of the cash flow coefficient with sectoral dummies. We 
acknowledge that, with a higher number of observations, a more general 
model would have been preferable. However, considering the small differences 
we find in estimates between equation (5.3) and (5.4) we are quite confident 
that results from equation (5.5), which we use only as an additional evidence 
and robustness test, are sufficiently sound. 
Finally, a further note on the instrument’s set which is used in System-
GMM estimations is due. We include among exogenous variables time 
dummies, sector dummies and (in equations in which stages are pooled, as in 
Table 5.4) stage dummies. In addition to the presence of the external 
investor, we include all the covariates in the set of endogenous variables, such 
as (lagged) investments, cash flows, sales and debt. This might be considered 
a somewhat excessively cautious assumption. However, the studies mentioned 
in section 5.2 do not propose a unanimous theoretical argument about which 
variables should be considered endogenous and which ones can be considered 
as exogenous or predetermined. We hence decided for the most general 
assumption. To limit the number of instruments and reduce overidentification, 
we limit the number of lags included in the regressions to 3 (i.e. lagged 
investments are used as instruments from t-2 to t-5 in differences for the level 
equations and from t-3 to t-6 in levels for the first differenced equations). We 
are still left with a sufficiently rich number of instruments without including 
very weak instruments such as remote lags of the covariates. To enhance 
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comparability we maintain the same set of instruments in all our 
specifications. The Hansen tests never reject the validity of the overidentifying 
restrictions, reassuring us about the soundness of our results. 
 
5.4. SAMPLE AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
5.4.1. THE SAMPLING PROCESS 
The sample used in this paper is based on unlisted Spanish firms that 
were subject to expansion (VC) and later stage (PE) investments between 
1995 and 2004. In accordance with the data obtained from Spanish Private 
Equity and Venture Capital Association (ASCRI), in that period 1,572 VC and 
PE investments were recorded in Spain, including all stages but not counting 
firms belonging to the finance and real-estate sectors (Martí et al., 2010). We 
include in the population 1,313 of these firms. The remaining 259 firms 
include firms that never reported to the Official Register, for which accounting 
information is unavailable, and firms that were acquired less than three years 
after the PE investment, for which the post-investment window is too short to 
be significant. Regarding the former group some firms did not report on 
purpose, whereas others were early stage firms that never made it to the first 
or the second year. Regarding the latter, the acquired firms were mostly firms 
at the expansion or late stages that were subject to a rapid acquisition by a 
third party and in which PE only played the role of bridge financing. As a 
result, firms excluded from the sample do not seem to introduce a significant 
success bias in our analysis. For all 1,313 firms we take accounting 
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information from the AMADEUS Database, which records information on 
1,202,363 Spanish firms.  
Since the aim of this chapter is to analyse the change in the investment-
cash flow sensitivity in VC- and PE-backed firms, we need to have a sufficient 
number of pre-investment observations, which would not be the case for early 
stage firms. After excluding 575 early stage firms from the sample, the 
remaining 738 firms belong to the expansion (579 firms) and buyout (159 
firms) stages. We also restrict sectoral heterogeneity by focusing on the most 
typical sectors in which VC and PE invest. Accordingly we exclude from the 
sample 98 VC-backed and 12 PE-backed firms in the following sectors: 
Research & Development, High-tech manufacturing, and Primary. 
In order to properly address the requirements of the dynamic models 
that are required in the empirical work, we only retained those firms for which 
we could have at least six consecutive years with complete accounting data. A 
huge effort was spent in tracking these firms over time since most VC and PE 
investors create new vehicles to pursue their acquisitions. Combining 
accounting data from the pre and post-investment period was however not 
always possible. In some cases, information was available in consolidated 
accounts but not in both the pre and post-investment period. In other cases, 
investors acquired two (or more) firms which were merged immediately 
afterwards. As a result, we were able to get reliable accounting data on six or 
more consecutive years, including the investment year, for 246 firms at the 
expansion stage and 78 firms that were subject to a buyout deal, representing 
51.1 per cent and 53.1 per cent of the number of fully identified firms in their 
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respective categories. 
Sample firms operate in the following low and medium research-intensive 
manufacturing and general services sectors (Dunning, 1986; Cantwell and 
Barnard, 2008): provision of electricity, gas, water, etc.; construction; 
wholesale and retail trade; hotels and restaurants; transportation; food 
products; beverages; textiles; clothing; leather and leather-type products; 
wood and wood products; paper and paper products; furniture and recycling; 
chemicals and chemical products; rubber and plastic products; building 
materials; basic metals and metal products; and motor vehicles and other 
transportation equipment. 
 
5.4.2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 5.1 reports the distribution of sample firms. Panel A shows the 
distribution of sample firms across sectors and Panel B reports the industry 
distribution of firms by stage. During the period 1995-2004, the VC 
investment in sample firms concentrates on low research-intensive 
manufacturing and general services (36.1 per cent and 33.6 per cent, 
respectively). Basically, these external investors invest more in firms at the 
expansion stage than at the buyout stage (75.9 per cent and 24.1 per cent, 
respectively).  
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TABLE 5.1. 
DISTRIBUTION OF THE SAMPLE FIRMS 
PANEL A: DISTRIBUTION OF THE SAMPLE FIRMS ACCORDING TO INDUSTRY 
TOTAL SAMPLE 
SECTOR 
n % 
General services  109  33.6 
Low research-intensive manufacturing  117  36.1 
Medium research-intensive manufacturing  98  30.3 
Total  324  100.0 
PANEL B: DISTRIBUTION OF THE SAMPLE FIRMS ACCORDING TO INDUSTRY BY STAGES 
Total sample General services 
Low research-
intensive 
manufacturing 
Medium research-
intensive 
manufacturing Stage 
n % n % n % n % 
Expansion  246  75.9  83 33.7  90 36.6 73 29.7 
Later stage  78  24.1  26 33.3  27 34.6 25 32.1 
Total  324  100.0  109 33.6  117 36.1 98 30.3 
Panel A shows the distribution according to industry of a sample of 324 unlisted Spanish firms that were subject to a VC and 
PE investment during the period 1995-2004. 
Panel B shows the sectoral distribution across different stages. Percentages in ‘Total sample’ column are related to the total 
number of sample firm. Percentages in the ‘General services’, ‘Low research-intensive manufacturing’ and ‘Medium research-
intensive manufacturing’ columns are related to the total number of the firms in respectively the expansion or later stage. 
It is quite important for our purposes to underline that the sectoral 
composition of VC and PE investments in our sample is similar. A χ2 test does 
not reject the hypothesis that the two samples come from the same 
underlying sectoral distribution (χ2(2)=2.65). This reassures us that our 
results will not be driven by differences in investment-cash flow sensitivity 
across sectors. Still, as an additional robustness check, we will control for 
sectoral specificities by estimating equation (5.5). It should be noted, 
however, that the similarity in sectoral distribution in our sample should not be 
generalised to the whole VC and PE industry but is mainly the result of our 
choice to exclude from the analysis high-tech and Research and Development 
VC AND PE ON INVESTMENT-CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY OF SPANISH SMES 
CHAPTER 5: VC, PE AND INVESTEE FIRM’S INVESTMENT SENSITIVITY TO CASH FLOW 
173 
(R&D) firms, where VC is far more specialised than PE.  
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 report some descriptive statistics for the pre and post-
investment periods, respectively. The descriptive statistics of investment is 
shown in Panel A, whereas those related to cash flow are shown in Panel B. 
The statistics are broken down by stage and sector. All variables are 
normalised using end-of-period-t-1 stock of fixed assets. To control for the 
potential influence of outliers (which are extremely relevant when dealing with 
accounting ratios), all the variables are winsorised at a 2 per cent cut-off value 
for each tail. In other words, we truncate the distribution of each variable and 
impute to all observations falling beyond the 2nd and 98th percentiles the 
respective threshold levels.32 The accounting information on the related firms 
was expressed in constant 2005 Euros using the Harmonised Consumer Price 
Index as deflator. Accounting information includes data from 1991 up to 2007, 
whenever possible.33 
                                                 
32  This technique is usual in this field of analysis. See Cleary (1999) and Bertoni et al. (2008), 
among others. We replicate all the regressions using 1 per cent and 5 per cent winsorising 
thresholds and obtain fairly similar results.  
33  In a few firms data about 2008 are also included. 
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TABLE 5.2. 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON INVESTMENT AND CASH FLOW 
(PRE-INVESTMENT PERIOD) 
PANEL A: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON INVESTMENT ACCORDING TO INDUSTRY ACROSS STAGES 
Sector 
Stage Total sample 
General services 
Low research-
intensive 
manufacturing 
Medium 
research-
intensive 
manufacturing 
Expansion     
Observations 1,213 432 466 315 
Mean 0.5044 0.6116 0.4431 0.4481 
 
Std. Deviation 0.9279 1.0567 0.8363 0.8548 
Later stage     
Observations 410 147 131 132 
Mean 0.3732 0.5360 0.2440 0.3200 
 
Std. Deviation 0.6366 0.7614 0.3235 0.6828 
Total sample     
Observations 1,623 579 597 447 
Mean 0.4712 0.5924 0.3994 0.4103 
 
Std. Deviation 0.8654 0.9900 0.7585 0.8092 
PANEL B: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON CASH FLOW ACCORDING TO INDUSTRY ACROSS STAGES 
Sector 
Stage Total sample 
General services 
Low research-
intensive 
manufacturing 
Medium 
research-
intensive 
manufacturing 
Expansion     
Observations 1,213 432 466 315 
Mean 0.3079 0.3537 0.2636 0.3107 
 
Std. Deviation 0.4851 0.5779 0.4326 0.4086 
Later stage     
Observations 410 147 131 132 
Mean 0.3356 0.4658 0.2280 0.2973 
 
Std. Deviation 0.4159 0.5422 0.2089 0.3700 
Total sample     
Observations 1,623 579 597 447 
Mean 0.3149 0.3821 0.2558 0.3068 
 
Std. Deviation 0.4686 0.5707 0.3946 0.3972 
The table reports descriptive statistics on winsorised (2% each tail) values of the variables. All variables are normalised by 
using beginning-of-period stock of fixed assets. 
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TABLE 5.3. 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON INVESTMENT AND CASH FLOW 
(POST-INVESTMENT PERIOD) 
PANEL A: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON INVESTMENT ACCORDING TO INDUSTRY ACROSS STAGES 
Sector 
Stage Total sample 
General services 
Low research-
intensive 
manufacturing 
Medium 
research-
intensive 
manufacturing 
Expansion     
Observations 1,951 676 683 592 
Mean 0.3471 0.3924 0.3167 0.3304 
 
Std. Deviation 0.7329 0.8196 0.7361 0.6132 
Later stage     
Observations 605 210 210 185 
Mean 0.6542 0.4607 0.2732 0.3252 
 
Std. Deviation 0.8041 0.9929 0.6582 0.6996 
Total sample     
Observations 2,556 886 893 777 
Mean 0.3488 0.4086 0.3064 0.3292 
 
Std. Deviation 0.7502 0.8637 0.7184 0.6343 
PANEL B: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON CASH FLOW ACCORDING TO INDUSTRY ACROSS STAGES 
Sector 
Stage Total sample 
General services 
Low research-
intensive 
manufacturing 
Medium 
research-
intensive 
manufacturing 
Expansion     
Observations 1,951 676 683 592 
Mean 0.1660 0.1315 0.1615 0.2107 
 
Std. Deviation 0.3662 0.4044 0.3464 0.3372 
Later stage     
Observations 605 210 210 185 
Mean 0.2392 0.3743 0.1200 0.2211 
 
Std. Deviation 0.4284 0.5998 0.2929 0.2431 
Total sample     
Observations 2,556 886 893 777 
Mean 0.1834 0.1890 0.1518 0.2132 
 
Std. Deviation 0.3830 0.4694 0.3349 0.3172 
The table reports descriptive statistics on winsorised (2% each tail) values of the variables. All variables are normalised by 
using beginning-of-period stock of fixed assets. 
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During the pre-investment period, the average investment ratio (cash 
flow ratio) is higher (lower) for firms at the expansion stage than for firms at 
the buyout stage, as expected. The average investment ratio of firms at the 
expansion stage is 50.4 per cent, with the cash flow ratio being 30.8 per cent. 
Regarding buyouts, the average investment ratio stands at 37.3 per cent, 
whereas the cash flow ratio is 33.6 per cent. These findings might be reflecting 
the fast-growing process in the first group of firms, and the low growth rates 
and high level of available cash flow in mature, large firms during the period 
prior to the VC or PE investment, respectively.  
According to the industry, the situation previously described is evidenced 
for firms in every sector, namely general services, low research-intensive 
manufacturing, and medium research-intensive manufacturing. Thus, the 
average investment and cash flow ratios are greater for firms at the expansion 
stage than are those at the buyout stage. It is worth noting that firms 
belonging to the general services category exhibit the greatest level of 
investment and cash flow in the whole sample. This holds true both in 
expansion and buyout firms.  
As regards the post-investment period, the average investment and cash 
flow ratios are lower for firms at the expansion stage than they are for firms at 
the buyout stage. The average investment ratio of firms at the expansion 
stage is 34.7 per cent, with the cash flow ratio being 16.6 per cent. Turning to 
buyouts, the average investment ratio is 65.4 per cent, whereas the cash flow 
ratio stands at 23.9 per cent. After receiving VC funds, the growing process 
seems to be gradually absorbed in firms at the expansion stage, since they are 
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no longer experiencing high growth rates. Conversely, after a buyout deal, 
target firms exhibit a greater investment ratio and smaller cash flow ratio. 
These results may signal the active asset management carried out by PE 
managers after a buyout deal.  
 
5.5. RESULTS 
We begin the analysis of the evolution of cash flow sensitivity across VC 
and PE investments by reporting, in Table 5.4, the estimates of the models 
described in section 5.3 without any distinction between VC and PE 
investments. Estimates are obtained by including all firms in the regressions, 
regardless of their stage (namely expansion or buyout). We begin by noticing 
that Hansen, AR(1) and AR(2) tests respect in all models the expected level of 
significance. The Hansen test never rejects the null hypothesis of the validity 
of overidentifying restrictions, and errors exhibit a AR(1) structure but no 
higher order autocorrelation. Focusing on the coefficients of cash flow, we 
observe that, regardless of the model we consider, pre-investment sensitivity 
to cash flow is, on average, positive and significant and that post-investment 
sensitivity is still positive and significantly different from zero in two out of the 
three specifications of the model. Following our hypotheses, these results 
should be driven by the fact that we are pooling expansion and buy-out 
stages: the former are cash flow sensitive before the investment and the latter 
after the investment, resulting in a pooled sensitivity which is positive all over 
the interval. 
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TABLE 5.4. 
CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY BEFORE AND AFTER VC AND PE INVESTMENTS 
EQUATION (5.1) INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES PRE-INV POST-INV 
EQUATION (5.3) EQUATION (5.4) 
Investments(t-1)         
Pre-Inv 0.2129        
 (0.141)        
Post-Inv   0.1896 *     
   (0.101)      
Pooled     0.1436 * 0.1377 * 
     (0.076)  (0.075)  
Investments(t-1)2         
Pre-Inv -0.0240        
 (0.038)        
Post-Inv   -0.0250      
   (0.028)      
Pooled     -0.0080  -0.0067  
     (0.022)  (0.022)  
Cash flows         
Pre-Inv 0.5635 ***   0.6145 *** 0.8391 *** 
 (0.177)    (0.177)  (0.161)  
Post-Inv   0.3637 * 0.4581 ** 0.2325  
   (0.210)  (0.222)  (0.257)  
Sales         
Pre-Inv -0.0061      -0.0080  
 (0.010)      (0.009)  
Post-Inv   0.0065    0.0157  
   (0.013)    (0.015)  
Pooled     0.0039    
     (0.009)    
Debt2         
Pre-Inv 0.0247 **     0.0272 *** 
 (0.010)      (0.009)  
Post-Inv   0.0305 ***   0.0368 *** 
   (0.008)    (0.009)  
Pooled     0.0305 ***   
     (0.006)    
δ     0.0930 * 0.0246  
     (0.053)  (0.056)  
Intercept 0.1519 *** 0.0829 *** -0.0016  0.0360  
 (0.044)  (0.029)  (0.046)  (0.047)  
Observations 1,285  1,926  2,971  2,971  
Firms 255  321  324  324  
Hansen 217.7  266.7  309.5  309.8  
Hansen d.o.f. 217  252  324  322  
Hansen p-value 0.4745  0.2524  0.7100  0.6763  
AR(1) -4.0930 *** -6.5963 *** -7.3612 *** -7.1539 *** 
AR(2) -1.5577  0.1897  -0.5336  -0.8289  
The table reports two-step System-GMM estimates with finite sample correction estimates on equations (5.1), (5.3) and 
(5.4) presented in section 5.3. The dependent variable is firm i’s investment ratio at time t. The independent variables are 
defined as: Cash flow is firm i’s cash flow in period t, Sales is firm i’s sales during period t, and Debt is firm i’s end-of-
period-t total debts. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate, respectively, significance levels of 
<1%, <5% and <10%. AR(1) and AR(2) are tests of the null hypothesis of, respectively, no first- or second-order serial 
correlation. Hansen is a test of the validity of the overidentifying restrictions based on the efficient two-step GMM 
estimator. Investments, Cash flows, and Debt are all normalised by beginning of period level of fixed assets. Pre- and Post- 
row report estimates of coefficients respectively before or after the investment event. Pooled rows refer to coefficients 
which are assumed to remain constant. 
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To ascertain whether our hypotheses are correct we perform all estimates 
separately on the expansion and buyout samples. Results are reported in 
Table 5.5. Panel A shows the estimates of different models on the sample of 
expansion stage deals. Again, all diagnostic tests are within the acceptable 
limits. Coherently with Hypothesis 5.1, and with the results of related works, 
the investment-cash flow sensitivity of firms at expansion stage before 
receiving VC is positive and strongly significant in all models, ranging from 
0.7072 in the split estimate of model (5.1) to 0.9683 in the estimation of 
equation (5.4). The post-investment sensitivity to cash flow is remarkably 
lower, ranging from 0.3409 in equation (5.4) to 0.4546 in equation (5.3). 
Moreover, it is not statistically different from zero in two of the three models, 
and retains a weak significance (p-value 8.7 per cent) in one case (equation 
5.3). This is fully in line with our Hypothesis 5.3: after VC financing the 
sensitivity of firm’s investment to cash flow is significantly reduced and, 
almost, disappears.  
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TABLE 5.5. 
CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY FOR VC-BACKED AND PE-BACKED FIRMS 
BEFORE AND AFTER THE INVESTMENT EVENT 
PANEL A: EXPANSION 
EQUATION (5.1) INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES PRE-VC POST-VC 
EQUATION (5.3) EQUATION (5.4) 
Investments(t-1)         
Pre-VC 0.3242 **       
 (0.146)        
Post-VC   0.2529 **     
   (0.112)      
Pooled     0.1297  0.1326  
     (0.086)  (0.084)  
Investments(t-1)2         
Pre-VC -0.0524        
 (0.041)        
Post-VC   -0.0327      
   (0.032)      
Pooled     0.0012  0.0001  
     (0.025)  (0.025)  
Cash flows         
Pre-VC 0.7072 ***   0.7695 *** 0.9683 *** 
 (0.198)    (0.224)  (0.175)  
Post-VC   0.4048  0.4546 * 0.3409  
   (0.256)  (0.265)  (0.286)  
Sales         
Pre-VC -0.0152      -0.0078  
 (0.011)      (0.010)  
Post-VC   0.0129    0.0173  
   (0.012)    (0.013)  
Pooled     0.0045    
     (0.008)    
Debt2         
Pre-VC 0.0377 ***     0.0321 *** 
 (0.009)      (0.009)  
Post-VC   0.0192 ***   0.0220 *** 
   (0.007)    (0.007)  
Pooled     0.0273 ***   
     (0.005)    
δ     0.1006 * 0.0579  
     (0.054)  (0.059)  
Intercept 0.1314 ** 0.0542  -0.0149  0.0035  
 (0.052)  (0.034)  (0.044)  (0.045)  
Observations 918  1,417  2,156  2,156  
Firms 190  244  246  246  
Hansen 184.4  236.0  234.9  236.7  
Hansen d.o.f. 216  250  321  319  
Hansen p-value 0.9418  0.7286  0.9999  0.9998  
AR(1) -3.7536 *** -5.2356 *** -5.8554 *** -5.7656 *** 
AR(2) -1.3772  -0.3159  -1.0394  -1.1553  
The table reports two-step System-GMM estimates with finite sample correction estimates on equations (5.1), (5.3) and (5.4) 
presented in section 5.3. The dependent variable is firm i’s investment ratio at time t. The independent variables are defined as: 
Cash flow is firm i’s cash flow in period t, Sales is firm i’s sales during period t, and Debt is firm i’s end-of-period-t total 
debts. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate, respectively, significance levels of <1%, <5% and <10%. 
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests of the null hypothesis of, respectively, no first- or second-order serial correlation. Hansen is a test of the 
validity of the overidentifying restrictions based on the efficient two-step GMM estimator. Investments, Cash flows, and Debt are all 
normalised by beginning of period level of fixed assets. Pre- and Post- row report estimates of coefficients respectively before or after 
the investment event. Pooled rows refer to coefficients which are assumed to remain constant. 
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TABLE 5.5. (CONT.) 
CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY FOR VC-BACKED AND PE-BACKED FIRMS  
BEFORE AND AFTER THE INVESTMENT EVENT 
PANEL B: BUYOUTS 
EQUATION (5.1) INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES PRE-PE POST-PE 
EQUATION (5.3) EQUATION (5.4) 
Investments(t-1)         
Pre-PE 0.1293        
 (0.127)        
Post-PE   -0.0588      
   (0.121)      
Pooled     -0.0194  0.0481  
     (0.085)  (0.073)  
Investments(t-1)2         
Pre-PE -0.0122        
 (0.029)        
Post-PE   0.0136      
   (0.034)      
Pooled     0.0115  -0.0079  
     (0.025)  (0.020)  
Cash flows         
Pre-PE 0.1313    0.1422  0.1234  
 (0.159)    (0.171)  (0.229)  
Post-PE   0.4798 *** 0.4360 *** 0.4945 ** 
   (0.185)  (0.169)  (0.193)  
Sales         
Pre-PE 0.0188      0.0283  
 (0.015)      (0.020)  
Post-PE   -0.0116    -0.0130  
   (0.017)    (0.019)  
Pooled     0.0089    
     (0.011)    
Debt2         
Pre-PE 0.0007      -0.0090  
 (0.013)      (0.014)  
Post-PE   0.0634 ***   0.0729 *** 
   (0.013)    (0.013)  
Pooled     0.0372 ***   
     (0.014)    
δ     -0.0301  -0.0531  
     (0.078)  (0.088)  
Intercept 0.1525 ** 0.1213 ** 0.1346 * 0.1391 ** 
 (0.063)  (0.055)  (0.071)  (0.060)  
Observations 367  509  815  815  
Firms 65  77  78  78  
Hansen 60.2  67.1  66.9  62.4  
Hansen d.o.f. 194  223  310  308  
Hansen p-value 0.9999  0.9999  0.9999  0.9999  
AR(1) -2.3610 ** -4.0443 *** -4.3393  -4.3466 *** 
AR(2) -0.9557  -0.8584  -0.2537  -0.9328  
The table reports two-step System-GMM estimates with finite sample correction on equations (5.1), (5.3) and (5.4) presented in section 
5.3. The dependent variable is firm i’s investment ratio at time t. The independent variables are defined as: Cash flow is firm i’s 
cash flow in period t, Sales is firm i’s sales during period t, and Debt is firm i’s end-of-period-t total debts. Standard errors 
are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate, respectively, significance levels of <1%, <5% and <10%. AR(1) and AR(2) are 
tests of the null hypothesis of, respectively, no first- or second-order serial correlation. Hansen is a test of the validity of the 
overidentifying restrictions based on the efficient two-step GMM estimator. Investments, Cash flows, and Debt are all normalised by 
beginning of period level of fixed assets. Pre- and Post- row report estimates of coefficients respectively before or after the investment 
event. Pooled rows refer to coefficients which are assumed to remain constant. 
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Interestingly, results reported in Panel B, which focuses on later-stage PE 
investments, depict a markedly different story. Pre-investment cash flow 
sensitivity is never found to be statistically significant at conventional 
confidence levels. This is exactly what we expect from Hypothesis 5.2: 
investment expenditures of buyout firms do not exhibit any significant sign of 
being hampered by cash flow before they are PE-backed. The estimates of 
post-investment cash flow sensitivity are, instead, large and highly statistically 
significant, ranging from 0.4360 (equation 5.1, post investment subsample) to 
0.4945 (equation 5.4). It is also interesting to observe that the coefficient of 
firm’s debt is positive and significant after firms receive PE, evidencing that 
this form of financing dramatically changes firm’s financial structure and, 
accordingly, the relative coefficient in the Euler equation. 
Finally, we move to the estimates of equation (5.5), in which investment-
cash flow sensitivity before and after VC/PE involvement is allowed to change 
across sectors. In Table 5.6, we observe that our results are confirmed to be 
particularly strong in services and mid-tech, while they appear to be less 
significant for low-tech manufacturing firms.  
As regards Hypotheses 5.1 and 5.2, they are confirmed in each sector: 
VC-backed and PE-backed firms exhibit, respectively, strong and weak cash 
flow sensitivity before the investment event. Hypotheses 5.3 and 5.4 are only 
confirmed in general services and mid-tech manufacturing firms. In both cases 
investment-cash flow sensitivity disappears from VC-backed firms and 
emerges in PE-backed firms. Results for low-tech manufacturing seem instead 
to show no significant changes in the significance of cash flow sensitivity 
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across investment. 
TABLE 5.6. 
CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY EVOLUTION FOR DIFFERENT STAGES AND SECTORS 
INDEPENDENT  
VARIABLES 
TOTAL SAMPLE EXPANSION LATER STATE 
Investments(t-1) 0.1495 * 0.1405  -0.0240  
  (0.082)  (0.092)  (0.095)  
Investments(t-1)2 -0.0058  0.0005  0.0146  
  (0.023)  (0.027)  (0.026)  
Cash flows        
0.4193 * 0.5845 * 0.1106  Pre-Inv 
(0.236)  (0.299)  (0.215)  
0.2261  0.0088  0.4168 * 
General 
services 
Post-Inv 
(0.234)  (0.269)  (0.250)  
        
0.5038  0.5906 * -0.1838  Pre-Inv 
(0.319)  (0.358)  (0.588)  
0.8444 ** 0.9160 * 0.5978  
Low-tech 
manufacturing 
Post-Inv 
(0.355)  (0.374)  (0.521)  
        
1.5834 *** 1.4882 *** 0.0601  Pre-Inv 
(0.408)  (0.435)  (0.335)  
-0.0416  0.3038  0.7083 ** 
Mid-tech 
manufacturing 
Post-Inv 
(0.342)  (0.548)  (0.303)  
        
Sales  0.0138  0.0137  0.0108  
  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.013)  
Debt2  0.0262 *** 0.0259 *** 0.0329 *** 
  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.012)  
δ  0.1906 *** 0.1932 *** -0.1126  
  (0.066)  (0.065)  (0.106)  
Intercept  -0.1063  -0.1183 * 0.1925 * 
  (0.069)  (0.065)  (0.113)  
Observations  2,971  2,156  815  
Firms  324  246  78  
Hansen  268.7  237.4  68.7  
Hansen d.o.f.  273  270  259  
Hansen p-value  0.5624  0.9244  0.9999  
AR(1)  -7.2387 *** -5.8854 *** -4.4287 *** 
AR(2)  -0.4212  -0.7506  -0.0807  
The table reports two-step System-GMM estimates with finite sample correction estimates on equation (5.5) presented in 
section 5.3. The dependent variable is firm i’s investment ratio at time t. The independent variables are defined as: Cash 
flow is firm i’s cash flow in period t, Sales is firm i’s sales during period t, and Debt is firm i’s end-of-period-t total debts. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate, respectively, significance levels of <1%, <5% and 
<10%. AR(1) and AR(2) are tests of the null hypothesis of, respectively, no first- or second-order serial correlation. Hansen 
is a test of the validity of the overidentifying restrictions based on the efficient two-step GMM estimator. Investments, Cash 
flows, and Debt are all normalised by beginning of period level of fixed assets. Pre- and Post- row report estimates of 
coefficients respectively before or after the investment event.  
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5.6. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
The aim of this chapter is to assess how the differences of VC and PE 
deals translate into different impacts on firm’s cash flow sensitivity. We 
hypothesise that the participation in growing firms will alleviate the 
dependency on internally generated resources whereas in levered acquisitions, 
popularly known as buyouts, we hypothesise an opposite change. Levered 
transactions are performed in firms that have stable cash flows and non-core 
assets. In such firms no significant sensitivity is expected before the 
acquisition. Nevertheless, after the acquisition the burden imposed by the 
huge amount of debt raised to finance the deal will restrict the access to 
additional external resources to finance additional growth and put managers 
under the pressure of debt repayments, thus removing excessive 
conservatism. 
We test our hypotheses on a firm-level large panel dataset on a 
representative sample of Spanish VC- and PE-backed firms that were subject 
to the initial investment between 1995 and 2004 in low and medium tech 
industries. Firms analysed were at the expansion or buyout stages and 
belonged to general services, low-tech manufacturing and medium-tech 
manufacturing sectors. To have better comparability and to be able to 
compare investment-cash flow sensitivity before and after VC/PE intervention, 
we exclude firms at the start-up stage (because no pre-investment data is 
available) and high tech manufacturing and service firms (where VC is more 
active than PE). 
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Our results confirm that there is a significant reduction in the investment-
cash flow sensitivity in firms at the expansion stage after the VC deal. 
Regarding buyouts, we do not find a significant sensitivity before the 
investment event whereas a positive value is found after the acquisition. 
Results are robust to various specifications of the econometric model. This 
work contributes to the previous literature in several ways. First, it adds to the 
limited literature on investment-cash flow sensitivity in unlisted firms 
(Manigart et al., 2003; Guariglia, 2008; Bertoni et al., 2008; Engel and 
Stiebale, 2009). Regarding PE literature, we analyse a period that is long 
enough to avoid the distortion of the investment-cash low sensitivity due to 
short term economic conditions (as could be the case in Manigart et al., 2003). 
Furthermore, we explore the sensitivity in the most widely invested sectors in 
Europe, when the change was only previously analysed in VC- and non-VC-
backed high tech firms (Bertoni et al., 2008). Finally, we also differentiate the 
role played by VC and PE, as in Engel and Stiebale (2009), but using an 
alternative methodology that allows the inclusion of debt and including at least 
six consecutive observations per firm. Our results are consistent with the 
evidence they provide on firms at the expansion stage, but differ with regards 
to buyouts.  
Our results confirm the role of VC as a tool to fill the equity gap in firms 
at the expansion stage. Nevertheless, it remains to be explained whether the 
positive investment-cash flow sensitivity found after a buyout transaction is 
good or bad for the firm and the economy as a whole. We argue that the lack 
of sensitivity before the acquisition could be caused by the existence of stable 
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stream of cash flows in firms with low debt and excessive non-core assets 
generating below-market return on equity. Nevertheless, it remains to be 
proved whether these firms are able to perform better in the long run after the 
acquisition. 
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Information asymmetry problems impede the SMEs’ access to long term 
financial sources. Therefore, SMEs with growth opportunities are usually 
restricted to a non-optimal choice, which is limited to only two alternatives. 
The first one is to finance growth with short term debt, if this possibility is 
available. The implication of this approach is that the firm adds more risk to 
the average risk faced in any investment, since it is funded with debt, rather 
than equity, and the maturity of the debt is not matching the time required to 
pay back the investment. The latter means that the SME is in deep trouble if 
the creditor chooses not to renew the loans granted. This may happen due to 
external events even if the firm was fully meeting the agreed payments of the 
previous debt. The second alternative is to limit growth to the owners’ wealth 
plus the internally generated resources, which could limit firm growth and 
involve not taking advantage of growth opportunities. 
An additional alternative is found with the emergence of VC, which is a 
long term source of external equity for innovative, fast-growing SMEs at the 
seed, start-up or expansion stage. In addition to funding, VC investors also 
provide value-added services, among which contacts with investment bankers 
to access other sources of money should be highlighted. As a result, the 
natural dependency of investments to cash flow could be reduced, or even 
eliminated, when SMEs approach VC firms to fund their investments.  
But VC has evolved since the 1980s to investments in large and mature 
firms, with a new term, namely Private Equity, being widely accepted. Those 
firms do not experience the same problems when accessing long term sources 
of funds. Some of them were even listed on the stock exchange before the 
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entry of the external investor. Mature firms generate stable cash flows and do 
not have many growth opportunities with positive net present values. 
Nevertheless, when ownership is dispersed, managers may choose to over-
invest to increase the size of the firm beyond optimal levels. Different 
problems arise in closely-held mature firms, because owner-managers may 
become conservative over time, keeping large inventories and cash holdings, 
at the cost of reducing the return on assets. In both cases, the investments 
should not be significantly related to the cash flow available. The dependency 
may arise after the entry of a PE investor as the result of the enhanced asset 
management. 
Most of the literature about the investment-cash flow sensitivity focuses 
on listed and large firms. From the perspective of VC and PE, just a few papers 
have addressed this issue so far and they show mixed results. Our research 
pretends to contribute to filling this gap.  
The main aim of this research is to identify the effects of VC and PE 
institutions on the investee firms. Focusing on the impact exerted on the 
investment-cash flow sensitivity, we expect different effects on that 
relationship since VC and PE play different roles in the investee firms. Whereas 
VC supplies financing funds as well as non-financial services to growing SMEs, 
without access to additional external resources, PE firms are involved in highly 
leveraged deals on mature, large firms with stable cash flows and non-core 
assets.  
Before the investment event, growth opportunities of SMEs basically are 
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financed by internally generated funds. This investment dependency might be 
reduced by the presence of VC investors not only by the financial resources 
provided but also by the value-added that increases the firms’ credibility. In 
the case of PE transactions, the effect of investment dependency on cash flow 
is the opposite. In addition to a high level of cash flows, mature, large firms 
have access to external financial resources since they are less affected by 
information asymmetries. After a PE deal, the high levels of debt restrain the 
internally generated funds to face the burden of leverage and restrict the 
access to additional external financial funds.  
The central hypothesis is tested in three different empirical exercises. We 
focus on unlisted Spanish firms at the expansion and later stages, which do 
not have access to capital markets, to be better able to identify the 
investment-cash flow sensitivity. The VC and PE investments recorded in Spain 
were obtained from the Spanish Private Equity and Venture Capital Association 
(ASCRI), and the accounting information of investee firms was taken from the 
AMADEUS Database. Additionally, a one-by-one matched sample of similar 
SMEs with no VC involvement was randomly selected from the AMADEUS 
Database. 
The empirical results confirm our central research hypothesis. First, we 
analyse the investment dependency on cash flow in a sample of Spanish 
manufacturing SMEs at the expansion stage that received a VC investment 
over the period 1995-2007 and on a one-by-one matched sample of similar 
SMEs that did not receive VC in that period. Our analysis is based on the Q 
Model of investment which considered the availability of investment 
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opportunities, proxy by Tobin’s q, as well as internally generated funds, 
measured by cash flow (alongside other control variables). For the purpose of 
this empirical work, we used a yearly average EBITDA multiple as proxy of 
Tobin’s q. We also use the volume of intangible assets as a proxy of growth 
opportunities since our sample includes only unlisted firms. After controlling 
for growth opportunities, size, age and sector, we find evidence of a positive 
and significant relationship between investment and cash flow, with the 
manufacturing firms that were later subject to a VC investment showing a 
significantly greater coefficient. 
The previous results are confirmed in our second empirical work. We 
analyse to what extent VC investors reduce the investment dependency on 
cash flow in a sample of Spanish SMEs at the expansion stage that receive a 
VC investment over the period 1995-2004 and on a one-by-one matched 
sample of similar SMEs with no VC involvement. A positive and significant 
relationship between investment and cash flow is found in all firms before the 
VC investment event. After the investment, VC-backed firms exhibit a 
significantly lower investment dependency on cash flow. This result is robust 
even when the sample is divided by activity sector.  
On a third empirical work, the different role played by VC and PE 
investors is identified by analysing the investment-cash flow sensitivity in 
investee firms operating in low and medium technology firms, before and after 
the investment event. The analysis is carried out on a sample of Spanish low 
and medium tech manufacturing and services firms that were invested in 
between 1995 and 2004 at the expansion (VC) or buyout stages (PE). The 
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‘structural break’ caused by VC and PE investments is tested through several 
specifications of an Euler equation. As in the previous empirical work, a 
significant reduction in the investment dependency on cash flows is found in 
firms at the expansion stage after the initial VC investment event. 
Nevertheless, firms that were the object of a buyout deal do not exhibit a 
significant relationship between investment and cash flow, whereas 
investment-cash flow sensitivity emerges after the transaction. 
This work contributes to the previous literature in several ways. First, 
regarding VC, we provide an empirical financial justification to explain VC 
intervention in SMEs exhibiting a high investment dependency on cash flow. 
Second, it adds to the limited literature on investment-cash flow sensitivity in 
unlisted firms. Third, the new evidence is in accordance with the agency 
theory (VC investments) and the free cash flow theory (PE investments), thus 
contributing to the clarification of the mixed results found in the scant VC 
literature on this issue. Fourth, we explore the sensitivity in the most widely 
invested sectors in Europe, which include low and medium technology sectors 
such as manufacturing and general services. Finally, this is the first study 
about the investment sensitivity to cash flow in VC- and non-VC-backed 
Spanish SMEs at the expansion stage and Spanish PE-backed mature firms at 
the buyout stage. As a final contribution, we find that both static and dynamic 
approaches lead to similar results. The former is usually conducted due to the 
lack of a sufficient number of time series observations, 
Regarding our limitations, the sample size of buyout firms is limited to 
only 78 firms for which we have the minimum desirable number of time series 
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observations. Similarly, regarding VC investments, the results found on 
technology, media and telecommunications (TMT), when this group is 
analysed separately, could be affected by the limited number of firms 
available.  
For future research, it is necessary to check the increased dependency of 
investment to cash flow found after a buyout deal performed by PE firms and 
the effect of that dependency on returns over time. Similarly, we found 
negative signs in the relative investment-cash flow dependency of VC-backed 
TMT firms. It should be important to test whether this result is caused by the 
distorting effects of subsidies that those firms obtain from public authorities. 
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The Venture Capital (VC, hereafter) and Private Equity (PE, hereafter) 
industry in Spain has been represented, managed and defended by the 
Spanish Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (ASCRI). In addition to 
the promotion on the sector and the help provided in the creation of VC firms, 
ASCRI conducts surveys and publishes reports, bulletins, books and surveys, 
edited or financed by the Association, alone or in collaboration with other 
institutions.  
In order to continuously monitor the VC and PE activities, ASCRI requires 
updated information about the industry. All the documents and publications of 
ASCRI are based on the list of VC and PE investments carried out in Spain. 
This list was originally collected by José Martí Pellón, Professor of Financial 
Management at the Universidad Complutense de Madrid since 1986. Since 
2001, this effort is jointly conducted with www.webcapitalriesgo.com, in close 
collaboration with ASCRI. A detailed survey is carried out every year on all 
active Spanish VC and PE firms, with the result being a yearly activity report 
published by ASCRI and www.webcapitalriesgo.com.  
The types of institutions considered include independent VC funds, 
independent PE funds, corporate VC funds, bank-owned VC firms, 
governmental VC firms, and university seed funds. 
The VC and PE transactions are identified from the list that includes all 
investments performed. Additional data are collected from press releases 
published by participants in the VC or PE investment, references found in 
printed media and/or on the Internet, and consultations by the Centre for 
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Management Buy-out and Private Equity Research (CMBOR) on commercial 
databases that track all kinds of corporate acquisitions and sales.  
The data collection process allows the investments to be distinguished by 
different stages of development. VC activities involve the financing of firms at 
the seed, start-up and expansion stages. Investments in either the seed or the 
start-up stage are also referred to simply as early stage investments. Later 
stage investments include turnaround, replacement and buyout transactions in 
mature firms older than five years at the time of funding.  
The investments are also classified by the industry sector. This 
classification includes 18 categories, namely computer related, electronics, 
industrial products and services, consumer related, agriculture/fishing, energy 
and resources, chemicals and materials, construction, health care, hospitality-
leisure, communications, biotechnology, industrial automation, financial 
services, other services, transportation, other, and other manufacturing. 
Accounting information of the investee firms is taken from the AMADEUS 
Database. Firms are excluded if it were not possible to complete data for any 
of the following reasons. In some cases the accounting information is 
unavailable since firms do not comply with the obligation to report their 
accounts in the Official Trade Register. On the other hand, when firms are 
acquired by some other firm before reaching the third year, it is difficult to 
consider them as a separate entity. Firms are also excluded if they disappear 
without reporting accounts to the Official Trade Register, or only for one or 
two of the years. 
VC AND PE ON INVESTMENT-CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY OF SPANISH SMES 
ANNEX 
 203 
Once investee firms are identified, firms with no VC funding and 
comparable one-by-one with the VC/PE-backed firms are selected. 
Comparable firms are randomly chosen from the AMADEUS Database, 
matching the sector, by means of the NACE Rev2 code (4-digit code), the 
number of employees, the revenues, the asset volumes, and the age, 
whenever possible, in the year before the initial VC investment was 
performed, as well as its location in a geographical area with a similar level of 
development, whenever possible. 
